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I	hereby	declare	that	this	thesis	has	not	been	and	will	not	be	submitted	in	whole	or	in	
part	to	another	University	for	the	award	of	any	other	degree.		
This	 is	 a	 thesis	 in	 papers	 style,	 and	 Chapter	 3	 of	 this	 thesis	 is	 co-authored	with	my	
supervisor	Prof.	Maria	Savona;	I	wish	to	acknowledge	her	contribution	in	drafting	the	
introduction	 and	 conclusion	 of	 the	 Chapter.	 The	 Hirschman-Linder	 hypothesis	 has	
been	put	forward	in	previous	work	by	Prof.	Savona,	as	properly	cited	in	the	Capter	3	of	
this	 thesis;	 however	 the	 expansion	 of	 this	 conjecture	 to	 natural	 resource	 industries	
and	the	empirical	testing	of	it	is	the	outcome	of	my	work	for	this	thesis.		
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Thesis	summary	
The	 thesis	explores	how	the	 fragmentation	of	production	and	 the	 subsequent	emergence	of	
Global	 Value	 Chains	 (GVCs)	 have	 changed	 countries’	 and	 firms’	 chances	 to	 benefit	 from	
international	trade	and	attain	economic	development.		
In	the	first	Chapter	we	use	inter-country	input-output	(ICIO)	tables	from	the	OECD	and	WTO	to	
revisit	the	role	of	trade	specialisation	taking	a	value	added,	rather	than	gross	export,	approach	
that	 allows	 to	 identify	 countries’	 domestic	 contribution	 to	 trade	 specialisation	 and	 export	
performance.	I	explore	these	issues	implementing	the	generalised	method	of	moments	(GMM)	
to	estimate	an	autoregressive	model.	In	doing	this,	we	contribute	to	the	literature	on	trade	in	
value	 added,	 as	 well	 as	 on	 structural	 change	 and	 the	 role	 of	 manufacturing	 for	 economic	
growth.		
We	 find	 that	 natural	 resources	 are	 not,	 unsurprisingly,	 a	 beneficial	 specialisation	 pattern.	
Specialisation	in	manufacturing	has	a	different	effect	depending	on	the	technology	level;	low-
tech	 manufacturing	 seems	 to	 exert	 a	 negative	 effect	 on	 countries	 trade	 performance.	 In	
contrast,	 high-tech	 manufacturing	 and	 knowledge	 intensive	 business	 services	 (KIBS)	 do	 not	
have	strong	negative	effects	in	the	long	run,	while	we	detect	a	positive	effect	during	the	years	
of	the	crisis.		
The	second	paper	explores	a	related	issue,	focusing	in	particular	on	the	relationship	between	
domestic	backward	linkages	and	export	in	value	added.	Taking	stock	on	the	findings	of	the	first	
paper,	 with	 natural	 resources	 as	 a	 detrimental	 specialisation	 pattern,	 we	 assess	 whether	
backward	linkages	emanating	from	this	sector	can	spur	export	 in	other	sectors,	namely	high-
tech	manufacturing	and	KIBS.	We	use	the	same	data	as	the	first	Chapter	and	also	implement	a	
system	GMM,	 finding	 that	a	 large	 intermediate	domestic	demand	 from	the	natural	 resource	
sector	has	a	positive	effect	on	the	export	of	domestic	value	added	of	both	KIBS	and	high-tech	
manufacturing.	These	results	are	strong	and	significant	both	for	the	mining	and	the	agriculture	
sectors.	 One	 of	 the	 main	 policy	 implications	 of	 these	 results	 is	 that	 countries	 with	 a	 large	
endowment	 in	 natural	 resources	 can	 foster	 domestic	 backward	 linkages	 to	 pursue	 export	
diversification.		
Finally,	the	third	Chapter	studies	the	linkages	in	GVCs	at	the	buyer-supplier	level	exploring	how	
buyer	supplier	 relationships	can	affect	exporters	capabilities	 in	Colombia.	We	combine	three	
datasets:	one	with	 information	on	buyer-suppliers	matches,	 from	 the	Colombian	Customs,	 a	
second	dataset	with	the	financial	statement	of	the	exporters	and	a	third	one	the	complexity	of	
the	traded	products	computed	by	the	Atlas	of	Complexity	compiled	by	Harvard	University.	We	
then	construct	measures	of	market	power	and	buyer-supplier	dependence	to	study	how	these	
are	 related	 to	 the	 complexity	 of	 each	 relationship	 and	 the	 capabilities	 of	 the	 Colombian	
exporters.	 In	 line	with	 the	 growing	 literature	 on	 trade	 and	 firm	 heterogeneity,	we	 find	 that	
complex	buyers	 tend	to	engage	with	complex	suppliers,	 trading	a	 larger	number	of	products	
than	less	complex	buyer-supplier	pairs.		
Moreover,	we	find	that	the	buyer’s	market	power	and	the	buyer-supplier	mutual	dependence	
are	associated	with	a	higher	complexity	of	the	products	traded,	suggesting	that	large	buyers	in	
intense	relationship	tend	to	favour	suppliers’	efforts	for	product	upgrading.	These	results	lend	
support	 to	 the	well-established	 literature	 on	 GVCs,	 confirming	 that	 power	 relationships	 are	
related	to	exporters’	performance,	especially	in	terms	of	sophistication.	We	contribute	to	this	
literature	by	offering	 a	quantitative	 approach	 that	 relies	on	administrative	data,	 rather	 than	
surveys	and	distinguishes	different	kinds	of	power,	based	on	its	source;	within	this	framework	
we	show	that	different	kinds	of	power	are	associated	with	different	export	outcomes.		
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1.	Introduction	
One	 of	 the	 most	 salient	 consequences	 of	 globalisation	 is	 the	 fragmentation	 of	
production	across	countries	and	the	emergence	of	global	value	chains	(GVCs):	this	has	
led	 to	 a	 significant	 share	 of	 countries’	 exports	 consisting	 of	 imported	 inputs	 (OECD	
2013a;	Baldwin	2012).		
It	has	been	argued	that	a	key	factor	in	shaping	countries’	economic	performance	is	not	
whether	 GVC	 integration	 is	 beneficial	 (or	 not)	 per	 se,	 but	 rather	 the	 way	 in	 which	
countries	 (and	 firms)	 enter	 GVCs	 (Kaplinsky	 2004;	 Mcmillan	 et	 al.	 2014;	 Baldwin	 &	
Lopez-Gonzalez	2015).		
On	the	one	hand,	at	the	macro	level	the	mode	of	insertion	in	GVCs	will	depend	on	the	
relationship	 between	 domestic	 production	 and	 export	 dynamics,	 which	 has	 become	
less	 straightforward:	 the	 divide	 between	 the	 two	 has	 in	 fact	 widened	 as	 countries’	
exports	 are	 increasingly	 the	 outcome	 of	 production	 activities	 happening	 in	 other	
countries	(Baldwin	2011).	
Therefore,	 it	 becomes	 necessary	 to	 reappraise	 this	 relationship	 and	 to	 establish	
whether	differences	in	countries’	productive	structure	are	a	determinant	of	countries’	
overall	 performance	 in	 GVCs	 and	 the	 sectors	 in	 which	 they	 are	 more	 likely	 to	
participate.		
On	 the	 other	 hand,	 at	 the	 micro	 level	 there	 is	 now	 a	 large	 body	 of	 evidence	
emphasising	 the	 importance	of	power	 relationships	within	GVCs,	 leading	 to	different	
kinds	 of	 governance	 and	 economic	 outcomes	 (Gereffi	 et	 al.	 2005;	 Humphrey	 and	
Schmitz	2002).	However,	the	scholarship	has	not	so	far	put	forward	a	measurable	and	
comparable	 understanding	 of	 the	 concept	 of	 power	 and	 its	 relationship	 with	 firms’	
ability	to	improve	their	position	in	GVCs.		
So	it	seems	that	countries’	domestic	features,	their	productive	structure	in	particular,	
and	 the	 characteristics	 of	 the	 specific	 GVCs	 segment	 being	 entered	 are	 important	
factors	to	be	studied	in	assessing	the	benefits	of	GVC	participation.	This	thesis	explores	
this	overarching	issue	at	different	levels	of	analysis.		
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Value	 chains	 represent	 all	 the	 activities	 involved	 to	 bring	 a	 product	 or	 service	 from	
conception,	 through	production	 to	delivery	 to	 final	 consumers	 (Kaplinsky	and	Morris	
2000).	Since	 the	 late	1980s,	 trade	 liberalisation	and	 the	 ICT	 revolution	have	 reduced	
not	only	the	costs	of	transport	and	communication,	but	have	also	made	coordination	
of	the	different	productive	activities	much	easier	and	cheaper	(Baldwin	2012).	This	has	
led	 to	 the	 increasing	 fragmentation	 of	 production	 across	 countries,	 making	 value	
chains	global	(Gereffi	1994).		
Now	that	production	 is	 fragmented	across	countries,	 it	has	been	argued	that	 it	 is	no	
longer	 necessary	 to	 develop	 the	 full	 set	 of	 capabilities	 and	 technology	 necessary	 to	
produce	a	particular	good;	 these	may	now	very	well	 come	 from	abroad	 through	 the	
import	of	intermediates	and	technology	(Baldwin	2011).	The	main	implication	of	this	is	
that	countries	no	longer	specialise	in	a	sector	as	a	whole,	but	in	part	of	its	value	chain	
(Baldwin	2012).		
This	has	sparked	some	optimism	with	 respect	 to	 the	potential	 for	new	specialisation	
paths	 for	 countries	 (OECD	 2013b).	 Developing	 economies	 can	 achieve	 these	 by	
entering	GVC	segments	based	on	their	factor	endowments,	and	then	upgrade	to	more	
value	added	intensive	activities	within	the	chain.		
According	to	this	view,	GVCs	would	therefore	provide	countries	with	the	opportunity	
to	diversify	their	productive	structure.		
Structural	 change,	 i.e.	 long-term	 shifts	 in	 the	 composition	 of	 countries’	 economic	
activity	 and	 the	 relative	 importance	 of	 sectors,	 has	 been	 a	 central	 topic	 of	 the	
literature	on	economic	development	for	decades	(Bah	2011;	Imbs	and	Wacziarg	2003).	
While	it	is	widely	recognised	that	changes	in	economies’	structure	are	tightly	linked	to	
economic	growth,	we	also	know	that	these	patterns	have	been	heterogeneous	across	
countries	with	different	outcomes	(de	Vries	et	al.	2017;	Timmer	et	al.	2014).		
The	 literature	 around	 countries’	 specialisation	 trajectory	 has	 often	 discussed	 export	
specialisation	as	an	expression	of	the	underlying	productive	structure	(Hausmann	and	
Klinger	2006;	Hausmann	et	al.	2007;	Hidalgo	et	al.	2007).		
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The	 international	 fragmentation	 of	 production	 has	 changed	 this.	 By	 joining	 GVCs,	
countries	 can	 now	 develop	 an	 export	 specialisation	 in	 a	 given	 sector,	 without	
experiencing	changes	of	 the	 same	magnitude	 in	 their	domestic	productive	 structure.	
This	is	because	much	of	what	countries	export	can	be	the	outcome	of	imported	inputs	
produced	abroad.		
In	 line	with	 this,	 and	despite	many	 countries	 joining	GVCs	over	 the	past	decade,	we	
observe	very	diverse	outcomes	in	developing	countries.	This	suggests	that	the	manner	
in	 which	 such	 GVC	 integration	 takes	 place	 is	 crucial	 for	 countries’	 development	
(Kaplinsky	2004;	McMillan	et	al.	2014).	
The	 relationship	 between	 GVC	 participation,	 structural	 change	 and,	 ultimately,	
economic	 development	 is	 in	 fact	 not	 straightforward.	 It	 is	 likely	 to	 be	 related	 to	
different	aspects,	both	at	the	macro-,	meso-	and	micro-level.		
In	this	thesis	we	explore	in	particular	the	three	following	issues:	
● First,	at	 the	macro-level,	do	different	export	 specialisation	 trajectories	 impact	
countries’	 trade	performance,	 in	a	GVC	context?	To	answer	 this	question,	we	
revisit	 the	 link	 between	 countries’	 domestic	 productive	 structure,	 trade	
specialisation	 and	 performance	 in	 the	 context	 of	 the	 international	
fragmentation	of	production.	We	 find	 that	 increasing	 specialisation	 in	natural	
resources	 and	 low-tech	 manufacturing	 has	 a	 negative	 impact	 on	 countries’	
export	 performance,	 which	 we	 discuss	 in	 relation	 to	 the	 on-going	 debate	
around	structural	change	and	industrialisation.		
● Second,	 as	 we	 find	 that	 specialisation	 in	 certain	 sectors,	 such	 as	 natural	
resources,	can	be	detrimental	to	countries’	economic	performance,	we	explore	
another	aspect	of	the	relationship	between	domestic	production	structure	and	
GVC	 participation.	 Focusing	 on	 countries	 with	 a	 specialisation	 in	 natural	
resources,	 we	 look	 at	 inter-sectoral	 backward	 linkages	 as	 a	 platform	 for	 the	
emergence	 of	 exports	 in	 new	 sectors.	 Specifically	 we	 test	 the	 following	 new	
conjecture:	 can	 the	 intermediated	 domestic	 demand	 of	 natural	 resource	
industries	 spur	 exports	 from	 both	 high-tech	 manufacturing	 and	 knowledge	
intensive	business	services?	
● Third,	 GVCs	 take	 place	 at	 the	 micro-level	 in	 the	 form	 of	 buyer-supplier	
relationships	 in	 which	 power	 asymmetries	may	 influence	 the	 possibilities	 for	
firms	 to	 introduce	 new,	more	 sophisticated	 products.	 So,	 is	 power	 in	 buyer-
supplier	relationships	associated	with	export	sophistication	and	upgrading?	We	
contribute	 to	 the	 literature	 on	 power	 in	 GVCs	 providing	 new	 quantitative	
evidence	at	the	micro	level.		
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The	remainder	of	this	section	addresses	these	three	questions	in	turn,	highlighting	the	
thesis’s	contribution	through	each	paper,	which	constitutes	a	Chapter	each.	
1.1	Trade	Specialisation	in	Global	Value	Chains.	
GVCs	have	indeed	made	it	easier	to	produce	and/or	export	new	products	and	services,	
but	 they	 have	 also	 led	 to	 a	 growing	 gap	 between	 a	 country’s	 exports	 and	 its	 actual	
contribution,	 in	 value	 added	 terms,	 to	 the	 production	 process	 (Baldwin	 2011).	
Crucially,	 opening	 the	 global	 economy	 has	 led	 countries	 to	 different	 productive	
trajectories,	yielding	widely	different	outcomes	(McMillan	et	al.	2014).		
Different	specialisation	patterns	may	have	different	growth	potentials	 (Amable	2000;	
Matsuyama	1992)	due	 to	differences	 in	 income	and	price	elasticities	of	 the	products	
exported	(Thirlwall	1979;	Cimoli	et	al.	2009)	as	well	as	endogenous	structural	change	
(Fagerberg	1988;	Uchida	and	Cook	2005).	
The	 scholarship	 has	 particularly	 emphasised	 the	 positive	 relationship	 between	
manufacturing	 and	 economic	 growth	 (Szirmai	 and	 Verspagen	 2015;	 Szirmai	 2012;	
Matsuyama	2008;	Rodrik	2013).		
There	are,	however,	growing	concerns	around	this	view,	 in	the	current	context.	First,	
developing	 countries	 seem	 to	 be	 specialising	 away	 from	 manufacturing	 towards	
services	 at	 increasingly	 low	 income	 levels	 (Rodrik	 2015).	 Second,	 Szirmai	 and	
Verspagen	(2015)	cast	 further	doubt	on	whether	manufacturing	 is	still	working	as	an	
engine	 of	 growth,	 proposing	 evidence	 that	 the	 relationship	 between	manufacturing	
specialisation	and	economic	growth	has	weakened	in	the	last	two	decades	and	seems	
to	be	conditional	on	countries’	human	capital	supply.		
Unlike	manufacturing,	services	are	not	usually	considered	to	exert	positive	effects	on	
economic	growth,	despite	 the	 fact	 that	structural	change	towards	 this	 sector	at	high	
levels	of	income	is	an	empirical	regularity	(Bah	2011;	Rodrik	2016b).		
However,	as	the	fragmentation	of	production	has	expanded,	including	the	off-shoring	
of	services,	decoupling	provision	and	consumption	of	services,	a	growing	literature	has	
put	forward	several	case	studies	showing	that	the	off-shoring	of	service	activities	may	
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be	 a	 new	 development	 avenue	 (Gereffi	 and	 Fernandez-Stark	 2010;	 Fernandez-Stark	
and	Gereffi	2011;	Hernandez	et	al.	2014).		
While	the	debate	around	manufacturing	and	services	as	an	engine	of	growth	has	been	
on-going	for	a	long	time	(Di	Meglio	et	al.	2018;	Szirmai	2012),	much	less	is	known	on	
the	 dynamic,	 rather	 than	 static,	 effects	 of	 changes	 in	 the	 production	 structure	 of	
countries.	de	Vries	et	al.	 (2017)	 recently	emphasised	how	developing	countries	have	
managed	 to	 move	 away	 from	 an	 agriculture-based	 economic	 structure	 towards	
services,	which	 led	 to	 a	 one-off	 static	 gain	 but	 failed	 to	 trigger	 a	 long-term	positive	
productivity	dynamic.		
A	 value	added	approach	 is	particularly	 relevant	 to	understanding	 the	 implications	of	
structural	change	in	light	of	the	emergence	of	GVCs.		
First,	the	gross	exports	(or	output)	of	a	country	may	consist	of	value	added	imported	
from	 other	 countries;	 this	 makes	 it	 harder	 to	 clearly	 appraise	 countries’	 domestic	
productive	structure.		
Second,	 value	 added	 produced	 by	 a	 given	 sector	may	 be	 exported	 indirectly	 in	 the	
gross	export	of	another	sector,	which	again	would	give	biased	perception	of	countries’	
domestic	productive	structure.	This	is	likely	to	be	particularly	true	for	business	services	
that	 are	 often	 important	 in	 increasing	 other	 sectors’	 performance,	 providing	 crucial	
inputs	to	the	production	process	(Guerrieri	and	Meliciani	2005;	Meliciani	and	Savona	
2014).	
So,	 a	 first	 contribution	 of	 this	 thesis	 is	 to	 revisit	 the	 link	 between	 economic	
performance	 and	 specialisation,	 contributing	 to	 the	 debate	 on	 premature	
deindustrialisation	and	structural	change	towards	services	in	a	GVC	framework.		
Second,	we	also	 study	dynamic,	 rather	 than	 static	and	one-off,	 effects	of	 changes	 in	
countries’	 specialisation.	 In	 doing	 so,	 we	 also	 propose	 a	 new	 application	 for	 input-
output	measures	to	compute	specialisation	indexes.		
We	wish	 therefore	 to	 study	whether	 the	acceleration	 in	different	 specialisations	has	
different	 impacts	on	countries’	export	growth.	 In	order	 to	bring	 this	 to	 the	data	and	
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fully	 account	 for	 the	 emergence	 of	 GVCs	 and	 the	 subsequent	 fragmentation	 of	
production,	we	use	the	OECD	inter-country	input-output	(ICIO)	tables	for	64	countries	
and	33	sectors	covering	the	period	1995-2011.		
We	trace	value	added	embodied	in	countries’	exports	back	to	the	originating	sectors,	
and	identify	countries’	own	contribution	to	their	gross	exports,	i.e.	the	domestic	value	
added.	We	use	this	measure	to	also	compute	revealed	comparative	advantages	with	
Balassa	 indexes	 in	 value	 added;	 these	 reflect,	 we	 argue,	 countries’	 domestic	
productive	structure	more	accurately	than	their	gross	export	homologues.		
We	perform	our	analysis	with	an	autoregressive	dynamic	panel,	using	a	system	GMM	
to	 deal	 with	 potential	 endogeneity	 due	 to	 the	 simultaneous	 effects	 between	 trade	
specialisation	and	export	performance.		
We	 find	 that	 countries	 increasing	 their	 specialisation	 in	 low-tech	manufacturing	 and	
natural	 resources	 experience	 a	 decrease	 in	 the	 domestic	 value	 added	 embodied	 in	
their	 exports.	We	detect	 a	positive	effect	of	 increases	 in	 specialisation	 in	both	high-
tech	manufacturing	and	knowledge	 intensive	services,	although	only	during	the	crisis	
period.		
The	 general	 implication	 of	 these	 results	 is	 that	 countries’	 production	 and	 export	
structure	 remain	 a	 determinant	 of	 their	 economic	 performance,	 and	 countries	
specialising	in	GVCs	in	different	sectors	will	fare	differently.		
The	Chapter	provides	a	thorough	discussion	of	these	results	in	relation	to	the	debate	
around	 premature	 deindustrialisation,	 and	 argues	 that	 specialising	 in	 low-tech	
manufacturing	to	then	move	onto	high-tech	activities	may	no	longer	be	a	viable	option	
for	developing	countries.		
Our	 results	 on	 the	 negative	 effect	 of	 an	 acceleration	 of	 the	 specialisation	 in	 natural	
resources	on	countries’	export	performance	are	consistent	with	a	very	large	literature	
regarding	 developing	 countries	 with	 such	 a	 productive	 structure	 being	 bound	 to	
experience	stagnant	or	low	growth.	The	third	chapter	of	this	thesis	contributes	to	this	
literature	 and	 specifically	 to	 the	 view	 of	 natural	 resources	 as	 an	 enclave	 sector	
hindering	the	emergence	of	other	sectors.		
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2.2	Revisiting	the	Natural	Resource	“Curse”	in	the	Context	of	Business	Services	
Trade:	Enclave	or	High-Development	Backward	Linkages?	
A	 common	 way	 of	 referring	 to	 the	 empirical	 association	 between	 natural	 resource	
abundance	and	disappointing	economic	performance	 is	 the	“natural	 resource	curse”,	
first	put	forward	by	Corden	(1982).		
Around	this,	a	fierce	debate	has	sparked	in	the	literature	with	views	both	in	favour	of	
this	view	(Auty	1986,	1987;	Sachs	and	Warner	1997;	Venables	2016;	Davis	and	Tilton	
2008)	 and	 opposing	 it	 (Lederman	 and	 Maloney	 2012;	 Wright	 and	 Czelusta	 2004;	
Brunnschweiler	and	Bulte	2008;	Bloch	and	Owusu	2012).	
One	 of	 the	 crucial	 aspects	 of	 this	 debate	 is	 the	 link	 between	 abundance	 in	 natural	
resources	 and	 the	 potential	 for	 export	 diversification.	 This	 is	 again	 related	 to	 the	
structure	of	the	domestic	economy,	and	specifically	inter-sectoral	linkages	originating	
from	natural	resource	industries.	
The	notion	of	 a	 specialisation	 in	natural	 resources	halting	 the	development	of	other	
sectors	and,	ultimately,	export	diversification	relies	on	two	theoretical	explanations.		
First,	 a	 large	 natural	 resource	 sector	 would	 hinder	 other	 sectors	 through	 an	
appreciation	 in	 the	 exchange	 rate	 reducing	 competitiveness	 of	 other	 tradable	
(manufactured)	products	and	draw	 investments	away	 from	non-NR	 intensive	 sectors	
(Corden	1984;	Harding	and	Venables	2016;	Venables	2016).		
This	view	was	first	put	forward	based	on	the	experience	of	the	Netherlands	after	the	
discovery	 of	 a	 large	 endowment	 in	 natural	 gas	 that	 negatively	 impacted	 exports	 in	
other	sectors,	which	is	why	this	mechanism	is	often	referred	to	as	the	Dutch	disease.		
Second,	 and	more	broadly,	 natural	 resource	 industries	 are	 often	 considered	 enclave	
sectors,	with	 little	 to	no	 inter-sectoral	 linkages	with	 the	 rest	of	 the	economy	 (Heeks	
1998;	 Matsuyama	 1992;	 Vogel	 1994).	 The	 importance	 of	 such	 linkages	 stems	 from	
Hirschman's	 (1958)	seminal	contribution	on	the	 importance	of	 inter-sectoral	 linkages	
to	provide	input	(forward)	to	and	require	output	(backward)	from	other	sectors.		
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In	this	view,	the	growth	in	a	large	sector,	well	connected	with	the	rest	of	the	economy	
through	 backward	 and	 forward	 linkages,	 would	 also	 lift	 other	 sectors,	 through	 an	
unbalanced	development	strategy.		
More	 recently,	 and	 relatedly	 with	 this	 literature,	 Hausmann	 and	 Klinger	 (2006)	 and	
Hidalgo	et	al.	 (2007)	have	adopted	a	different	approach	 to	 look	at	 linkages	between	
sectors.	Instead	of	input-output	flows,	they	use	the	probability	of	two	products	being	
exported	by	the	same	countries	to	proxy	for	similarity	in	capabilities	requirements	and	
create	a	product	space.	They	find	that	not	all	products	are	equally	connected	to	each	
other;	 they	 also	 conclude	 that	 natural	 resource	 sectors	 tend	 to	 produce	 low-
complexity	products	that	are	unlikely	to	lead	to	the	emergence	of	other	industries.		
Based	on	this	approach,	Hausmann	et	al.	(2008)	argue	that	forward	linkages	stemming	
from	the	natural	resource	sector	would	not	be	a	suitable	avenue	for	fostering	export	
diversification	 towards	 downstream	 manufacturing	 activities	 in	 resource	 abundant	
countries.		
Most	of	 the	 literature	has	 indeed	focused	on	forward	 linkages	from	natural	 resource	
industries	to	the	manufacturing	sector,	debating	around	the	viability	of	resource	based	
industrialisation	as	a	development	strategy	for	countries	abundant	in	natural	resources	
(Auty	1987;	Roemer	1979;	Massol	and	Banal-Estañol	2014;	Morris	et	al.	2012).		
The	 third	 chapter	 of	 this	 thesis	 contributes	 to	 this	 debate	 by	 exploring	 a	 different	
strategy,	 i.e.	 whether	 countries	 with	 a	 large	 endowment	 in	 natural	 resources	 could	
exploit	 backward	 linkages	 to	 foster	 the	 export	 of	 the	 knowledge	 intensive	 business	
services	or	high-tech	manufacturing	that	provide	domestic	inputs	for	the	extraction	of	
natural	resources.		
Moreover	we	wish	to	test	whether	this	potential	effect	is	stronger	for	countries	with	a	
specialisation	in	natural	resources.	This	is	because,	first,	such	countries	would	benefit	
from	 a	 way	 of	 exploiting	 their	 specialisation	 to	 foster	 exports	 in	 other	 sectors	 and	
specialise	 away	 from	 natural	 resource	 industries.	 Second,	 countries	 with	 a	
specialisation	 in	 natural	 resources	 are	 also	 more	 likely	 to	 have	 a	 large	 domestic	
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intermediate	 demand	 stemming	 from	 this	 industry	 and	 thus	 be	 able	 to	 exploit	 this	
mechanism	to	a	greater	extent	than	other	countries.		
To	test	this	set	of	hypotheses	we	implement	an	autoregressive	panel	analysis	with	the	
ICIO	data	 from	the	OECD.	Consistent	with	Chapter	2,	our	measures	are	computed	 in	
value	 added	 terms:	 this	 is	 to	 take	 into	 account	 the	 emergent	 GVCs	 and	 the	 issues	
discussed	 in	 the	 previous	 section,	 i.e.	 export	 specialisation	 based	 on	 value	 added	
(rather	 than	 gross	 exports)	 is	 more	 likely	 to	 represent	 the	 underlying	 domestic	
structure,	 and	 services	 often	 tend	 to	 be	 exported	 embodied	 in	 other	manufactured	
products.		
We	 find	 that	 backward	 linkages	 from	 the	 natural	 resource	 sector	 can	 indeed	 foster	
exports	in	knowledge	intensive	business	services.	We	also	test	our	main	conjecture	for	
the	export	of	high-tech	manufacturing,	 finding	that	 in	 this	case	the	positive	effect	of	
backward	linkages	from	natural	resource	industries	vanishes	when	we	control	for	the	
productivity	of	this	sector.		
This	 suggests	 that	 relying	 on	 the	 sheer	 strength	 of	 backward	 linkages	 from	 natural	
resource	 industries	 may	 be	 a	more	 promising	 strategy	 towards	 fostering	 exports	 in	
knowledge	intensive	business	services	rather	than	high-tech	manufacturing.		
Our	findings	contribute	to	revisiting	the	natural	resource	curse	and,	within	this	debate,	
we	challenge	the	view	that	natural	resource	sectors	are	enclaves	lacking	input-output	
linkages	with	the	rest	of	the	economy	and	hindering	economic	diversification.	In	fact,	
we	 find	 the	 opposite	 to	 be	 true	 for	 knowledge	 intensive	 business	 services	 and	 this	
effect	to	be	stronger	in	countries	with	a	specialisation	in	natural	resource	sectors.		
In	line	with	the	Chapter	2,	this	second	contribution	of	the	thesis	also	suggests	that	the	
productive	structure	and	specialisation	trajectories	are	a	determinant	not	only	of	the	
extent	to	which	countries	will	benefit	from	participation	to	GVCs,	but	also	which	GVC	
they	will	be	most	likely	to	join	in	the	first	place.		
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3.3	Power	and	Export	Sophistication	in	Buyer-Supplier	Relationships:	Insights	
from	Colombian	Customs	Data	
Chapters	2	and	3	in	this	thesis	look	at	both	GVC	participation	and	structural	change	as	
aggregate	 phenomena;	 these	 are,	 however,	 the	 results	 of	 changes	 and	 firm-to-firm	
interactions	at	the	micro	level.		
There	 is	 a	 well-established	 literature	 on	 GVCs	 exploring	 such	 interactions,	 mainly	
through	case	studies	at	 the	 firm	or	 industry	 level	 (Gereffi	and	Fernandez-Stark	2011;	
Hernandez	et	al.	2014;	Frederick	et	al.	2015).	
In	parallel,	 the	 literature	on	 structural	 change	has	been	enriched	with	new	evidence	
looking	 at	products	 at	 a	more	disaggregated	 level,	 rather	 than	broad	macro-sectors,	
proposing	the	notion	of	sophistication	as	key	to	 identifying	profitable	trajectories	 for	
structural	 change	 and	export	 upgrading	 (Hidalgo	 and	Hausmann	2009;	 Cristelli	 et	 al.	
2014;	Zhu	and	Fu	2013;	Poncet	and	Starosta	de	Waldemar	2013).	
Chapter	4	blends	these	two	streams	of	 literature	to	explore	the	association	between	
buyer-supplier	 international	 trade	 relations	 and	 supplier’s	 export	 sophistication,	
putting	forward	a	quantitative	approach	based	on	large	samples	from	transaction	level	
data.		
One	of	the	main	 insights	of	the	literature	on	GVCs	is	that	while	the	fragmentation	of	
production	has	made	it	easier	for	suppliers	 in	developing	countries	to	have	access	to	
global	 markets	 and	 foreign,	 more	 productive,	 buyers,	 this	 is	 no	 guarantee	 that	
suppliers	will	easily	increase	the	sophistication	of	their	exports.		
In	 particular,	 this	 literature	 has	 emphasised	 that	 GVCs	 are	 ruled	 by	 lead	 firms	 that	
establish	 different	 kinds	 of	 governance	 and	 power	 relationships,	 determining	 who	
does	 what,	 and	 thus	 supplier’s	 possibilities	 of	 upgrading	 along	 the	 value	 chain	
(Kaplinsky	2013;	Gereffi	1994;	Gereffi	et	al.	2005).		
The	concept	of	export	upgrading	is	particularly	important	because	recent	contributions	
in	 the	 literature	 have	 better	 qualified	 the	 widely	 accepted	 positive	 relationship	
between	exports	and	growth,	by	introducing	the	quality	of	exports	as	a	determinant	of	
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firms’	 (and	 countries’)	 economic	 performance	 (Iacovone	 and	 Javorcik	 2009,	 2010;	
Hidalgo	et	al.	2007;	Poncet	and	Starosta	de	Waldemar	2013;	Lall	et	al.	2006).	
Based	on	 this,	 the	 idea	of	export	 sophistication	has	become	central	 to	capturing	 the	
‘quality’	 of	 the	 exports,	 and	 an	 increasing	 body	 of	 evidence	 supports	 the	 idea	 that	
increases	 in	 export	 sophistication	 go	 hand	 in	 hand	with	 improvements	 in	 economic	
performance	(Minondo	2010;	Hidalgo	et	al.	2007;	Lall	et	al.	2006;	Zhu	and	Fu	2013).	
While	adopting	a	mainly	qualitative	approach,	 the	 literature	on	GVCs	has	gathered	a	
large	body	of	evidence	on	the	importance	of	power	asymmetries	as	a	determinant	of	
supplier’s	 upgrading	possibilities	 over	 the	past	 two	decades	 (Humphrey	 and	 Schmitz	
2002;	Giuliani	et	al.	2005;	Gereffi	et	al.	2005;	Gereffi	and	Fernandez-Stark	2011).		
The	importance	of	buyer-supplier	relationships	has	also	been	emphasised	by	literature	
relying	 on	 micro-level	 transaction	 data.	 This	 literature	 has	 contended	 that	 mutual	
knowledge	 between	 buyers	 and	 suppliers	 is	 key	 to	 a	 relationship’s	 survival	 and	
profitability,	especially	in	the	context	of	low	contract	enforceability	(Macchiavello	and	
Morjaria	 2015,	 2016;	Macchiavello	 and	Miquel-Florensa	 2017).	 This	 latter	 stream	 of	
literature	 has,	 however,	 put	 little	 evidence	 forward	 concerning	 the	 linkage	 between	
power	asymmetries	in	trade	relationships	and	suppliers’	upgrading.		
We	attempt	to	fill	 this	gap	by	constructing	measures	of	power	 in	trade	relationships:	
we	 distinguish	 in	 particular	 between	 two	 kinds	 of	 power,	 based	 on	 its	 source:	 (i)	
relational	power	based	on	dyadic	features	of	the	relationship,	such	as	the	dependence	
of	 one	 party	 on	 the	 other,	 and	 (ii)	market	 power,	 i.e.	 the	 position	 that	 each	 of	 the	
trading	parties	occupies	in	the	market,	which	we	capture	with	market	shares.		
We	 then	 explore	 the	 association	 of	 these	 different	 kinds	 of	 power	 to	 supplier’s	
sophistication,	the	likelihood	of	 introducing	a	new	product	and	that	of	 increasing	the	
supplier’s	sophistication.		
To	test	these	hypotheses	we	use	transaction	data	from	the	Colombian	customs.	After	
extensive	cleaning,	we	obtain	buyer-supplier	pairs	in	each	year	and	quantify	both	the	
power	in	each	pair	and	the	sophistication	of	the	products	in	which	they	trade.	
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We	find	that	suppliers	that	depend	heavily	on	purchases	from	their	buyers	are	more	
likely	to	have	low	sophistication	levels	of	exports	and	are	less	likely	to	upgrade	to	more	
sophisticated	products.	A	 large	market	 size	of	 the	buyer	 is	positively	associated	with	
higher	levels	of	sophistication	of	trade.		
Suppliers	with	 large	market	 shares	 are	more	 likely	 to	 start	 trading	 in	 new	products,	
while	the	dependence	of	the	buyer	vis-à-vis	the	supplier	 is	positively	associated	with	
increases	in	the	sophistication	of	the	products	traded	within	the	pair.		
We	also	explore	how	these	associations	change	across	destination	countries	and	find	
that	while	a	large	market	share	of	a	buyer	is,	on	average,	associated	with	high	export	
sophistication,	 buyers	 dominating	 the	 market	 in	 the	 US	 tend	 to	 import	 low	
sophistication	products	and	make	it	harder	for	suppliers	to	upgrade.		
The	main	implication	of	these	findings	is	that	power	in	trade	relationships	seems	to	be	
related	to	suppliers’	upgrading	prospects.	We	contribute	to	the	growing	literature	on	
buyer-supplier	relationships,	and	we	also	offer	new	quantitative	evidence	in	favour	of	
the	mainly	qualitative	literature	on	GVCs.		
We	 also	 expand	 the	 literature	 on	 GVCs,	 qualifying	 the	 concept	 of	 power	 and	 its	
relationship	with	supplier’s	upgrading	in	a	more	nuanced	way.		
More	specifically,	we	find	that	different	kinds	of	power,	 i.e.	whether	they	stem	from	
buyer-supplier	mutual	 dependence	 or	 the	wider	market	 structure,	 are	 correlated	 in	
different	ways	to	both	sophistication	and	upgrading.		
These	 results	 are	 relevant	 both	 to	 firms	 that	 should	 take	 power	 asymmetries	 into	
account	when	attempting	to	enter	foreign	markets,	as	well	as	to	policy	makers	in	the	
design	of	policies	to	foster	domestic	suppliers’	engagement	with	global	markets.		
This	 is	 a	 first	 contribution	 based	 on	micro-level	 evidence,	 paving	 the	way	 for	 future	
research	on	inter-firms’	relationship	in	trade,	exploring	more	potential	factors	shaping	
power	 between	 trading	 partners,	 such	 as	 ownership	 relationships,	 size,	 productivity	
and	 technological	 capabilities	 of	 the	 buyer.	 To	 the	 best	 of	 our	 knowledge	 these	 are	
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issues	 that	 have	 so	 far	 remained	 unexplored	 that	 would	 yet	 provide	 very	 useful	
insights	for	trade	theory	as	well	as	to	both	private	firms	and	policy	makers.		
		 	
21		
2.Trade	Specialisation	and	Performance	in	Global	Value	Chains	
	
Abstract	
This	Chatper	investigates	whether	trade	specialisation	explains	economies’	trade	performance	
within	 a	 Global	 Value	 Chain	 (GVC)	 context.	 We	 consider	 trade	 specialisation	 in	 natural	
resources,	 high	 and	 low	 tech	 manufacturing	 and	 business	 services,	 before	 and	 after	 the	
financial	crisis.	The	aimed	contribution	of	 this	Chapter	 is	 to	shed	 light	on	 the	effects	of	 trade	
specialisation	 as	 measured	 in	 domestic	 value	 added	 embodied	 in	 exports	 rather	 than	 gross	
exports.	We	add	to	the	literature	on	GVCs	by:	(i)	studying	the	role	of	the	domestic	productive	
structure	 in	 countries’	 trade	 specialisation	 and	 performance,	 (ii)	 accounting	 for	 the	 rate	 of	
changes	 in	 trade	 specialisation	 as	 affecting	 GVC	 performance.	 We	 employ	 Balassa	 indexes	
based	on	value	added	flows	in	a	GMM	dynamic	panel	framework.		
We	 find	 that	 trade	 specialisation	 in	 low-tech	 manufacturing	 and	 natural	 resources	 have	 a	
negative	 impact	 on	 value	 added	 exported	 by	 countries.	 High-tech	 manufacturing	 and	
knowledge	intensive	services	exhibit	a	positive	effect	during	the	crisis	period.	We	discuss	these	
findings	 in	 relation	 to	 the	 recent	 debates	 on	 the	 role	 of	 manufacturing	 and	 premature	 de-
industrialisation	in	developing	countries.		
	
2.1	Introduction	
Countries’	 economic	 development	 and	 its	 relationship	with	 the	 productive	 structure	
has	been	 the	 subject	 of	 a	 long	 and	established	 literature,	 spanning	 several	 decades,	
looking	at	 the	 role	of	 specific	 sectors,	 such	as	agriculture,	manufacturing	ad	 services	
(Kaldor	 1968;	 Matsuyama	 2008;	 Szirmai	 and	 Verspagen	 2015),	 the	 linkages	 across	
sectors	 (Guerrieri	 and	 Meliciani	 2005;	 Hirschman	 1958;	 Evangelista	 et	 al.	 2015;	
Meliciani	and	Savona	2014;	Lopez-Gonzalez	et	al.	2015),	and	the	importance	of	trade	
structure	for	economic	performance	(Balassa	1978;	Hausmann	et	al.	2007;	Lederman	
and	Maloney	2012;	Lee	2011).		
In	 the	 past	 decades,	 globalisation	 has	 brought	 about	 a	 much	 higher	 degree	 of	
interdependence	 and	 interconnectedness	 across	 countries,	 also	 in	 trade	 flows.	 A	
consequence	of	 this,	 and	arguably	one	of	 the	most	 relevant	 changes	 in	 recent	years	
22		
concerning	 the	nature	of	 trade,	 is	 that	 intermediate	goods	account	 for	an	 increasing	
share	 of	 trade	 flows	 (OECD	 2013a).	 This	 is	 because	 production	 is	 scattered	 across	
countries,	and	global	value	chains	(GVCs)	represent	a	large	proportion	of	trade	(Gereffi	
1994;	 Gereffi	 et	 al.	 2005;	 Baldwin	 and	 Robert-Nicoud	 2014).	 This	 Chapter	 studies	
countries’	export	performance	in	light	of	this	significant	change.		
Foreign	imported	inputs	constitute	an	increasing	share	of	gross	exports,	which	in	turn	
are	 less	 representative	 of	 countries’	 domestic	 production	 structure	 (Koopman	 et	 al.	
2014).	As	Baldwin	(2011,	p.33)	puts	it,	while	previously	“exporting	engines	was	a	sign	
of	 victory	 now	 it	 is	 a	 sign	 that	 the	 nation	 is	 located	 in	 a	 particular	 segment	 of	 an	
international	value	chain”.	Moreover,	 this	phenomenon	has	 turned	 foreign	countries	
not	only	into	export	destinations,	but	also	into	co-producers;	this	changes	the	way	in	
which	 we	 think	 about	 countries’	 trade	 specialisation	 and	 its	 impact	 on	 export	
performance.		
In	light	of	the	growing	importance	of	GVCs,	this	Chapter	investigates	the	role	of	trade	
specialisation	 as	 a	 determinant	 of	 countries’	 export	 performance.	 In	 particular,	 we	
argue	 it	 is	 increasingly	 important	 to	 distinguish	 countries’	 domestic	 value	 added	
contribution	from	what	other	countries	provide,	rather	than	relying	on	gross	exports.	
In	sum,	rather	than	“what	you	export	matters”,	as	posited	by	Hausmann	et	al.	(2007),	
it	is	what	a	country	produces	(and	then	exports)	that	matters.	
In	 addition,	 we	 characterise	 changes	 in	 trade	 specialisation,	 not	 only	 in	 terms	 of	
direction,	 i.e.	 in	which	 sectors	 a	 country	 specialises,	 but	 also	 in	 terms	of	 the	 rate	of	
change,	i.e.	the	speed	at	which	such	changes	occur.		
More	 specifically,	 we	 focus	 on	 the	 relationship	 between	 countries’	 acceleration	 in	
specialisation	 and	 the	 growth	 of	 export	 shares.	 This	 is	 quite	 a	 novel	 approach,	 and	
complements	earlier	studies	on	countries’	trade	and	structural	change,	which	focus	on	
static	effects.		
We	 also	 include	 services	 (and	 in	 particular	 knowledge	 intensive	 business	 services	 -	
KIBS)	in	the	analysis	of	output	and	export	specialisation;	as	opposed	to	manufacturing,	
services	 have	 been	 comparatively	 overlooked	 in	 the	 literature	 on	 both	 trade	 and	
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structural	 change,	 despite	 some	 exceptions	 (Anderson	 et	 al.	 2015;	 Wolfmayr	 2012;	
Varela	 and	 Hollweg	 2016;	 Di	 Meglio	 et	 al.	 2018).	 However,	 services	 represent	 an	
increasing	share	of	trade	and	countries’	productive	structures	(Anderson	et	al.	2015).	
Being	less	tradable	than	manufactured	goods,	it	is	even	more	important	to	assess	their	
contribution	to	countries’	trade	with	a	value	added	approach.		
We	build	on	Kowalski	et	al.	(2015)	and	operationalise	our	questions	by	estimating	the	
effect	of	the	rate	of	change	 in	countries’	 trade	(in	value	added)	specialisation	on	the	
growth	 of	 countries’	 share	 in	 domestic	 value	 added	 exported.	 We	 find	 that	 trade	
specialisation	 in	 low-tech	 and	 natural	 resources	 has	 a	 negative	 or	 not	 significant	
impact,	while	we	detect	a	positive	and	significant	effect	of	increases	in	specialisation	in	
KIBS	and	high-tech	manufacturing,	although	only	after	the	financial	crisis.	These	results	
suggest	that	countries	increasing	their	specialisation	towards	low-tech	manufacturing	
are	 likely	 to	 experience	 a	 decrease	 in	 the	 growth	 of	 export	 shares	 in	 value	 added	
terms.	Relating	this	more	 in	general	 to	the	debate	on	manufacturing	as	an	engine	of	
growth	(Rodrik	2016b;	Szirmai	and	Verspagen	2015;	Szirmai	2012)	this	hints	towards	a	
differential	impact	of	specialisation	in	high-	versus	low-tech	manufacturing.		
Our	 results	 are	 also	 relevant	 to	 the	 literature	 on	 the	 role	 of	 countries’	 trade	
specialisation	 and	 their	 performance	 (Hausmann	 et	 al.	 2007;	 Hidalgo	 et	 al.	 2007),	
which	 has	 so	 far	 overlooked	 the	 emergence	 of	 GVCs	 (Koopman	 et	 al.	 2014).	 We	
provide	 a	 richer	 understanding	 of	 trade	 specialisation,	 not	 only	 through	 our	 value	
added	approach,	but	also	looking	at	the	speed	of	changes	in	specialisation,	which	the	
literature	 has	 shown	 to	 have	 important	 effects	 on	 countries’	 long-term	 growth	
dynamics	(de	Vries	et	al.	2017;	Timmer	and	de	Vries	2009;	Timmer	et	al.	2014).		
The	remainder	of	 the	Chapter	 is	organised	as	 follows:	Section	2	reviews	the	relevant	
literature;	 Section	 3	 presents	 our	 value	 added	 based	 measures	 and	 some	 relevant	
descriptive	 evidence;	 Section	 4	 illustrates	 how	 they	 are	 computed	 and	 the	 overall	
empirical	 strategy	 as	 well	 as	 the	 data	 used;	 Section	 5	 presents	 the	 results	 and	
discusses	the	Chapter’s	findings;	Section	6	concludes.		
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2.2	Trade	specialisation	and	performance	in	the	context	of	GVCs	
2.2.1	Trade	specialisation	and	the	domestic	productive	structure	
There	 is	a	 long	standing	 literature	 looking	at	exports	as	a	driver	of	economic	growth	
(Balassa	1978;	Marin	1992).	The	export	sector	has	been	regarded	as	more	productive	
(Feder	1982)	 for	 reasons	 ranging	 from	access	 to	a	 larger	market,	economies	of	 scale	
and	 scope,	 technological	 spillovers,	 and	 incentives	 for	 exporters	 to	 increase	
productivity	 (Bustos	 2015;	 Rivera	 Batiz	 and	 Romer	 1991).	 Moreover,	 access	 to	
international	market	has	historically	played	an	 important	 role	 in	 the	development	of	
several	 developing	 countries,	 particularly	 in	 East	 Asia	 (Lee	 et	 al.	 2011;	 Kim	 and	 Lee	
1987;	Kim	1980;	Hobday	2015;	World	Bank	1993).	
Economic	 theory	 has	 mainly	 stressed	 the	 role	 of	 factor	 endowment	 in	 shaping	
countries’	comparative	advantage	and	specialisation	 in	 trade.	According	to	 this	view,	
countries	 should	 specialise	 in	 sectors	 in	 which	 they	 have	 a	 comparative	 advantage,	
regardless	of	the	sector’s	specific	characteristics.		
In	contrast	with	this	sector-neutral	approach,	some	economists	have	also	argued	that	
countries’	 specialisation	 and	 its	 changes	 reflect	 their	 technological	 capabilities,	
endogenous	technical	change	and	thus	their	competitiveness	(Fagerberg	1988;	Uchida	
and	Cook	2005).	 In	 this	 stream	of	 research,	 income	and	price	elasticities	 vary	across	
specialisation	 trajectories,	 determining	 demand	 and	 productivity	 growth	 dynamics	
(Thirlwall	1979).	So,	 trade	specialisation	and	trade	performance	 influence	each	other	
and,	 at	 times,	 countries	 go	 down	 specialisation	 patterns	 with	 low	 growth	 potential	
(Amable	2000)	as	shown,	for	instance,	by	Matsuyama	(1992)	for	the	agriculture	sector.		
A	more	 recent	 literature	 has	 looked	 at	 countries’	 trade	 specialisation,	 and	 revealed	
comparative	 advantage	 (RCA)	 in	 particular,	 to	 infer	 countries’	 underlying	 domestic	
capabilities.	Hidalgo	et	al.	 (2007)	and	Hausmann	and	Klinger	(2007)	have	argued	that	
countries’	 export	 specialisation	 reflects	 their	 domestic	 capabilities	 as	 well	 as	 their	
development	 perspectives.	 As	 a	 result,	 Hausmann	 et	 al.	 (2007)	 show	 that	 export	
specialisation	 is	 a	 determinant	 of	 future	 economic	 growth	 and	 that	 therefore	 “what	
you	export	matters”.	
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Interestingly,	Hausmann	and	co-authors	link	countries’	export	specialisation	with	their	
underlying	 domestic	 economic	 structure	 and	 ultimately	 study	 how	 this	 evolves	 and	
affects	 long-term	 growth.	 However,	 they	 do	 not	 account	 for	 the	 increasing	
fragmentation	 of	 production	 across	 countries	 that	 accompanies	 the	 emergence	 of	
global	value	chains	(GVCs)	and	the	limitations	of	using	gross	export	data	to	infer	on	the	
domestic	economic	structure	and	capabilities	(Baldwin	2012).		
The	 relationship	 between	 domestic	 productive	 structure	 and	 GVCs	 is	 not	 merely	 a	
methodological	 issue	 but	 represents	 a	 significant	 change	 in	 countries’	 specialisation	
opportunities.	 In	 fact,	while	 globalisation	has	 opened	up	new	 specialisation	 avenues	
for	countries	 (Baldwin	2011),	 this	has	yielded	rather	diverse	outcomes	as	developing	
countries	 have	 taken	 different	 specialisation	 patterns	 at	 different	 speeds,	 also	
depending	on	their	pre-existing	productive	structure	(McMillan	et	al.	2014).		
2.2.2	Direction	and	pace	of	change	in	countries’	trade	specialisation	and	economic	
structure	
Within	 the	 literature	 on	 structural	 change,	 manufacturing	 has	 traditionally	 been	
considered	as	the	engine	of	growth;	Szirmai	(2012)	provides	a	thorough	discussion	of	
the	 different	 arguments	 in	 favour	 of	 this	 hypothesis.	 The	 first	 Kaldor's	 Law	 (1968),	
postulates	 that	manufacturing	 share	 and	 economic	 growth	 are	 positively	 correlated,	
and	Verdoorn’s	Law	posits	a	positive	relationship	between	the	manufacturing	sector’s	
size	and	its	productivity.	Furthermore,	manufacturing	has	been	argued	to	have	many	
linkages	with	other	sectors,	 for	which	 it	provides	either	 inputs	or	demand	for	output	
(Hirschman	1958),	 as	well	 as	 opportunities	 for	 technology	 and	 knowledge	 spillovers.	
Rodrik	 (2013)	 finds	 that	 while	 the	 convergence	 between	 developing	 and	 advanced	
economies	 predicted	 by	 neoclassic	 growth	 models	 is	 conditional	 on	 a	 set	 of	 other	
factors,	 such	 as	 education	 and	 institutions,	 productivity	 in	 the	manufacturing	 sector	
shows	unconditional	convergence,	i.e.	irrespective	of	countries’	characteristics.		
Recent	 evidence	 seems	 to	 question	 whether	 manufacturing	 is	 still	 playing	 its	
traditional	role	of	a	growth	engine.	In	another	contribution,	Rodrik	(2015a)	argues	that	
rapid	 industrialisation	 for	 developing	 countries	 is	 going	 to	 be	 more	 difficult	 in	 the	
future	 due	 to	 the	 strong	 Chinese	 competition	 in	 low-tech	 labour-intensive	
manufacturing	sectors	and	the	fragmentation	of	production.		
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Szirmai	and	Verspagen	(2015)	also	find	that	an	increasing	amount	of	human	capital	is	
now	 needed	 in	 order	 for	 manufacturing	 to	 trigger	 its	 engine	 of	 growth	 effect.	 This	
evidence	 suggests	 that	 specialisation	 in	 high-	 and	 low-tech	manufacturing	may	 yield	
different	outcomes	in	terms	of	countries’	economic	performance.		
Services	have	traditionally	not	been	considered	to	exert	the	same	virtuous	properties	
on	 economic	 growth.	 However,	 structural	 change	 towards	 services	 is	 an	 empirical	
regularity	associated	with	economic	growth	(Bah	2011),	both	in	high	and	low	income	
countries.	Rodrik	(2015b)	finds	that	structural	change	towards	services	and	away	from	
manufacturing	is	happening	in	developing	countries	at	much	lower	income	levels	than	
in	 the	 past;	 for	 this	 reason,	 he	 raises	 concerns	 for	 its	 implication	 for	 low-income	
countries’	growth	perspectives.		
In	 contrast	with	 this	 view	on	 the	contribution	of	 services	 to	economic	development,	
recent	 studies	on	 the	emergence	of	GVCs	 in	 services	have	provided	evidence	on	 the	
opportunities	 of	 offshoring	 service	 activities	 from	 developed	 towards	 developing	
countries	 (Gereffi	and	Fernandez-Stark	2010;	Hernandez	et	al.	2014).	However,	most	
of	 the	 studies	 in	 this	 strand	 of	 work	 take	 a	 qualitative	 approach,	 while	 little	
quantitative	evidence	has	been	offered	so	far	to	the	debate	around	GVCs	and	the	role	
of	services	in	developing	countries.		
While	the	body	of	 literature	on	the	direction	of	structural	change	 is	vast,	still	 little	 is	
known	 on	 the	 dynamic	 effects	 of	 the	 pace	 at	 which	 countries	 specialise	 on	 their	
growth	rate.	It	has	been	argued	that	the	speed	at	which	structural	change	takes	place	
is	 key	 to	 countries’	 successful	 development	 (Haraguchi	 2014;	 Matsuyama	 1992).	
McMillan	 et	 al.	 (2014)	 stress	 the	 importance	 of	 the	 dynamic	 effects	 of	 structural	
change,	distinguishing	between	structural	change	that	is	growth	enhancing	or	growth	
reducing.	 In	 particular	 they	 argue	 that	 developing	 countries	 with	 significant	
productivity	differences	between	sectors	may	have	a	lot	to	gain	–	or	to	lose	–	by	simply	
reallocating	the	labour	force	from	low	to	high	productivity	growth	sectors.	
For	instance,	when	we	compare	Asian	and	Latin	American	countries,	we	see	that	while	
in	 the	 former	 structural	 change	 has	 favoured	 sectors	 with	 higher	 productivity	
dynamics,	this	has	not	happened	in	the	latter	(Timmer	et	al.	2014).	More	specifically,	
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Asian	 economies	 have	 moved	 towards	 manufacturing	 sectors	 that	 had	 a	 faster	
technological	 dynamic	 and	 thus	 higher	 productivity	 growth	 rates.	 In	 contrast,	 Latin	
America	and	Africa	have	specialised	in	services	that	did	have	higher	productivity	levels	
than	agriculture,	but	much	lower	productivity	growth	rates	than	other	manufacturing	
sectors.	The	result	has	been	a	static,	one-off,	productivity	boost	rather	than	a	dynamic	
one	(de	Vries	et	al.	2017;	Timmer	and	de	Vries	2009;	Timmer	et	al.	2014).		
The	qualitative	literature	on	GVCs	has	also	emphasised	the	importance	of	speed	when	
countries	 specialise	 in	 sectors	 with	 high	 value	 added	 content,	 in	 order	 to	 reap	 the	
benefits	of	 the	 first-mover.	Furthermore	 it	 is	 important	 that	countries	maintain	 their	
ability	to	specialise	quickly	so	they	can	sustain	a	rent,	deriving	from	constantly	moving	
towards	new	high-value	added	sectors	(Kaplinsky	2004).		
For	 this	 reason,	 it	 is	 particularly	 interesting	 to	 look	 at	 rates	 of	 change,	 rather	 than	
levels,	in	both	export	performance	and	specialisation.		
2.2.3	Research	question	and	Chapter’s	contribution	
This	 Chapter	 sets	 out	 to	 study	 the	 relationship	 between	 trade	 specialisation	 and	
performance	in	the	context	of	GVCs.	We	aim	to	take	into	account	that	the	emergence	
of	GVCs	has	made	the	relationship	between	export	specialisation	and	the	underlying	
domestic	productive	structure	less	straightforward,	with	the	former	being	less	and	less	
representative	of	 the	 latter.	This	 requires	a	novel	understanding	of	 trade	 flows:	 they	
are	no	longer	the	outcome	of	exchanges	of	finished	goods	produced	within	countries’	
borders,	 but	 rather	 a	 process	 of	 production	 fragmented	 across	 borders	 in	 which	
countries	are	both	destination	and	co-producers.		
In	addition,	and	in	line	with	a	growing	literature,	we	argue	that	changes	in	countries’	
specialisation	will	have	an	impact	on	the	dynamic	of	their	export	performance,	i.e.	the	
rate	at	which	it	will	improve	(or	worsen),	and	that	the	speed	at	which	countries	change	
their	specialisation	will	also	be	a	determinant	of	their	performance.	This	is	something	
that	the	scholarship	has	already	acknowledged	(McMillan	et	al.	2014;	Kaplinsky	2004),	
although	 the	evidence	on	 this	 remains	 scarce,	 compared	 to	 the	vast	body	of	 studies	
looking	at	the	relationship	between	levels	of	trade	specialisation	and	levels	of	export	
performance.		
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Following	on	from	this,	 this	Chapter	aims	to	answer	the	following	research	question:	
do	changes	in	countries’	trade	specialisation	affect	their	export	performance,	within	a	
GVC	context?	
We	bring	 this	 hypothesis	 to	 the	data	by	 computing	measures	of	 trade	 specialisation	
and	 of	 trade	 performance.	 In	 order	 to	 account	 for	 the	 emergence	 of	 GVCs	 and	 to	
explore	the	relationship	between	exports	and	domestic	specialisation,	we	build	on	the	
growing	 literature	 on	 trade	 in	 value	 added,	 which	 we	 review	 in	 detail	 in	 the	 next	
section.		
	
2.3	Measuring	trade	in	a	GVC	context:	descriptive	evidence	
In	order	to	account	for	the	emergence	of	GVCs	and	the	gaping	divide	between	trade	in	
value	 added	 and	 gross	 exports,	 a	 recent	 and	 growing	 stream	 of	 research	 has	
developed	a	set	of	measures	capturing	countries’	participation	in	GVCs.	De	Backer	and	
Miroudot	(2013)	and,	more	recently,	Johnson	(2018)	provide	a	quite	complete	review	
of	the	measures	of	both	backward	participation,	i.e.	the	value	added	a	country	imports	
from	other	countries	that	is	subsequently	exported,	and	forward	participation,	i.e.	the	
value	added	a	country	exports	and	is	subsequently	exported	by	third	countries.		
In	line	with	the	export-led	growth	models,	the	underlying	assumption	of	this	strand	of	
literature	 is	 that	 GVC	 participation	 is	 desirable	 and	 that	 it	 should	 lead	 to	 economic	
growth.	Without	making	 such	 an	 assumption,	 Banga	 (2014)	 argues	 that	 linking	 into	
GVCs	is	not	necessarily	enough	to	trigger	export-led	growth.	As	an	alternative	measure	
of	countries’	GVC	performance,	she	proposes	to	use	the	difference	between	backward	
and	 forward	 participation	 and	 found	 very	 unequal	 benefits	 being	 drawn	 from	 GVC	
participation	across	countries.	Based	on	these	results,	she	argues	for	policies	favouring	
forward,	rather	than	backward,	participation.	
Kowalski	et	al.	(2015)	show,	however,	that	backward	and	forward	participation	may	be	
complementary	and	propose	an	alternative	measure	of	countries’	trade	performance	
in	 GVCs.	 They	 look	 at	 domestic	 value	 added	 embodied	 in	 countries’	 exports	 (DVA,	
henceforth),	 which	 corresponds	 to	 the	 share	 of	 exports	 that	 is	 used	 to	 remunerate	
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domestic	 labour	 and	 capital.	 This	measure	 captures	 the	parts	of	 countries’	 domestic	
productive	 structure	 that	 can	 compete	 in	 the	 international	 market	 and	 ultimately	
contributes	to	their	export.		
In	 order	 to	measure	 countries’	 performance	 in	GVCs,	we	 thus	 follow	Kowalski	 et	 al.	
(2015)	and	opt	for	DVA	as	our	main	variable	of	interest,	which	we	use	to	compute	both	
our	outcome	and	explanatory	variables.	This	variable	 is	particularly	 interesting	 for	us	
for	two	main	reasons.		
First,	while	DVA	can	be	intuitively	understood	as	the	value	added	homologue	of	gross	
exports,	 it	 is	worth	stressing	that	this	measure	accounts	for	the	fact	that	within	each	
country	 value	added	exported	by	one	 sector	may	be	generated	by	different	 sectors.	
This	 measure	 thus	 allows	 reallocating	 value	 added	 to	 the	 sector	 that	 originated	 it	
rather	 than	 the	 one	 that	 exported	 it.	 This	 is	 particularly	 relevant	 when	 looking	 at	
countries’	 export	 specialisation	 in	 relation	 to	 domestic	 structure,	 and	 a	 fortiori	 for	
business	services	that	are	often	embodied	in	manufacturing	goods	and	exported.		
Second,	the	growth	of	a	country’s	share	in	total	DVA	flows	(which	we	will	refer	to	as	
DVA	share	henceforth)	is	loosely	related	to	countries’	competitiveness.	This	is	because	
an	 increasing	 growth	 rate	 in	 DVA	 share	 is	 arguably	 a	 manifestation	 of	 countries’	
increasing	competitiveness	in	the	export	markets	(Kowalski	et	al.	2015a).	
The	 literature	has	yet	 to	 reach	a	 consensus	on	a	 single	approach	 to	measuring	DVA.	
Koopman	et	al.	(2014)	suggest	using	a	vector	of	gross	exports	including	both	final	and	
intermediate	 foreign	 demand.	 Johnson	 (2018)	 points	 out	 that	 in	 Koopman	 et	 al.’s	
(2014)	approach,	 foreign	 intermediate	demand	 is	 treated	 inconsistently	because	 it	 is	
included	in	both	the	gross	export	vector	and	in	the	global	Leontief	Inverse,	which	leads	
to	a	double	counting	of	a	sort.	
In	an	attempt	to	tackle	all	these	issues,	our	measure	of	DVA	includes	the	value	added	
exported	by	a	country	either	as	final	foreign	demand	or	intermediate	foreign	demand,	
the	latter	being	the	value	added	demanded	by	other	countries’	production	processes.	
However,	we	also	exclude	the	value	added	generated	by	a	country,	exported	to	meet	
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foreign	intermediate	demand	and	then	re-imported	to	satisfy	the	country’s	own	final	
demand1.		
We	 use	 the	 Inter-Country	 Input-Output	 (ICIO)	 tables	 compiled	 by	 the	 OECD,	 and	
compute	countries’	DVA	shares	and	value	added	RCA	in	four	sector	groups:	knowledge	
intensive	 business	 services	 (KIBS),	 natural	 resource	 (NR),	 low-tech	 and	 high-tech	
manufacturing	(LTMF	and	HTMF	respectively).		
In	Section	2.4	we	explain	in	more	detail	how	these	measures	are	computed.	However,	
we	first	present	some	descriptive	evidence	of	how	different	our	value	added	measures	
are	 compared	 with	 their	 gross	 export	 homologues,	 especially	 when	 looking	 at	
countries’	 trade	 specialisation.	 This	 evidence	 suggests	 that	 when	 countries	 export	
value	added	of	a	 sector	 indirectly,	 i.e.	 embodied	 in	exports	of	other	 sectors,	 a	gross	
export	approach	is	likely	to	underestimate	trade	specialisation.		
We	compare	countries’	RCA	when	computed	in	gross	exports	and	DVA,	and	we	show	
that	using	value	added	has	a	relevant	impact	on	our	trade	specialisation	measure.	To	
be	sure,	the	pattern	of	GVC	participation	may	vary	across	sectors.	KIBS	are	often	non-
tradable;	 as	 a	 consequence	 their	 contribution	 to	 a	 country’s	 export	 is	 likely	 to	 be	
indirect,	e.g.	KIBS	value	added	provided	domestically	contributing	to	the	gross	export	
of	 manufacturing.	 For	 this	 reason	 gross	 export	 figure	 may	 underestimate	 KIBS	
importance	for	countries’	export	and	therefore	the	countries’	trade	specialisation.	
Manufacturing	 on	 the	 other	 hand	 usually	 consists	 of	 tradable	 products,	 whose	
production	 is	 likely	 to	 be	 fragmented	 across	 countries.	 For	 this	 reason	 gross	 export	
figures	 may	 be	 overestimated,	 due	 to	 the	 large	 share	 of	 imported	 inputs	 that	 are	
included	in	gross	export.	
Figure	2.1	below	shows	how	 the	average	RCA	 in	KIBS	over	 the	years	 changes	across	
countries	 when	 using	measures	 based	 on	 gross	 exports	 or	 DVA.	We	 take	 KIBS	 as	 a	
particular	example	since,	as	we	have	already	pointed	out,	this	sector	is	more	likely	to	
be	exported	indirectly	through	manufactured	exports.	However,	the	same	pattern	can	
																																																								1 We provide a more formalised explanation of how this measure is computed in the Appendix. 
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be	found	looking	at	the	other	three	macro-sectors	 in	our	analysis2.	Regardless	of	the	
mechanisms	 at	 play,	 it	 is	 important	 to	 note	 that	 using	 a	 value	 added	 approach,	 as	
opposed	 to	 a	 gross	 export	 one,	 will	 yield	 different	 specialisation	 patterns	 for	 most	
countries.			
	
Figure	2.1:	Country	Average	RCA	in	KIBS	across	years	in	gross	exports	and	domestic	value	
added	
Note:	Figure	1.1	compares	countries’	average	RCA	in	KIBS	across	years	in	our	sample,	using	gross	exports	and	
domestic	value	added	in	exports.	
Source:	Author’s	own	calculation	using	ICIO	tables.	
In	Figure	2.1,	we	can	see	that	using	DVA	does	not	simply	reduce	the	RCA.	For	countries	
such	as	Chile,	 France,	Germany,	 Italy	or	 Japan,	 the	gross	export	RCA	underestimates	
their	 trade	specialisation	 in	KIBS.	 In	contrast,	 countries	 such	as	Luxembourg,	 the	UK,	
Cyprus,	 Ireland,	 India	 and	 Singapore,	 see	 their	 RCA	 increase	 significantly	 when	
measured	in	gross	exports.		
																																																								2 Figures A1-A3 in the Appendix report the same comparison between gross exports and domestic value 
added for the other three sector groups, NR, LTM and HTM, respectively. 
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It	 is	 important	to	stress	that	using	gross	exports	does	not	move	all	RCAs	 in	the	same	
direction,	which	makes	 the	bias	 of	 using	 of	 gross	 exports	 particularly	 relevant	when	
studying	trade	specialisation.	The	distribution	of	the	two	variables	differs	substantially,	
which	means	that	estimates	based	on	gross	exports	may	lead	to	incorrect	conclusions:	
RCAs	 based	 on	 gross	 exports	 capture	 values	 exported	 by	 services	 but	 possibly	
originating	 from	 other	 sectors	 (and	 countries),	 while	 they	 leave	 out	 value	 added	
originating	 from	 domestic	 services	 but	 exported	 by	 other	 sectors.	 This	 arguably	
explains	 the	 difference	 between	DVA	 and	 gross	 export-based	RCAs:	 sectors	 that	 are	
less	 tradable,	 such	as	 services,	may	be	 traded	 through	other	 sectors’	 exports,	which	
would	only	be	captured	by	DVA-based	RCA.		
In	 support	of	 this	 conjecture	we	 see	 in	 Figure	2.1	 that	 gross	export	RCA	 inflates	 the	
KIBS	 specialisation	of	 countries	 that	are	direct	exporters	of	 services	 (such	as	 the	UK,	
Luxembourg,	Singapore,	and	India),	while	 it	underestimates	the	service	specialisation	
of	 countries	 that	 are	 direct	 exporters	 of	 other	 sectors	 but	 that	 also	 have	 significant	
domestic	provision	of	services	(such	as	Australia,	France,	Germany,	and	Japan).		
In	 conclusion,	 we	 argue	 that	 value	 added	 based	 measures	 better	 capture	 the	 link	
between	trade	specialisation	and	the	underlying	domestic	economic	structure.	It	does	
this	by	 focusing	on	the	parts	of	 the	domestic	productive	structure	that	contribute	to	
countries’	export	performance,	either	directly	or	indirectly.		
Within	 this	 value	 added	 based	 approach	we	 are	 particularly	 interested	 in	 looking	 at	
how	the	evolution	of	countries	export	structure	 in	relation	to	trade	performance	has	
changed	 over	 time.	 We	 find	 some	 significant	 heterogeneity	 of	 these	 measures	 of	
specialisation	when	we	distinguish	between	high-income	and	developing	countries	 in	
our	sample3.	In	Figure	2.2	we	see	that	developing	countries	tend	to	have	much	starker	
specialisations,	 especially	 in	natural	 resources	and	 low-tech	manufacturing,	 although	
this	seems	to	decrease	over	time.	We	note	an	increase	over	time	of	the	specialisation	
in	high-tech	manufacturing;	however,	this	remains	smaller	than	high-income	countries.	
Developing	 countries	 seem	 to	 have	 been	 specialising	 away	 from	 KIBS,	 showing	 a	
slightly	decreasing	trend.																																																										3 We use the WB threshold of US$ 12,236 of GDP per capita. Table A1.2 reports number of years in which 
each country is above this threshold and therefore considered as high-income. 
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It	 is	worth	bearing	 in	mind	that	this	does	not	contradict	the	evidence	Rodrik	(2015b)	
puts	 forward	 concerning	 countries’	 premature	 deindustrialisation	 and	 shift	 towards	
services;	 Rodrik	 refers	 to	 low-productivity	 services,	 such	 as	 retail	 or	 non-tradable	
services,	that	are	not	KIBS.		
High-income	 countries	 have	 more	 homogeneous	 specialisations,	 with	 the	 RCA	 KIBS	
being	 consistently	 above	 1.	 On	 average,	 natural	 resources	 also	 exhibit	 a	 high	 RCA	
among	high-income	countries,	which	 is	most	 likely	explained	by	 the	presence	of	 few	
resource	 rich	countries	 in	our	 sample,	 such	as	Saudi	Arabia,	Brunei	and	Norway.	We	
can	also	see	a	decreasing	trend	in	the	specialisation	in	low-tech	manufacturing	among	
high-income	countries.	
Both	this,	and	the	strong	specialisation	in	KIBS	of	high-income	countries	are	consistent	
with	 the	 established	 view	 that,	 as	 income	 in	 countries	 increases,	 their	 specialisation	
tends	 to	move	away	 from	manufacturing	 towards	 services	 (Bah	2011).	 The	different	
specialisation	between	developing	and	high-income	economies	can	also	be	explained	
by	 the	 fragmentation	 of	 productive	 activities,	 in	 particular	 the	 offshoring	 of	
manufacturing	 towards	 developing	 countries	 with	 lower	 wages,	 while	 higher	 value	
added	 activities	 have	 been	 retained	 in	 high	 income	 economies;	 Baldwin	 and	 Lopez-
Gonzalez	(2015)	refer	to	these	as	head-quarter	economies.		
The	 fact	 that	 high-income	 countries	 tend	 to	 have	more	 homogeneous	 specialisation	
across	 sectors,	 and	 be	 more	 specialised	 in	 high-tech	 and	 knowledge	 intensive	
industries,	 is	 also	 to	 be	 expected.	 This	 is	 because	more	 advanced	 and	 sophisticated	
economies	will	 have	 a	 larger	 set	 of	 capabilities	 and	 therefore	 be	 able	 to	 produce	 a	
larger	 set	of	 goods	and	 services	 in	 a	 competitive	way	 (Hausmann	and	Hidalgo	2011;	
Hidalgo	and	Hausmann	2009;	Felipe	et	al.	2012).		
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Figure	2.2:	Average	RCA	over	the	years,	comparing	high-income	and	developing	countries	
Note:	Figure	2.2	shows	the	average	domestic	value	added	based	RCA	computed	across	all	countries	for	each	year,	
dividing	the	sample	between	high-income	and	developing	countries.	
Source:	Author’s	own	calculation	using	ICIO	tables.	
Overall	 it	 seems	 that,	 over	 time,	 countries	 have	 specialised	 away	 from	 low-tech	
manufacturing	 (especially	 high-income	 ones)	 and	 natural	 resources	 (especially	
developing	 ones),	with	 the	 largest	 changes	 taking	 place	 in	 these	 two	 sectors	 and	 in	
developing	countries.		
As	this	Chapter’s	aim	is	to	study	the	effect	of	changes	in	trade	specialisation	on	trade	
performance	with	a	value	added	approach,	we	now	turn	to	how	domestic	value	added	
in	 exports	 has	 evolved	 over	 time,	 looking	 again	 at	 high-income	 and	 developing	
countries	separately.	Figure	2.3	reports	the	yearly	average	changes	in	domestic	value	
added	exported.	We	can	clearly	observe	the	impact	of	the	financial	crisis	in	2007	and	
2009.	It	is	also	interesting	to	see	that,	in	its	aftermath,	developing	countries’	exports	in	
value	added	have	been	growing	at	a	higher	rate	than	high-income	countries.	The	crisis	
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years	thus	seem	to	be	significantly	different	from	the	rest	of	our	panel,	which	is	why	
our	analysis	will	also	explore	these	separately.		
	
Figure	2.3:	Average	change	in	DVA	across	countries	and	over	time,	comparing	high-income	
and	developing	countries,	thousands	of	US	dollars.	
Note:	Figure	2.3	shows	the	average	change	in	DVA	in	thousands	of	USD,	across	countries	for	every	year	in	our	
sample,	dividing	between	developing	and	high-income	countries.	
Source:	Author’s	own	calculation	using	ICIO	tables.	
In	conclusion,	we	find	some	considerable	changes	in	the	specialisation	pattern	across	
developing	 and	 high-income	 countries.	 Specialisation	 in	 natural	 resources	 and	 low-
tech	manufacturing	seem	to	have	changed	the	most,	with	a	decreasing	trend,	over	the	
years.	 In	contrast,	 specialisation	 in	KIBS	and	high-tech	manufacturing	has	been	more	
stable	over	the	years,	despite	a	decreasing	trend	among	developing	countries.	
These	 sectors	 appear	 to	 have	 been	 a	 more	 difficult	 specialisation	 trajectory	 for	
countries	to	undertake.	Based	on	this	preliminary	evidence	and	the	existing	literature	
reviewed,	we	would	expect	a	negative	impact	of	the	specialisation	in	natural	resources	
and	low-tech	manufacturing	on	countries’	growth	in	DVA	shares.		
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We	 also	 know	 that	 the	 relationship	 between	 export	 specialisation	 and	 economic	
performance	 is	 likely	 to	 be	 affected	 by	 reverse	 causality	 (Amable	 2000)	 and	 serial	
correlation.	 In	 the	next	 section	we	discuss	how	our	 econometric	 strategy	deals	with	
these,	as	well	as	how	we	compute	the	DVA	and	the	RCA	with	ICIO	data.		
	
2.4	Methodology	and	empirical	strategy	
In	 the	previous	 section	we	 reviewed	 the	growing	 literature	on	measurement	of	GVC	
participation	 and	 DVA	 in	 particular,	 arguing	 that	 such	 an	 approach	would	 allow	 the	
capturing	of	countries’	domestic	contribution	to	exports	in	a	more	accurate	way.		
As	 has	 been	 emphasised,	 the	 notion	 of	 speed	 of	 structural	 transformation	 is	
particularly	interesting	from	a	theoretical	point	of	view,	as	countries’	ability	to	rapidly	
shift	trade	specialisation	may	be	an	advantage	in	itself.	Secondly,	looking	at	changes	is	
conceptually	closer	to	structural	change	and	allows	the	capture	of	the	dynamic	effects	
related	to	growth	rates	rather	than	levels	(Timmer	et	al.	2014).	In	order	to	investigate	
this	dynamic	aspect	of	 changes	 in	countries’	 trade	specialisation,	 in	our	econometric	
approach	we	look	at	growth	rates,	i.e.	changes	in	the	log	of	the	variables.	
We	compute	the	DVA-based	measures	using	the	OECD	ICIO	tables.	Data	are	available	
for	64	countries	(including	a	compound	for	the	rest	of	the	World),	33	sectors	(including	
natural	resources,	manufacturing	and	services),	for	the	years	1995	to	2011	
We	compute	our	measure	of	countries’	DVA	in	gross	exports	as	follows:	
𝐷𝑉𝐴! = 𝑉!(𝐼 − 𝐴)!!𝐸  
Where	V’	is	a	diagonalised	vector,	yielding	a	ij	x	ij	diagonal	matrix	where	all	elements	
of	the	diagonal	are	populated	with	the	value	added	output	shares	for	each	country	 i	
and	sector	j.		
(I-A)-1	is	an	inter-country	Leontief	inverse	matrix	capturing	the	inter-industry	linkages.	
This	matrix	captures	the	relationship	between	all	sectors	from	all	countries.	
E	is	a	ij	x	1	column	vector	including	sector’s	export	in	each	country,	i.e.	the	value	added	
generated	by	 country	 i	 and	exported	either	 through	 foreign	 final	 demand	or	 foreign	
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intermediate	demand,	netting	out,	however,	the	value	added	that	is	then	reimported	
to	meet	country	i’s	own	final	demand.	We	obtain	DVAij,	which	is	an	ij	x	1	column	vector	
containing	each	 country	 i’s	 and	 sector	 j’s	domestic	 value	added	 in	exports.	We	 then	
aggregate	across	all	sectors	and	obtain	our	variable	DVA.		
We	then	take	each	country	 i’s	 share	 in	worldwide	 flows	of	DVA,	and	divide	 it	by	 the	
share	the	country	represents	of	the	world	population	as	follows:	
𝐷𝑉𝐴𝑆𝐻 = 𝐷𝑉𝐴!𝐷𝑉𝐴!!𝑝𝑜𝑝𝑢𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛!𝑝𝑜𝑝𝑢𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛!!  
This	 ratio	 captures	 the	 extent	 to	 which	 a	 country	 accounts	 for	 total	 DVA	 flows,	
normalised	by	population,	considering	that	larger	countries	account	for	a	larger	share	
of	total	DVA	flows.		
Our	main	explanatory	variables	are	computed	as	the	Balassa	index	(Balassa	1965),	but	
we	use	domestic	value	added	flows	rather	than	gross	exports	as	follows:		
𝑅𝐶𝐴!" =  𝐷𝑉𝐴!"𝐷𝑉𝐴!𝐷𝑉𝐴!"! 𝐷𝑉𝐴!!  
We	use	the	share	that	our	sector	of	interest	j	represents	in	the	domestic	value	added	
embodied	 in	 the	 exports	 of	 country	 i	 and	weight	 this	 with	 the	 share	 that	 domestic	
value	added	 from	sector	 j	 represents	 in	world	wide	value	added	 flows.	We	compute	
this	RCA	index	for	four	groups	of	industries:	KIBS,	NR,	LTMF	and	HTMF4.	
So,	 the	 general	 form	 of	 the	 estimated	 equation	 in	 our	 econometric	 analysis	 is	 the	
following:		
𝑑𝑣𝑎𝑠ℎ! = 𝛽! + 𝛽!𝑑𝑣𝑎𝑠ℎ!!!+𝛽!𝑡𝑓𝑝! + 𝛽!𝑘𝑖𝑏𝑠!"!! + 𝛽!𝑛𝑟_𝑟𝑐𝑎!+ 𝛽!𝑙𝑡𝑚𝑓_𝑟𝑐𝑎! + 𝛽!ℎ𝑡𝑚𝑓_𝑟𝑐𝑎! + 𝛽!𝑠𝑒𝑐𝑒𝑛𝑟𝑜𝑙! + 𝛽!𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑛𝑒𝑡𝑎𝑐𝑐𝑒𝑠𝑠!+ 𝛼! + 𝛼! + 𝜀! 
																																																								4 A detailed breakdown of how these sectors are aggregated is provided in the Appendix in Table A1 
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Where	dvasht	is	the	growth	rate	of	DVASH	at	time	t,	and	all	variables	are	expressed	in	
changes;	αt	 and	αi	 are	 year	 and	 country	 fixed	 effects	 (FE)	 respectively;	 _rcat	 are	 the	
growth	rates	of	the	RCA	of	the	four	groups	of	industries	discussed	above.	
Both	human	capital	and	 technological	 capabilities	play	a	 significant	 role	 in	countries’	
trade	 specialisation	 and	 competitiveness	 (Guerrieri	 and	 Meliciani	 2005).	 For	 this	
reason	we	 control	 for	 both	 of	 them,	 using	 gross	 enrolment	 in	 secondary	 education	
(secenrol)	 and	 Internet	users	per	1,000	 inhabitants	 (internetaccess),	both	 taken	 from	
the	World	Bank’s	World	Development	Indicators.		
Finally,	we	also	acknowledge	 that	having	 such	aggregated	data	may	not	 capture	 the	
inter-country	 differences	 in	 productivity	 and	 development,	 which	 are	 likely	 to	 be	
related	to	both	our	outcome	and	explanatory	variables.	For	instance,	being	specialised	
in	KIBS	in	Singapore	is	probably	not	the	same	as	in	Peru.	More	productive	countries	are	
also	more	likely	to	participate	to	trade	and	to	have	a	specific	specialisation.	In	order	to	
deal	with	this	 issue	we	also	control	 for	countries’	 total	 factor	productivity	 (tfp)	using	
the	Penn	World	Tables.	
We	perform	our	analysis	using	 the	 system	generalised	methods	of	moments	 (GMM)	
developed	by	Blundell	and	Bond	(1998),	which	deals	more	efficiently	with	models	with	
high	persistence	 like	ours	 than	the	 first-differences	GMM	developed	by	Arellano	and	
Bond	 (1991).	 We	 estimate	 the	 two-step	 robust	 version	 of	 system	 GMM	 with	 the	
Windmeijer	correction	to	deal	with	heteroscedasticity	and	 finite	sample	 (Windmeijer	
2005).		
Using	 GMM	 allows	 us	 to	 deal	 with	 the	 potential	 reverse	 causality	 that	 could	 affect	
ordinary	 least	 squares	 (OLS)	 estimators,	 by	 using	 lags	 of	 the	 observed	 variables	 as	
instruments.	In	fact,	while	trade	specialisation	may	indeed	impact	countries	DVA,	it	is	
also	possible	that	countries	that	export	more	value	added	tend	to	specialise	 in	some	
sectors	in	particular.	Using	lags	to	instrument	within	our	sample	allows	us	to	deal	with	
the	simultaneity	of	the	relationship	between	countries’	 trade	specialisation	and	their	
trade	performance	within	GVCs.		
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Finally,	 we	 opt	 for	 an	 autoregressive	model	 as	 exports	 in	 panel	 data	 often	 present	
serial	correlation.	This	means	that	the	outcome	variable	and	 its	 lag	are	correlated	by	
construction	 through	 the	 FE,	 and	 that	 OLS	 estimators	 would	 be	 biased	 and	
inconsistent.	The	system	GMM,	by	 instrumenting	with	past	 lags,	deals	with	this	 issue	
too.	
	
2.5	Econometric	results	and	discussion	
The	 ICIO	 data	 cover	 a	 rather	 long	 span	 of	 time	 including	 the	 financial	 crisis	 (2007	
onwards),	which	we	have	 seen	 shows	 a	 significantly	 different	 pattern	 from	previous	
years.		
Table	 2.1	 reports	 the	 results	 of	 our	main	model	 results	 for	 all	 years	 available	 in	our	
data,	 as	 well	 as	 for	 the	 crisis	 years	 only.	 As	 expected,	 natural	 resources	 exert	 a	
negative	and	significant	effect	on	the	growth	of	export	shares	during	all	 the	years	 in	
our	sample.	This	is	largely	consistent	with	an	established	view	of	natural	resources	as	a	
sector	with	low	productivity	dynamic	(Matsuyama	1992).	
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Table	2.1:	GMM	results	on	the	effect	of	increases	in	trade	specialisation	on	growth	of	
export	shares,	in	value	added	terms	
		 (1)	 (2)	
VARIABLES	 All	years	 Crisis	years	
		 		 		
dvash	 -0.0606	 -0.282***	
	 (0.0455)	 (0.0488)	
tfp	 0.715***	 1.046***	
	 (0.196)	 (0.238)	
kbs_rca	 -0.00295	 0.118*	
	 (0.0392)	 (0.0631)	
nr_rca	 -0.170***	 -0.00891	
	 (0.0560)	 (0.0540)	
ltm_rca	 -0.183**	 -0.153**	
	 (0.0761)	 (0.0741)	
htm_rca	 0.0104	 0.0250	
	 (0.0561)	 (0.0692)	
secenrol	 -0.00136	 0.000180	
	 (0.00130)	 (0.00149)	
Internet	access	 0.00178	 0.00151	
	 (0.00158)	 (0.00254)	
Constant	 0.0870**	 0.0118	
	 (0.0379)	 (0.0162)	
	 	 	
Observations	 780	 278	
Number	of	groups	 59	 59	
AR(2)	 0.852	 0.398	
Hansen	test	
overidentification	 0.477	 0.135	
Difference-in-Hansen	 0.606	 0.473	
System	GMM	estimates	on	the	effect	of	increases	in	specialisation	for	each	of	the	four	sector	groups	on	
countries’	 share	 in	domestic	 value	added	 in	exports.	The	 four	 sector	groups	are:	 knowledge	 intensive	
business	 services	 (KIBS),	 natural	 resources	 (NR),	 low-	 and	 high-tech	 manufacturing	 (LTM	 and	 HTM,	
respectively).	Education	is	gross	enrolment	in	secondary	education;	Internet	access	is	Internet	users	per	
thousand	inhabitants.	Crisis	years	are	2007-2011.	
Standard	errors	in	parentheses,	all	variables	in	changes,	_rca	and	_shr	in	natural	logs.		
For	the	AR	and	Hansen	tests	the	p	values	are	reported.		
***	p<0.01,	**	p<0.05,	*	p<0.1	
Source:	author’s	own	calculation	using	ICIO	tables.	
Low-tech	 manufacturing	 also	 has	 a	 negative	 impact	 on	 our	 outcome	 variable,	 both	
when	 looking	 at	 the	 crisis	 years	 or	 at	 all	 the	 years.	 This	was	 also	 expected	 and	 has	
significant	implications	for	developing	countries	in	particular	for	at	least	two	reasons.	
First,	these	countries	seem	to	be	more	specialised	in	low-tech	manufacturing	and	are	
moving	away	from	this	sector	at	a	slower	pace	than	high-income	countries	(see	Figure	
2.3);	 second,	 while	 manufacturing	 has	 traditionally	 been	 regarded	 as	 the	 engine	 of	
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growth,	 and	 low-tech	 manufacturing	 as	 a	 stepping-stone	 for	 structural	 change	 and	
industrial	upgrading,	we	have	seen	while	reviewing	the	literature	that	some	doubt	has	
been	cast	over	this	notion	(Rodrik	2016a;	Szirmai	and	Verspagen	2015).		
Moreover,	we	do	not	detect	any	significant	impact	of	high-tech	manufacturing	on	the	
growth	of	export	shares.	However,	this	 is	not	completely	unexpected,	both	based	on	
the	descriptive	evidence	showing	specialisation	in	this	sector	to	be	rather	stable	over	
the	time	span	considered	(see	Figure	2.2	and	2.3),	and	the	evidence	for	a	similar	year	
period	 offered	 by	 Szirmai	 and	 Verspagen	 (2015).	 They	 examine	 structural	 change	
between	 1950	 and	 2005,	 and,	 in	 the	 last	 decade,	 find	 a	 slowing	 down	 of	
manufacturing’s	beneficial	effect	on	growth	and	an	increased	dependence	on	human	
capital	for	manufacturing	to	be	exerting	its	traditional	role	of	engine	of	growth.		
Concerning	KIBS,	we	do	not	detect	 any	 significant	effect,	 except	a	weakly	 significant	
and	 positive	 coefficient	 for	 the	 crisis	 years.	 These	 results	 do	 not	 allow,	 however,	
considering	 as	 unwarranted	 Rodrik's	 (2015b)	 concerns	 with	 respect	 to	 developing	
countries’	 structural	 change	 towards	 services	 and	 its	 consequences	 on	 economic	
development.	
One	of	the	main	limitations	of	the	ICIO	data	is	the	high	level	of	aggregation	of	sectors,	
while	a	wide	range	of	countries	are	included.	As	seen	while	discussing	the	descriptive	
evidence,	 our	 specialisation	 measures	 exhibit	 significant	 heterogeneity	 across	
countries	based	on	the	development	level	of	the	country.	We	try	to	account	for	this	by	
including	 total	 factor	productivity	as	a	 control,	which	has	a	 consistently	positive	and	
significant	effect,	as	expected.		
We	wish	 to	 explore	more	 in	 depth	whether	 specialisation	 in	 any	of	 our	 four	macro-
sectors	 has	 different	 impacts	 on	 countries	 depending	 on	 their	 income	 level.	 We	
achieve	 this	by	 interacting	our	 specialisation	 variables	with	a	dummy	variable,	dvpd,	
taking	value	1	if	the	country	is	high-income	and	0	otherwise.	
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Table	2.2:	GMM	results	on	the	effect	of	increases	in	trade	specialisation	on	growth	of	
export	shares,	in	value	added	terms,	controlling	for	income	level	
		 (1)	 (2)	
VARIABLES	 All	years	 Crisis	years	
		 		 		
dvash	 -0.0522	 -0.274***	
	 (0.182)	 (0.0723)	
dvpd	 -0.0618*	 -0.0727	
	 (0.0366)	 (0.0445)	
tfp	 1.152	 0.953***	
	 (0.801)	 (0.354)	
kbs_rca	 -0.277	 0.214***	
	 (0.253)	 (0.0560)	
kibs_rca*dvpd	 -0.249	 -0.0396	
	 (0.368)	 (0.155)	
nr_rca	 -0.303	 -0.0179	
	 (0.295)	 (0.109)	
nr_rca*dvpd	 -0.233	 0.0183	
	 (0.179)	 (0.0771)	
ltm_rca	 -0.980***	 -0.0815	
	 (0.363)	 (0.117)	
ltm_rca*dvpd	 0.279	 -0.0158	
	 (0.211)	 (0.118)	
htm_rca	 -0.00881	 0.218**	
	 (0.200)	 (0.0976)	
htm_rca*dvpd	 -0.151	 -0.0775	
	 (0.154)	 (0.0682)	
secenrol	 0.000506	 -0.00243	
	 (0.00912)	 (0.00170)	
internetaccess	 -0.00300	 0.00240	
	 (0.00351)	 (0.00267)	
Constant	 0.0619	 0.0352	
	 (0.0924)	 (0.0505)	
	 	 	
Observations	 780	 278	
Number	of	groups	 59	 59	
AR(2)	 0.557	 0.113	
Hansen	test	overidentification	 0.371	 0.139	
Difference-in-Hansen	 0.278	 0.735	
System	GMM	estimates	on	the	effect	of	increases	in	specialisation	for	each	of	the	four	sector	groups	on	
countries’	 share	 in	domestic	 value	added	 in	exports.	The	 four	 sector	groups	are:	 knowledge	 intensive	
business	 services	 (KIBS),	 natural	 resources	 (NR),	 low-	 and	 high-tech	 manufacturing	 (LTM	 and	 HTM,	
respectively).	Education	is	gross	enrolment	in	secondary	education;	Internet	access	is	Internet	users	per	
thousand	inhabitants;	dvpd	is	a	dummy	variable	taking	value	1	if	the	country	has	a	GDP	per	capita	above	
US$	12,236.	Crisis	years	are	2007-2011.	
Standard	errors	 in	parentheses,	all	variables	 in	changes,	_rca	and	_shr	 in	natural	 logs.	For	 the	AR	and	
Hansen	tests	the	p	values	are	reported.	
***	p<0.01,	**	p<0.05,	*p<0.1	
Source:	Author’s	own	calculation	using	ICIO	tables.	
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When	 controlling	 for	 income	 levels	 we	 find	 some	 interesting	 results,	 although	 it	 is	
worth	 noting	 that	 the	 interacted	 terms	 are	 not	 statistically	 significant,	 hence	
specialisation	patterns	do	not	seem	to	affect	high-income	countries	in	a	different	way	
from	low-income	countries.		
Low-tech	manufacturing	still	exerts	a	negative	effect,	which	is	consistent	with	what	we	
found	 in	 our	 previous	 specification.	 Natural	 resources,	while	maintaining	 a	 negative	
sign,	 do	 not	 seem	 to	 have	 any	 significant	 impact	 on	 export	 share	 growth,	 once	we	
control	 for	 countries	 levels	 of	 income.	 This	 suggests	 that	 the	 negative	 impact	 of	
increasing	 specialisation	 in	 this	 sector	 on	 countries’	 DVA	 share	 depends	 on	 income	
rather	 than	 the	 natural	 resource	 sector	 per	 se.	 Interestingly,	 we	 also	 find	 high-tech	
manufacturing	and	KIBS	to	exert	positive	effects,	although	only	during	the	crisis	years,	
i.e.	from	2007	onwards;	this	suggests	that	when	global	demand	contracts,	this	is	likely	
to	 affect	 less	 high-tech	manufacturing	 and	 KIBS.	 Concerning	 the	 latter,	 this	 result	 is	
consistent	with	our	findings	in	Table	2.1.		
While	we	find	no	evidence	concerning	the	long-term	effect	of	increasing	specialisation	
in	 technology	 and	 knowledge	 intensive	 sectors	 on	 countries’	 export	 shares,	 these	
results	 suggest	 that	 in	periods	of	 crisis,	 such	 industries	may	prove	 to	be	a	beneficial	
specialisation	trajectory.		
	
2.6	Discussion	and	concluding	remarks	
This	 Chapter	 has	 looked	 at	 the	 effect	 of	 the	 acceleration	 in	 the	 pace	 of	 trade	
specialisation	on	countries’	trade	performance.	We	also	explore	which	sectors	provide	
a	beneficial	specialisation	path.		
This	 Chapter	 shows	 that	 the	 emergence	 of	 GVCs	 has	 increased	 the	 divide	 between	
domestic	 productive	 structure	 and	 countries’	 trade	 specialisation,	 as	 an	 increasing	
share	of	gross	exports	stems	from	imported	input	produced	abroad.	In	order	for	trade	
specialisation	to	be	representative	of	countries’	domestic	contribution,	 it	 is	therefore	
crucial	to	take	a	value	added	approach.		
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We	 take	 such	 an	 approach	 to	 compute	 both	 our	 specialisation	 measures	 and	 the	
export	 shares	 of	 each	 country.	 This	 methodological	 novelty	 reflects	 a	 different	
theoretical	 understanding	 of	 trade	 flows	 that	 are	 not	 the	 outcome	 of	 countries	
independent	 production	 but	 rather	 of	 cross-country	 interdependencies.	 This	 is	 the	
result	 of	 the	 fragmentation	 of	 production	 and	 emergence	 of	 GVCs	 that	make	 gross	
exports	 an	 unreliable	 measure	 of	 countries’	 domestic	 production	 structure.	 As	 a	
consequence,	researchers	seeking	to	infer	capabilities	from	countries’	export	structure	
should	be	wary	of	using	gross	exports;	this	is	because	they	would	be	capturing	part	of	
the	value	added	that	has	been	provided	by	other	countries.		
This	is	also	very	relevant	for	policy	makers	designing	export-oriented	policies	that	need	
to	ensure	 that	changes	 in	gross	export	specialisation	also	drive	changes	 in	countries’	
domestic	productive	structure.		
In	 addition	 to	 this	 novel	 view	 on	 trade	 specialisation,	 which	 can	 now	 be	 linked	 to	
domestic	economic	structure,	we	also	look	at	the	dynamics	of	specialisation	trajectory	
and	its	outcome	in	terms	of	export	shares.		
We	 find	 evidence	 that	 is,	 broadly	 speaking,	 in	 line	 with	 the	 large	 literature	 on	
manufacturing,	 in	 particular	 the	 most	 recent	 contributions	 highlighting	 a	 potential	
change	in	the	role	of	this	sector	for	economic	growth.	While	taking	a	methodologically	
different	approach,	our	 results	 support	 the	 findings	of	Szirmai	and	Verspagen	 (2015)	
who	 look	 at	 structural	 change	 between	 1950	 and	 2005	 and	 find	 that	 “since	 1990,	
manufacturing	 is	becoming	a	 somewhat	more	difficult	 route	 to	growth	 than	before”	
(Szirmai	and	Verspagen	2015,	p.58).		
Our	results	also	suggest	that	countries	increasing	their	specialisation	towards	low-tech	
manufacturing	 are	 unlikely	 to	 see	 their	 trade	 performance	 improve	 at	 a	 faster	 rate.	
This	can	be	because	competing	in	low-tech	manufacturing	has	become	harder	as	China	
rose	to	be	the	world’s	main	manufacturer,	exploiting	its	large	endowment	in	low	cost	
labour.		
Another,	 speculative,	 explanation	 could	 be	 that	 before	 the	 emergence	 of	 GVCs,	
specialisation	in	low-tech	manufacturing	would	also	foster	domestic	linkages	with	the	
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high-tech	 sectors,	 whereas	 now	 these	 linkages	 are	 across	 borders,	 as	 these	 two	
activities	no	longer	need	to	take	place	in	the	same	country	or	region.	
Concerning	high-tech	manufacturing,	we	find	rather	weak	evidence	that	this	could	be	a	
beneficial	specialisation	pattern,	since	we	only	detect	positive	effects	when	looking	at	
the	crisis	period	and	accounting	for	income	differences	across	countries.		
High-tech	manufacturing	 is	usually	considered	a	sector	with	fast	productivity	growth,	
although	 in	 the	 last	 decade	 its	 effects	 on	 growth	 seem	 to	 be	 fading	 (Rodrik	 2016a;	
Szirmai	and	Verspagen	2015;	Szirmai	2012).	From	a	development	standpoint,	high-tech	
manufacturing	may	 prove	 to	 be	 a	 difficult	 industry	 in	which	 to	 specialise,	 as	 can	 be	
seen	in	Figure	1.3,	because	it	is	likely	to	have	higher	barriers	to	entry.	In	addition,	one	
could	wonder	how	big	a	share	of	labour	this	sector	will	be	able	to	absorb,	especially	in	
developing	countries.	This	may	explain	why	we	find	no	significant	results	for	high-tech	
manufacturing	when	we	do	not	take	into	account	income	differences	across	countries.		
Finally,	a	novel	aspect	of	this	research	is	the	inclusion	of	services,	that	tend	to	be	often	
exported	 indirectly,	 i.e.	embodied	 in	manufacturing	exports,	and	for	which	our	value	
added	approach	is	particularly	suited.		
Services	have	traditionally	been	considered	less	dynamic	by	the	literature	on	structural	
change	and	economic	development	(Baumol	1967;	Rodrik	2013;	Timmer	et	al.	2014),	
although	 an	 emerging	 stream	 of	 research	 has	 been	 looking	 at	 the	 off-shoring	 of	
services	towards	developing	countries,	as	a	consequence	of	the	emergence	of	service	
GVCs,	in	a	rather	optimistic	way	(Gary	Gereffi	and	Fernandez-Stark	2010).		
Our	 results	 offer	 no	 strong	 evidence	 in	 support	 of	 the	 idea	 that	 increased	
specialisation	 in	KIBS	may	be	beneficial	 to	countries’	export	performance	 in	 the	 long	
run.	We	 find,	 as	 for	 high-tech	manufacturing,	 a	 positive	 effect	 only	 during	 the	 crisis	
years.	Overall,	this	evidence	seem	to	justify	Rodrik’s	concern	about	what	he	refers	to	
as	premature	de-industrialisation	of	developing	countries	(Rodrik	2016a,	2015b).	From	
a	 policy	 perspective,	 it	 also	 warrants	 caution	 when	 considering	 the	 increasing	 off-
shoring	 of	 services	 (Fernandez-Stark	 and	 Gereffi,	 2011)	 as	 a	 new	 developmental	
avenue	 for	 low	 and	middle	 income	 countries.	 Our	 results	 suggest	 in	 fact	 that	while	
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increasing	specialisation	KIBS	could	offer	a	short-term	increase	 in	the	domestic	value	
added	in	gross	export,	this	may	have	no	significant	effect	in	the	long-run.	
Our	 results	 are	 somewhat	weakened	 by	 the	 high	 level	 of	 aggregation	 and	 relatively	
short	time	span	covered	by	our	data.	Related	to	this,	another	shortcoming	of	the	data	
is	also	the	relative	 low	number	of	observations,	which	may	question	the	reliability	of	
the	GMM.	This	methodology	 is	 designed	 for	 instances	with	a	 small	 number	of	 years	
but	 a	 large	 number	 of	 observations	 for	 each	 cross-section;	 to	mitigate	 this	we	have	
tried	 several	 combination	 of	 instruments,	 choosing	 the	 most	 robust	 ones	 and	 also	
relying	on	the	Hansen	and	Arellano	tests	for	overidentification	and	serial	correlation,	
respectively.	 	 Taking	 stock	 on	 this	 however,	 future	 research	 should	 look	 at	 more	
disaggregated	sectors	over	longer	time	periods.		
Exploring	 trade	 in	 value	 added	 at	 a	 more	 granular	 level	 is	 crucial	 because	 trade	 is	
involving	 more	 and	 more	 intermediates,	 and	 production	 is	 increasingly	 being	
fragmented	 across	 countries	 in	 terms	 of	 tasks	 rather	 than	 products	 (Grossman	 and	
Rossi-Hansberg	2006;	 Lanz	 et	 al.	 2011):	working	with	 aggregated	manufacturing	 and	
services	 categories	 may	 hide	 substantial	 differences.	 An	 additional	 advantage	 of	
focusing	on	tasks	across	sectors	is	that	this	allows	exploring	the	relationship	between	
the	 fragmentation	 of	 production	 and	 employment	 related	 issues	 such	 as	 skills	
requirement	and	wages.	Unfortunately	 there	 is	 still	a	 lack	of	 reliable	data	 to	explore	
these	 issues	 at	 a	 high	 level	 of	 disaggregation	 both	 in	 high-income	 and	 especially	 in	
developing	countries.	
Moreover,	 the	 increasing	 fragmentation	of	production	across	countries,	and	 the	blur	
of	 the	 divide	 between	manufacturing	 and	 services,	 brings	 up	 the	 issue	 of	 domestic	
inter-sectoral	 linkages.	 This	 in	 turn	 raises	 the	 question	 of	 the	 relationship	 between	
domestic	 economic	 structure	 and	GVC	 participation	 and	 performance,	which	 should	
also	be	explored	by	future	work.		 	
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3.	Revisiting	the	Natural	Resource	“Curse”	in	the	context	of	
trade	in	value	added:	Enclave	or	high-development	backward	
linkages?	
Abstract		
The	 Chapter	 puts	 forward	 and	 empirically	 tests	 the	 conjecture	 that	 specialisation	 in	 Natural	
Resource	Industries	(NRI)	might	not	necessarily	be	a	“curse”	for	(developing)	countries,	to	the	
extent	 that	 it	provides	opportunities	 for	export	diversification	 in	backward	 linked	sectors	à	 la	
Hirschman.	We	first	revisit	the	evolution	of	the	debate	around	the	NRI	“curse”,	including	those	
views	that	are	sceptical	of	diversification	based	on	beneficiation	from	NRI.	We	then	empirically	
test	whether	NRI	might	represent	a	sufficient	“domestic	representative	demand”	à	la	Linder	for	
backward	 linked	 sectors	 such	 as	 Knowledge	 Intensive	 Business	 Services	 (KIBS)	 or	 high	 tech	
manufacturing	 that	 might	 provide	 new	 opportunities	 for	 export	 diversification	 based	 on	
virtuous	pathways	of	domestic	structural	change.	We	find	empirical	support	for	this	conjecture	
and	discuss	our	results	as	a	contribution	to	revisiting	the	NRI	curse	debate.		
	
3.1	Introduction		
Countries	 rich	 in	 or	 dependent	 on	 Natural	 Resources	 (NR)5	 might	 be	 “blessed”	 or	
“cursed”,	 depending	 on	 a	 large	 number	 of	 factors.	 The	 literature	 has	 copiously	
analysed	these,	as	effectively	summarised	in	some	of	the	most	recent	reviews	(Badeeb	
et	al.	2017;	Havranek	et	al.	2016;	Van	Der	Ploeg	and	Poelhekke	2017).		
The	term	“Natural	Resource	Curse”	was	first	coined	by	Auty	(Auty	1993,	1987)	and	is	
now	 commonly	 referenced.	 This	 is	 since	 the	 publication	 of	 a	 widely	 cited	 work	 by	
Sachs	 and	Warner	 (Sachs	 and	Warner	 1995,	 1997).	 In	 a	 nutshell,	 the	 “curse”	 thesis	
argues	 that	 countries	 rich	 in	 or	 dependent	 on	 NR	 experience	 low	 and/or	 stagnant	
growth	performance,	with	detrimental	consequences	for	their	development	(Venables	
2016;	Harding	and	Venables	2016).																																																										5	 NR	 is	 commonly	 intended	 to	 be	 non-renewable	 extractive	 industries	 such	 as	 oil	 and	 gas.	 The	
renewables,	such	as	forestry,	water,	 land	that	produce	raw	material	and	commodities,	usually	fall	 into	
the	primary	activities.	Here	we	look	at	both	types	of	sectors,	as	detailed	below.	The	literature	on	the	NR	
“curse”	 instead	 tends	 to	 associate	 NR	 primarily	 with	 extractive	 industries.	 Broadly,	 and	 based	 on	
Venables	(2016),	countries	rich	in	NR	have	at	 least	20%	of	their	export	or	fiscal	revenues	coming	from	
NR.	For	countries	dependent	on	NR,	this	share	is	at	least	50%.		
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The	 theoretical	 explanations	 and	 empirical	 grounding	 of	 the	 NR	 curse	 include	 a	
classical	argument	of	factors	crowding-out,	i.e.	production	inputs	that	are	moved	away	
from	non-resources	activities,	as	well	as	trade	related	issues	such	as	the	worsening	of	
the	 balance	 of	 payment	 and	 terms	 of	 trade	 due	 to	 the	 contraction	 of	 the	 non-
resources	tradable	sectors	(the	well-known	Dutch	disease,	more	below)	(Corden	1982;	
Corden	 1984)	 and	 the	 volatility	 of	 commodity6	 prices,	 which	 makes	 resource	 rents	
uncertain.	 Moreover	 natural	 resource	 rich	 countries	 will	 miss	 the	 learning-by-doing	
opportunity,	stemming	from	the	maintenance	of	a	core	non-resource	(manufacturing	
mainly)	 sector	 (Torvik	 2001).	 Finally,	 the	 scholarship	 has	 also	 noted	 a	 negative	
association	of	NR	dependence	with	quality	of	institutions	(Mehlum	et	al.	2006).		
It	 is	also	worth	noting	 tha	a	high	heterogeneity	 in	 the	 type	of	natural	 resources	 (i.e.	
coal	 rather	 than	oil	 or	diamonds),	 levels	of	 initial	 investments,	quality	of	 institutions	
and	 the	public	management	of	 rents	 (Havranek	et	 al.	 2016)	make	 the	presence	of	 a	
“curse”	 largely	heterogeneous	across	countries.	The	 literature	has	 identified	cases	of	
growth-adverse	NR	dependence	 (e.g.	 RDC,	Angola,	 and	many	African	 countries)	 that	
are	 counter-balanced	 by	 cases	 of	 a	 growth-enhancing	 one	 (e.g.	 Botswana,	 Norway,	
Chile,	 Australia)	 (Venables	 2016).	 Overall,	 the	 latest	 two	 decades	 of	 scholarship	 has	
shown	 large	 country	 heterogeneity	 on	 the	 presence	 of	 an	 NR	 “curse”,	 so	 that	 a	
negative	 relationship	 between	 NR	 endowment	 (abundance	 or	 dependence)	 and	
growth	has	not	proven	to	be	conclusive	(James	2015;	Badeeb	et	al.	2017).		
One	of	the	arguments	contributing	to	the	NR	curse	debate	-	of	particular	interest	here	
-	is	the	link	between	NR	abundance/dependence,	domestic	structural	change,	and	the	
trade	patterns	of	NR	industries	(NRI	from	now	on)	versus	non-resource	industries.	For	
instance,	trade	scholars	have	developed	the	Dutch	disease	argument	by	looking	at	the	
link	 between	 NR	 and	 non-resource	 sector	 exports,	 with	 a	 particular	 interest	 in	
developing	 countries	 (Torvik	 2001;	 Harding	 and	 Venables	 2016).	 It	 has	 been	 argued	
that,	because	NR	exports	might	be	detrimental	to	non-resource	tradables,	it	is	difficult	
																																																								6	 The	 term	 “commodity”	 generally	 refers	 to	 homogenous	 goods	 whose	 market	 cannot	 be	 easily	
fragmented.	This	is	often,	although	not	exclusively,	the	case	for	the	production	of	both	renewable	and	
non-renewable	natural	resource	sectors.	Henceforth,	we	refer	to	both	of	these	when	we	use	the	term	
commodity.		
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to	 achieve	 diversification	 through	 industrial	 policies	 and	 “move	 away”	 from	 NR	
(Harding	and	Venables	2016;	Venables	2016).		
The	 issue	of	diversification	 in	NR	rich	countries,	 traditionally	envisaged	as	away	from	
NRI,	towards	an	(export-driven)	manufacturing	sector,	calls	for	adequate	attention	to	
the	role	of	the	structure	of	the	domestic	economy.	The	importance	of	the	structure	of	
sectoral	 (backward	 and	 forward)	 linkages,	 alongside	 the	 levels	 of	 exports	 in	NR	 and	
non-resources	industries,	has	started	to	become	more	widely	recognised	(Baldwin	and	
Venables,	2015;	Cust	and	Poelhekke,	2015).		
The	case	for	making	good	use	of	backward	and	forward	linkages	within	development	
policies	 is	not	new,	and	dates	back	 to	 the	seminal	work	by	development	economists	
such	as	Hirschman	and	Rostow	 (Hirschman,	1958;	Rostow,	1960).7	Hirschman	took	a	
remarkably	 original	 stand	 with	 respect	 to	 the	 mainstream	 growth	 theory	 based	 on	
factor	 endowments.	 The	 role	 of	 linkages	 in	Hirschman’s	work	 serves	 the	 purpose	of	
creating	 new	 sectors	 by	 way	 of	 scalable	 intermediate	 demand,	 and	 therefore	
represents	 a	 useful	 device	 to	 identify	 strategies	 of	 industrial	 policy	 that	 favour	
diversification	of	the	sectoral	composition	of	economies.		
When	it	comes	to	the	issue	of	diversifying	away	from	NR,	the	linkages	framework,	and	
specifically	 the	 argument	 of	 beneficiation	 (that	 is	 the	 development	 of	 downstream,	
forward-linked	manufacturing	industries	that	process	raw	materials	and	NR)	has	been	
criticised	despite	a	substantial	paucity	of	recent	specific	contributions.	Hausmann	et	al.	
(2008),	 for	 instance,	 argue	 that	 policies	 aimed	 at	 beneficiation	 are	 misguided,	 as	
diversification	 should	 be	 based	 on	 similarity	 of	 factor	 and	 technological	 capabilities	
intensity	 rather	 than	 vertical	 linkages,	 most	 especially	 when	 NR	 is	 concerned.	 The	
argument,	within	the	product	space	framework	(Hidalgo	et	al.	2007;	Hausmann	et	al.	
2007),	 seems	 to	 have	 been	 crafted	 only	 with	 respect	 to	 beneficiation	 (i.e.	 forward-
linked	 industries),	 rather	 than	 to	backward-linked	ones,	 that	are	 those	 that	could	be	
demanded	by	NRI	as	intermediate	inputs.																																																										7	 According	 to	 Hirschman	 (1958),	 there	 are	 different	 types	 of	 externalities,	 depending	 on	 whether	
activities	 are	 related	 to	 one	 another	 by	 backward	 or	 forward	 inducement	 mechanisms,	 i.e.	 whether	
certain	 sectors,	 by	 demanding	 inputs,	 induce	 the	 growth	 of	 supplier	 industries	 (input-provision	 or	
backward	linkage	effect)	or,	rather,	by	supplying	output	 induce	the	growth	of	client	 industries	(output	
provision	or	forward	linkage	effect).	
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This	 Chapter	 aims	 to	 revisit	 the	 role	 of	 Hirschman	 linkages,	 particularly	 of	 NR	
backward-linked	 business	 services,	 to	 identify	 whether	 new	 patterns	 of	 export	
diversification	 in	 NR	 rich	 countries	 can	 emerge,	 depending	 on	 the	 revealed	
comparative	 advantage	 in	NR	of	 countries,	 and	by	distinguishing	between	extractive	
industries	and	agriculture.	We	aim	therefore	to	contribute	to	the	NR	curse	debate	by	
offering	a	novel	perspective	and	empirical	 evidence	 that	might	 ground	a	whole	new	
set	of	reflections	on	how	to	craft	industrial,	trade	and	development	policies	for	NR-rich	
emerging	countries.		
We	 claim	 that	 for	 NR-rich	 countries,	 many	 of	 which	 are	 emerging	 economies,	 a	
specialisation	in	NRI	might	not	necessarily	be	a	“curse”,	to	the	extent	that	it	provides	
opportunities	 for	 export	 diversification	 in	 backward-linked	 sectors	 à	 la	 Hirschman.	
Such	 opportunities	 might	 be	 based	 on	 virtuous	 pathways	 of	 domestic	 structural	
change	 that	 do	 not	 necessarily	 involve	 “moving	 away”	 from	NRI,	 but	 use	 them	as	 a	
platform	 to	 sectoral	 (and	 technological)	 upgrade	 towards	 directions	 that	 have	 not	
often	been	 considered,	 let	 alone	as	 virtuous	ones,	 such	as	backward-linked	business	
services.		
A	 previous	 work	 (López-Gonzalez	 et	 al.	 2015)	 put	 forward	 a	 Hirschman-Linder	
conjecture	on	the	determinants	of	participation	in	business	services	(BS)	Global	Value	
Chains	(GVCs)	and	found	empirical	support	for	it.	We	have	argued	that	participation	in	
BS	 GVCs,	 particularly	 in	 emerging	 countries,	 depends	 on	 the	 specific	 domestic	
structure	of	backward-linked	industries	to	BS,	particularly	manufacturing	industries.	A	
critical	mass	of	domestic	intermediate	demand	for	BS	is	found	to	be	as	important,	and	
in	the	case	of	emerging	countries	even	more	important,	as	the	foreign	demand	of	(BS)	
intermediates.	There	is,	therefore,	a	specific	role	of	backward-linkages	and	the	scale	of	
the	intermediate	demand	for	BS	that	explains	the	potential	for	export	diversification.		
By	drawing	on	this	empirically	grounded	conjecture	and	extending	the	argument,	here	
we	ask	whether	NRI	might	represent	a	sufficient	‘domestic	representative	demand’	à	
la	 Linder	 for	 backward-linked	 sectors	 such	 as	 Knowledge	 Intensive	 Business	 Services	
(KIBS)8.	 Should	 this	 be	 the	 case,	 there	 would	 be	 an	 opportunity	 to	 spur	 export																																																									8	We	also	test	our	conjecture	by	looking	at	high-tech	manufacturing.		
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diversification	in	sectors	such	as	KIBS.	This	would	create	a	whole	new	narrative	around	
NR	and	 trade	and	development	policy	“when	backward	and	 forward	 linkage	matter”	
(Baldwin	and	Venables	2015),	albeit	with	a	set	of	sectors	so	far	overlooked.		
We	 empirically	 test	 our	 conjecture	 within	 a	 general	 method	 of	 moments	 (GMM)	
dynamic	framework,	to	ascertain	whether	the	domestic	 intermediate	demand	arising	
from	the	NR	sector,	distinguishing	between	extractive	industries	and	agriculture9,	has	
a	positive	 impact	on	 the	export	performance	of	other	sectors,	 in	particular	KIBS.	We	
use	data	from	the	OECD	inter-country	 input	output	tables	(ICIO)	to	capture	domestic	
intermediate	demand	as	well	as	value	added	in	exports.		
We	find	empirical	support	for	the	Hirschman-Linder	conjecture	in	the	case	of	NRI.	We	
find	 that	countries,	particularly	 those	with	a	 revealed	comparative	advantage	 in	NRI,	
and	 particularly	 agriculture,	 benefit	 from	 a	 sufficient	 ‘representative	 domestic	
demand’	for	KIBS	coming	from	NRI,	which	favours	trade	in	KIBS	value	added.	Our	main	
results	 also	 hold	 when	 looking	 at	 domestic	 intermediate	 demand	 for	 high	 tech	
manufacturing	 sectors,	 though	 we	 find	 stronger	 support	 for	 such	 an	 effect	 to	 exist	
between	the	mining,	rather	than	agriculture,	and	manufacturing	sector.		
These	 results	 seem	 to	 corroborate	 the	 idea	 that	 vertical	 linkages	matter	 in	 the	 first	
place	and	that	the	presence	of	backward	linkages	to	NRI,	particularly	when	a	country	
has	 a	 revealed	 comparative	 advantage	 in	 agriculture,	 might	 be	 a	 way	 of	 rethinking	
export	diversification	strategies	that	exploit	NRI,	rather	than	bypassing	them.	More	in	
general,	the	NR	curse	might	therefore	be	reversed,	with	adequate	efforts.		
The	 Chapter	 is	 organised	 as	 follows.	 We	 first	 revisit	 the	 evolution	 of	 the	 NR	 curse	
debate	that	is	relevant	to	the	purpose	of	this	Chapter	(Section	3.2).	We	then	describe	
the	empirical	strategy	and	the	data	(Section	3.3)	and	present	some	initial	descriptive	
evidence	 in	 support	 of	 our	 main	 conjecture	 (Section	 3.4).	 	 This	 is	 followed	 by	 a	
discussion	of	 the	 econometric	 results	 in	 order	 to	 contribute	 to	 the	NR	 curse	debate	
from	the	perspective	of	structural	change	and	export	diversification	(Section	3.5).	We	
conclude	 by	 drawing	 implications	 from	 the	 perspective	 of	 industrial,	 trade	 and	
development	policies	(Section	3.6).																																																										9	In	the	Appendix	we	provide	a	detailed	disaggregation	of	the	sectors	included	in	the	empirical	analysis.		
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3.2	Background	
In	what	follows	we	offer	a	review	of	the	debate	on	the	NR	curse	and	related	topics.	As	
a	 general	 background,	 we	 first	 review	 the	 seminal	 NR	 curse	 contributions;	 we	 then	
review	a	second	stream	of	scholarship	that	has	focused	on	the	specialisation	in	Natural	
Resource	Industries	(NRI)	and	its	consequences	for	export	diversification,	to	which	this	
Chapter	aims	to	contribute.		
3.2.1	The	evolution	of	the	NR	curse	debate		
An	abundance	of	NR	and	 specialisation	 in	NRI	have	been	alternatively	 regarded	as	a	
“blessing”	or	a	“curse”	 for	economic	development.	At	 first,	NR	was	considered	as	an	
opportunity	for	countries	to	develop,	 following	a	path	similar	to	that	of	the	USA	and	
Australia	(Rostow	1960).	
Among	 the	 first	 scholars	 to	question	 the	dominant	 view	of	 their	 time,	 Singer	 (1950)	
and	 Prebisch	 (1959),	 considered	 NR	 as	 an	 “inferior”	 specialisation	 strategy,	 notably	
with	respect	to	manufacturing,	because	of	the	difference	in	income-demand	elasticity	
and	 the	deteriorating	 terms	of	 trade	 in	 natural	 resources.	Demand	 for	 exports	 from	
natural	 resource	 industries	 is,	 in	 fact,	 less	 elastic	 than	 for	manufactured	 goods.	 This	
means	that	as	world	 income	grows,	demand	for	commodities	 from	NR	will	grow	less	
than	that	for	manufactured	products.	As	a	consequence,	countries	exporting	NR-based	
commodities	and	importing	manufactured	products	will	face	price	to	import	increases	
at	a	faster	rate	than	the	price	of	exports.		
The	presence	of	NRI	was	deemed	beneficial	only	conditionally	on	the	development	of	a	
substantial	 manufacturing	 sector	 (Prebisch	 1959),	 within	 a	 balanced	 development	
strategy	à	la	Nurkse	(1952).	The	argument	was	based	on	the	evidence	that	productivity	
increases	in	the	NRI	would	make	large	parts	of	the	workforce	redundant,	which,	in	the	
absence	 of	 a	 manufacturing	 sector	 absorbing	 this	 labour,	 would	 lead	 to	
unemployment,	particularly	in	developing	countries	(Prebisch	1959).	
The	 scepticism	around	 economic	 development	 ensuing	 from	a	 large	NR	 endowment	
and	 specialisation	 in	 NRI	 became	 a	 dominant	 view	 in	 the	 1980s,	 when	 the	 Dutch	
Disease	thesis	was	first	coined	(Corden	1982;	Auty	1993).	 In	a	nutshell,	based	on	the	
experience	 of	 the	 Netherlands	 after	 the	 discovery	 and	 export	 of	 natural	 gas	 in	 the	
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1960s	and	1970s,	the	Dutch	disease	 implies	that	the	use	of	production	factors	 in	the	
extraction	of	NR	–	assuming	full	employment	–	diverts	resources	from	other	tradable,	
(typically	manufacturing	 sectors)	and	non-tradable	 sectors	 (typically	 services	 sectors)	
for	which	demand	(and/or	 import)	 increases.	The	consequence	 is	a	worsening	of	 the	
balance	 of	 payments	 and	 the	 terms	 of	 trade	 in	 the	 NR	 rich	 country.	 In	 addition,	 a	
contraction	 of	manufacturing	 exports	might	 affect	 “learning	 by	 doing”	 and	 dynamic	
efficiency	at	the	macro	level	(Torvik	2002,	2001).		
Apart	 from	 the	 particular	 argument	 behind	 the	 Dutch	 Disease,	 the	 scholarship	 has	
identified	 a	 range	 of	 negative	 effects	 that	 a	 large	 export-oriented	 natural	 resource	
sector	 would	 have	 on	 the	 rest	 of	 the	 economy,	 hindering	 its	 overall	 performance.	
Because	of	the	exports	from	the	NRI,	the	country’s	currency	would	appreciate	making	
other	tradable	sectors	less	competitive	(Harding	and	Venables	2016).	Specialisation	in	
NRI	would	also	draw	investment	and	other	resources	away	from	other	sectors	(Sachs	
and	Warner	1997;	Matsuyama	1992).	By	concentrating	all	the	revenues	in	one	sector,	
the	country	would	become	exposed	to	price	volatility	of	the	exported	natural	resource.	
Indeed,	over	 the	 last	decade	some	scholars	have	challenged	 the	existence	of	 the	NR	
curse,	 by	 reverting	 to	 historical	 examples	 (Wright	 and	 Czelusta	 2004).	 For	 instance,	
some	scholars	have	argued	 that	 the	 resource	curse	would	not	be	 inevitable	 if	 “high-
quality”	 institutions	 were	 in	 place,	 capable	 of	 investing	 and	 distributing	 resource	
revenues	in	a	virtuous	way	(Brunnschweiler	2008;	Boschini	et	al.	2013;	Venables	2016).	
Scholars	have	also	raised	a	range	of	issues	questioning	the	empirical	soundness	of	the	
evidence	 brought	 in	 support	 of	 the	 resource	 curse	 (see	 for	 instance,	 Stijns	 2000;	
Lederman	 and	Maloney	 2006;	 Brunnschweiler	 and	 Bulte	 2008).	 In	 particular,	 it	 has	
been	 argued	 that	 the	 empirical	 evidence	 in	 support	 of	 the	 curse	 thesis,	 as	 in	 the	
seminal	Sachs	and	Warner	(1995),	is	based	on	cross-sectional	data,	which	are	not	fit	to	
capture	 the	evolution	over	 time	of	both	 institutions	and	 technology	 (Robinson	et	 al.	
2006;	 Van	 Der	 Ploeg	 and	 Poelhekke	 2017;	 James	 2015).	 Also,	 natural	 resource	
abundance	 is	often	confused	with	natural	 resource	dependence	 (Brunnschweiler	and	
Bulte	 2008);	 when	 this	 is	 disentangled	 from	 natural	 resource	 rents,	 the	 latter	 can	
actually	have	a	positive	impact	on	economic	growth	(Ding	and	Field	2005).	
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Crucially	to	our	purpose	here,	another	reason	why	the	NR	sector	has	been	perceived	
as	 detrimental	 for	 economic	 development	 is	 that	 it	 has	 often	 been	 regarded	 as	 an	
enclave	 (Heeks	1998),	 extracting	 resources	 from	 the	 country,	with	 few	 linkages	with	
the	 rest	 of	 the	 domestic	 economy	 and	 most	 of	 the	 profits	 being	 shipped	 away	
(Weisskoff	and	Wolff	1977).		
Being	 an	 enclave	 also	 affects	 the	 opportunities	 in	 natural	 resource	 dependent	
countries	 for	 export	 diversification	 (Lederman	 and	 Maloney	 2006).	 In	 this	 respect,	
contributions	have	focused	on	the	chances	of	diversifying	“away”	from	NRI	(	Harding	
and	 Venables	 2016;	 Baldwin	 and	 Venables	 2015).	 Baldwin	 and	 Venables	 (2015),	 for	
instance,	to	model	the	effects	of	trade	policies	aimed	at	increasing	industrialisation	in	
developing	 –	 albeit	 not	 specifically	 NR	 rich	 –	 countries.	 These	 policies,	 they	 argue,	
should	 take	 into	 account	 the	 interactions	 between	 backward	 and	 forward	 linkages	
between	 “part”	 and	 “final”	 goods;	 they	 conclude	 that,	 because	 linkages	 create	 a	
multiplier	 effect,	 targeted	 trade	 and	 industrial	 policies	 that	 make	 sense	 of	 the	
domestic	 structure	 of	 linkages	 would	 increase	 the	 industrial	 base	 and	 its	 export	
performance.	The	theoretical	framework	and	ensuing	argument	might	well	be	applied	
to	NR	rich	countries,	although	the	authors	do	not	go	that	far.	
3.2.2	Export	diversification,	NRI	and	“high	development	linkages”	
There	seems	to	be	a	consensus	on	the	importance	for	countries	with	a	specialisation	in	
NRI	 to	 spur	 the	 emergence	 of	 other	 sectors	 in	 their	 export	 portfolio,	 reducing	 their	
dependence	 on	NRI.	While	 such	 changes	may	 be	 driven	 by	 a	 variety	 of	 factors,	 it	 is	
worth	noting	that	changes	 in	countries’	export	specialisation	are	tightly	 linked	to	the	
underlying	 domestic	 structure	 (Hausmann	 and	 Klinger	 2006;	Hausmann	 et	 al.	 2007),	
including	 an	 increasing	 number	 of	 complex	 products	 and	 services	 (Hidalgo	 and	
Hausmann	2009;	Hidalgo	2009;	 Felipe	et	 al.	 2012).	 Consistent	with	 this	 view,	 export	
diversification	 has	 often	 been	 a	 stated	 policy	 goal	 of	 many	 commodity	 dependent	
countries	(Massol	and	Banal-Estañol	2014).		
However,	 it	 has	 been	 argued	 that	 export	 diversification	 may	 be	 hard	 to	 achieve,	
particularly	 for	 countries	 abundant	 in	 NR;	 this	 is	 because	 NRI	 is	 an	 enclave	 lacking	
significant	 linkages	with	the	rest	of	the	economy	(Heeks	1998;	Hirschman	1958).	The	
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view	of	NRI	as	an	enclave	posits	that	NR	sectors,	and	extractive	industries	in	particular,	
are	 dominated	 by	 large	 foreign	 companies,	 employing	 a	 foreign	 skilled	 workforce,	
importing	 intermediate	 goods	 and	 services,	 shipping	 profits	 back	 to	where	 they	 are	
headquartered,	and	mainly	selling	on	the	international	market.	For	these	reasons,	NRI	
has	often	been	regarded	as	ill-suited	to	foster	the	emergence	of	new	sectors	through	
backward	or	forward	linkages	(Bloch	and	Owusu	2012;	Heeks	1998).	
However,	 recent	 qualitative	 contributions	 have	 cast	 some	 doubt	 on	 the	 enclave	
hypothesis	 about	NRI	 (Bloch	 and	Owusu	2012;	Adewuyi	 and	Ademola	Oyejide	 2012;	
Marin	and	Stubrin	2015;	Marin	et	al.	2009;	Walker	2001),	putting	forward	a	range	of	
examples	 such	 as	 the	 gold	 mining	 sector	 in	 Ghana	 (Bloch	 and	 Owusu,	 2012)	 and	
positive	 experience	 of	 specialist	 services	 and	 equipment	 for	 mining	 in	 South	 Africa	
(Kaplan,	 2012).	 This	 idea	 is	 partly	 based	 on	 important	 changes	 the	 natural	 resource	
sector	has	undergone	in	recent	years.	The	sector	has	seen	an	increase	in	outsourcing	
of	non-core	activities	towards	 local	suppliers,	which	would	foster	domestic	backward	
linkages	(Barnett	and	Bell	2011;	Aragón	and	Rud	2013).		
The	 debate	 in	 the	 literature	 around	 the	 enclave	 hypothesis	 for	 NRI	 has	 also	 largely	
hinged	upon	the	role	of	forward	and,	to	a	lesser	extent,	backward	linkages.		
Taking	 a	 different	 approach,	Hidalgo	 et	 al.	 (2007)	 and	Hausmann	 and	Klinger	 (2006)	
have	 looked	 at	 how	 some	 products	 favour	 the	 emergence	 of	 others	 in	 countries’	
export	 structure,	 finding	 again	 that	NRI	 is	 unlikely	 to	 lead	 to	 the	 emergence	of	 new	
industries.	 Rather	 than	 input-output	 linkages,	 Hausmann	 and	 co-authors	 look	 at	
capabilities	 requirements,	which	 they	 infer	 as	 using	 goods’	 joint	 probability	 of	 being	
exported	by	the	same	country	as	a	measure	of	proximity	(Hidalgo	et	al.	2007;	Hidalgo	
&	Hausmann	2009).	The	core	intuition	of	this	approach	is	that	if	a	pair	of	products	has	
a	high	probability	of	being	exported	by	the	same	countries,	they	must	require	a	similar	
set	of	capabilities	to	be	produced.		
Using	this	measure	of	proximity,	Hausmann	et	al.	build	a	‘product	space’	where	some	
products	are	more	or	 less	connected	to	others	 (Hausmann	et	al.	2007;	Hidalgo	et	al.	
2007).		
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While	 the	product	space	approach	does	not	 rely	on	backward	or	 forward	 linkages,	 it	
yields	similar	conclusions	to	the	traditional	enclave	view:	within	the	product	space,	NRI	
is	shown	to	be	among	the	 least	connected	goods,	making	 it	 thus	particularly	hard	to	
diversify	starting	from	a	specialisation	in	such	industries.		
Consequently,	 policies	 encouraging	 export	 diversification	 through	 beneficiation,	 i.e.	
fostering	 forward	 linkages	 and	 trying	 to	 move	 from	 NRI	 to	 more	 downstream	
manufacturing	processing	activities,	 are	 considered	 ill	 advised	 for	 two	 reasons.	 First,	
NRI	is	a	poorly	connected	sector	to	begin	with	and,	second,	export	diversification	is	not	
driven	by	input-output	linkages	but,	rather,	by	similarity	in	capability	requirements.	In	
fact,	 Hausmann	 et	 al.	 (2008)	 argue	 that	 rather	 than	 moving	 vertically,	 industrial	
policies	 should	 focus	 on	 goods	 that	 lie	 closer	 in	 the	 product	 space	 to	 what	 they	
currently	 export.	 In	 doing	 so,	 they	 join	 a	 quite	 long-standing	 view	 in	 the	 economic	
debate	 that	 looked	 with	 criticism	 at	 resource	 based	 industrialisation	 policies	 (Auty	
1986).		
3.2.3	The	Hirschman-Linder	hypothesis	and	NRI:	research	questions	
In	this	Chapter	we	explore	the	role	of	backward	linkages.	We	refer	in	particular	to	the	
Hirschman-Linder	 hypothesis	 that	 we	 have	 developed	 in	 previous	 work	 (Lopez-
Gonzalez	et	al.	2015).		
This	conjecture	blends	the	concept	of	backward	linkages	à	la	Hirschman,	with	the	idea	
of	“domestic	representative”	demand	à	la	Linder	(Burenstam	Linder	1961).	According	
to	this,	countries	would	be	able	to	export	a	certain	good	if	they	attained	a	benchmark	
level	of	domestic	demand;	 this	would	make	domestic	producers	competitive	enough	
to	operate	in	the	international	market.		
Linder	 (1961)	 puts	 forward	 this	 thesis	 concerning	 final	 manufactured	 products.	 In	
Lopez-Gonzalez	 et	 al.	 (2015)	 we	 have	 explored	 whether	 intermediate	 domestic	
demand	 could	 be	 a	 determinant	 of	 countries’	 GVC	 participation	 in	 KIBS,	 finding	
support	 for	 this	 hypothesis	 concerning	 domestic	 backward	 linkages	 between	 the	
manufacturing	sector	and	KIBS.	
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Here	we	explore	whether	 the	Hirschman-Linder	hypothesis	 could	 apply	 to	backward	
linkages	 emerging	 from	NRI	 demand,	 particularly	 to	 KIBS.	 In	 particular,	we	 pose	 the	
following	questions:		
- What	is	the	NRI’s	relationship	with	KIBS	domestic	backward	linked	sectors,	and	
can	this	intermediate	demand	generated	by	NRI	drive	the	emergence	of	other	
sectors	in	export?	
- Does	this	conjecture	apply	to	high-tech	manufacturing	too?	
- Does	 specialisation	 in	 NRI	 affect	 the	 potential	 effect	 of	 NRI	 intermediate	
demand	on	the	export	of	KIBS	and	high-tech	manufacturing?		
	
	
3.3	Data	and	Empirical	Strategy	
We	aim	to	test	our	main	conjecture,	that	domestic	intermediate	demand	from	the	NR	
sector	to	KIBS	and	high-tech	manufacturing	sectors	can	be	a	“representative	demand”	
à	 la	Linder,	favouring	the	emergence	of	other	sectors	and	ultimately	fostering	export	
diversification.	Relatedly,	we	would	also	expect	countries	with	a	specialisation	 in	NRI	
to	be	more	apt	to	use	such	sector	as	a	platform	to	spur	exports	in	other	sectors.		
It	also	seems	important	to	distinguish	between	extractive	NRI	and	renewable	ones;	the	
latter	 are	 natural	 resources	 from	 soil,	 such	 as	 the	 agriculture	 sector.	 They	 are,	 in	
contrast	with	extractive	activities	such	as	mining,	usually	considered	to	be	less	prone	
to	NR	curse	effects	 (Venables	2016),	However,	 they	also	yield	commodities	that	may	
risk	 making	 the	 producing	 country	 highly	 dependent	 on	 them,	 exposed	 to	 price	
volatility	and,	crucially	to	our	analysis,	 less	 likely	to	diversify	due	to	the	 lack	of	 inter-
sectoral	linkages	(Vogel	1994;	Matsuyama	2008;	Hirschman	1958).		
For	 these	 reasons	 we	 include	 them	 in	 our	 analysis.	 However,	 bearing	 in	 mind	 the	
differences	between	these	two	sectors,	we	present	our	results	separately,	 looking	at	
the	relationship	between	intermediate	domestic	demand	from	these	sectors	and	KIBS.	
So,	our	NRI	are	the	two	following	sectors:		
- agriculture,	hunting	and	fishing	(AGR);	
- mining	and	quarrying	(MIN).		
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In	 the	remainder	of	 the	thesis	when	we	refer	 to	both	AGR	and	MIN,	we	will	use	the	
general	term	NRI.	When	our	analysis’s	results	only	apply	to	either	sector,	we	will	use	
the	name	of	the	relevant	sector.		
In	Appendix	A3,	Table	A3	 reports	 the	 full	 list	of	 the	 sectors	used	 in	our	analysis	and	
how	they	are	aggregated	 into	KIBS	and	high-tech	manufacturing,	 following	the	OECD	
classification.		
3.3.1	Data		
In	 order	 to	 test	 this	 Chapter’s	 main	 hypothesis	 on	 the	 effect	 of	 NRI	 intermediate	
demand	on	export	in	other	sectors,	we	use	the	inter-country	input-output	(ICIO)	tables	
compiled	by	 the	OECD,	 covering	33	 sectors	 in	64	 countries	 for	 the	years	1995-2011.	
ICIO	tables	allow	observing	inter-sectoral	linkages,	tracing	value	added	flows	from	the	
originating	 to	 the	 destination	 sector,	 both	 domestically	 and	 across	 borders10.	
Moreover,	 a	 value	 added	 approach	 allows	 capturing	 each	 sector’s	 domestic	 value	
added	 contribution	 to	 countries’	 exports,	 reallocating	 value	 added	 exported	 to	 the	
sectors	from	which	it	has	originated	(Koopman	et	al.	2010).		
This	way	we	can	assess	the	extent	to	which	the	increase	of	exports	from	a	given	sector	
is	 driven	 by	 domestic	 productive	 activity	 in	 that	 sector,	 as	 opposed	 to	 value	 added	
contributions	coming	from	other	sectors,	either	domestic	or	abroad	(i.e.	imports).		
With	33	sectors,	the	data	are	quite	aggregate	and	each	sector	category	includes	a	wide	
range	of	different	activities.	This	means	that	very	diverse	activities	are	included	in	each	
sector.	We	try	to	mitigate	this	shortcoming	by	looking	at	exports	to	focus	on	the	share	
of	 production	 that	 is	 tradable	 and	 meets	 high	 enough	 quality	 standards	 to	 be	
competitive	 on	 the	 international	 market	 (Hidalgo	 et	 al.	 2007).	 This	 choice	 is	 also	
consistent	with	the	literature	on	the	Dutch	disease	(Corden	1984;	Torvik	2001),	which	
focuses	on	the	effect	of	large	NRI	on	exports	from	other	sectors.	
In	order	to	maximise	the	number	of	observations	on	which	we	can	rely,	we	carry	out	
our	econometric	analysis	at	 the	geo-sector	 level,	 i.e.	 looking	at	each	of	 the	two	KIBS																																																									10	While	 a	 range	 of	 inter-country	 input-output	 databases	 are	 available,	 we	 chose	 the	 ICIO	 from	 the	
OECD	 because	 it	 ensures	 the	 largest	 coverage	 of	 countries,	 while	 still	 being	 based	 on	 statistical	
information	from	countries,	without	using	imputation	methods	(Kowalski	et	al.	2015b).		
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sectors,	 ITS	and	BZS,	 in	each	country.	We	have	thus	a	panel	of	64	countries,	 i.e.	128	
country-sector	 combinations,	which	we	 refer	 to	 as	 geo-sectors	 henceforth,	 over	 the	
1995-2011	period11.	 In	 the	next	 subsection	we	detail	 how	we	use	 the	 ICIO	 tables	 to	
compute	the	outcome	and	main	explanatory	variables.		
3.3.2	Variables		
Our	 literature	review	has	emphasised	the	 importance	for	countries	with	 large	NRI	 to	
diversify	 their	 export	 portfolio,	 which	 means	 putting	 in	 place	 policies	 to	 spur	 the	
exports	of	other	sectors.	Our	main	conjecture	 is	 that	domestic	 intermediate	demand	
stemming	 from	NRI	 could	 achieve	 just	 this;	 this	 would	 imply	 for	 policy	makers	 that	
fostering	 backward	 inter-sector	 linkages	 could	 be	 an	 effective	 policy	 tool	 to	 achieve	
export	diversification.	We	operationalise	this	conjecture	by	estimating	domestic	value	
added	in	exports	of	sectors	different	from	NRI	as	a	result	of	NRI	backward	linkages.	For	
simplicity,	our	discussion	here	refers	to	KIBS,	although	the	same	variables	have	been	
computed	for	high-tech	manufacturing.	
Our	main	 outcome	 variable	 is	 domestic	 value	 added	 in	 exports	 per	 capita	 from	 the	
KIBS	sector,	which	we	compute	as	follows:	let	VAE	be	a	c*i	x	1	column	vector	with	each	
country	c	and	sector	i	domestic	value	added	embodied	in	gross	export:	
 𝑉𝐴𝐸 = 𝑉′(𝐼 − 𝐴)!!𝐸 
Where	V’	is	a	ci	x	ci	diagonal	matrix	populated	with	each	geo-sector	value	added	share	
in	output,	i.e.	value	added	produced	by	a	given	geo-sector	divided	by	its	total	output.	
(I-A)-1	is	the	traditional	Leontief	inverse	capturing	all	inter-sectoral	relationships	for	all	
sectors	and	countries.	Finally,	E	is	a	ci	x	1	column	vector	with	each	geo-sector	export.	
The	 elements	 of	 VAE	 include	 all	 value	 added	 that	 is	 originated	 by	 country	 i	 but	
consumed	 abroad,	 either	 through	 foreign	 final	 demand	 or	 foreign	 intermediate	
demand.	 We	 exclude	 from	 this	 measure	 the	 value	 added	 exported	 as	 foreign	
intermediate	demand	but	then	re-imported	through	country	i’s	own	final	demand.		
																																																								11	 The	 ICIO	 data	 provide	 a	 balanced	 panel.	 However,	 the	World	 Development	 Indicators	 have	 some	
missing	values,	which	makes	the	final	panel	we	are	working	with	unbalanced	and	forces	us	to	drop	some	
countries	 from	 our	 analysis	 altogether,	 such	 as	 Brazil,	 Brunei,	 Vietnam	 and	 the	 rest	 of	 the	 World	
compound.		
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From	 this	VAE	 vector	 we	 select	 the	 elements	 corresponding	 to	 each	 country’s	 KIBS	
sectors.	 We	 therefore	 obtain	 our	 vector	 of	 observations,	 which	 we	 divide	 by	 each	
country’s	population	obtaining	dva_kbs_cap,	 i.e.	value	added	in	exports	per	capita	 in	
KIBS	sector12.		
It	is	worth	pointing	out	that	our	outcome	variable	includes	the	KIBS	value	added	that	is	
exported	 indirectly	 through	 NRI	 exports.	 This	 is	 also	 included	 in	 our	 explanatory	
variable	 that	 captures	 the	 domestic	 demand	 of	 NR	 for	 KIBS.	 In	 order	 to	 avoid	 this	
pitfall,	we	exclude	from	our	outcome	variable	the	portion	of	KIBS	value	added	that	is	
exported	 through	 NRI.	 In	 this	 way	 we	 avoid	 any	 mechanical,	 i.e.	 by	 construction,	
linkage	between	our	two	variables	of	interest.	
Our	main	explanatory	variable,	domestic	 intermediate	demand	 for	KIBS	 from	the	NR	
sector,	is	computed	in	a	similar	way,	but	we	take	the	ci	x	ci	matrix	X_DVA	where	each	
entry	 is	 populated	 with	 each	 geo-sector	 value	 added	 contribution	 to	 each	 sector’s	
output:	
𝑋_𝐷𝑉𝐴 = 𝑉′(𝐼 − 𝐴)!!!𝐹 
This	matrix	is	computed	very	much	in	the	same	way	as	VAE	but	we	substitute	the	ci	x	1	
E	vector	with	the	ci	x	ci	matrix	F	populated	with	zeros	off	the	diagonal	and	with	each	
geo-sector	 final	 demand	 on	 the	 diagonal.	 We	 also	 use	 (I-A)d-1,	 which	 is	 the	 usual	
Leontief	 Inverse,	 although	 we	 extract	 from	 it	 a	 block-diagonal	 matrix	 where	 the	
dimensions	of	the	block	are	the	number	of	sectors,	33	in	this	case.	This	matrix	will	thus	
only	capture	the	inter-sectoral	linkages	within	the	same	country.		
From	the	resulting	ci	x	ci	matrix	we	isolate	those	entries	belonging	to	KIBS	rows	and	to	
NR	columns	 that	correspond	to	how	much	each	KIBS	geo-sector	contributes	 in	value	
added	 terms	 to	 each	 of	 the	 two	 NR	 sectors’	 output.	We	 then	 aggregate	 across	 NR	
sectors	and	divide	by	each	country’s	population	and	obtain	dd_kbs_nr_cap.	
																																																								12	This	variable	is	computed	in	the	same	way	as	the	DVA	variable	used	in	Chapter	2	to	compute	both	
RCAs	and	DVA	shares.		
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Finally,	 both	 human	 capital	 and	 information	 and	 communication	 technologies	 (ICT)	
infrastructure	have	played	a	significant	role	in	the	expansion	of	the	service	sector	and	
its	linkages	with	the	rest	of	the	economy	(Guerrieri	and	Meliciani	2005).	
For	 this	 reason	 we	 rely	 on	 the	World	 Bank	World	 Development	 Indicators	 and	 use	
gross	enrolment	 in	secondary	education	to	capture	human	capital	and	Internet	users	
per	thousand	inhabitants	as	a	proxy	of	technological	infrastructure,	particularly	related	
to	ICT.	
3.3.3	Econometric	strategy	
To	 test	 our	main	 conjecture	 of	 the	 Hirschman-Linder	 hypothesis	 applied	 to	 NR,	 the	
general	form	of	our	estimated	equation	is	the	following:		
𝑑𝑣𝑎_𝑘𝑏𝑠_𝑐𝑎𝑝!" = 𝛼! + 𝛽!𝑑𝑣𝑎_𝑘𝑏𝑠_𝑐𝑎𝑝!"!! + 𝛽!𝑑𝑑_𝑘𝑏𝑠_𝑛𝑟_𝑐𝑎𝑝!" + 𝛽!𝑑𝑑_𝑘𝑏𝑠_𝑛𝑟_𝑐𝑎𝑝!" ∗ 𝑛𝑟_𝑟𝑐𝑎!"+ 𝛽!𝑠𝑐ℎ𝑜𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑛𝑔!" + 𝛽!𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑛𝑒𝑡𝑎𝑐𝑐𝑒𝑠𝑠!" + 𝛼! + 𝛼! + 𝜀!" 
In	our	econometric	equation	presented	above,	dva_kbs_capit	 is	 the	KIBS	value	added	
embodied	 in	 each	 geo-sector’s	 i	 gross	 exports	 per	 capita	 in	 each	 year	 t,	
dd_kbs_nr_capit	 is	 the	per	capita	domestic	 intermediate	demand	provided	by	the	NR	
sector	to	each	geo-sector:	both	these	variables	are	in	log.		
schoolingct	captures	human	capital	 through	years	of	 schooling	 in	each	 country	c	 and	
year	t,	while	 internetaccessct	 is	 Internet	users	per	 thousand	 inhabitants	and	captures	
countries’	 technological	 infrastructure.	We	also	control	 for	geo-sector	and	year	 fixed	
effects	(FE)	αi	and	αt	respectively.	
While	 our	 main	 hypothesis	 concerns	 the	 positive	 effect	 of	 intermediate	 domestic	
demand	stemming	from	NRI	on	the	domestic	value	added	exported	by	both	KIBS	and	
high-tech	 manufacturing	 for	 all	 countries,	 we	 expect	 that	 the	 specialisation	 in	 NR	
sectors	 of	 a	 country	 may	 influence	 the	 relationship	 between	 our	 outcome	 and	
explanatory	 variables.	 An	 additional	 hypothesis	 we	 wish	 to	 test	 is,	 in	 fact,	 whether	
countries	 with	 a	 specialisation	 in	 NRI	 experience	 a	 stronger	 relationship	 between	
backward	 linkages	stemming	 from	NRI	and	the	DVA	they	export	 from	KIBS	and	high-
tech	manufacturing.	
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To	test	this,	we	interact	our	main	explanatory	variable	with	a	dummy	variable	nr_rca	
taking	value	1	if	the	country	has	a	revealed	comparative	advantage	(also	measured	in	
value	added)	in	the	natural	resource	sector13.	This	will	allow	us	to	explore	whether	a	
specialisation	 in	 natural	 resources	 affects	 the	 relationship	 between	 exports	 of	 value	
added	 in	 KIBS	 and	 the	 intermediate	 domestic	 demand	 generated	 by	 the	 natural	
resource	sector.		
Using	the	revealed	comparative	advantage	to	assess	countries’	specialisation	in	NRI	is	
a	 data-driven	 approach.	 This	 has	 the	 advantage	 that	 our	 definition	 of	 specialisation	
does	 not	 rely	 on	 any	 ex-ante	 and	 arbitrary	 definition	 of	 how	 much	 NRI	 should	
represent	of	a	country’s	GDP	or	exports.		
Two	more	issues	need	to	be	dealt	with.	First,	export	of	KIBS	is	likely	to	be	affected	by	
serial	 correlation,	 as	 current	 levels	 of	 exports	 are	 often	 correlated	 with	 past	 ones.	
Second,	 the	 relationship	 between	 exports	 of	 KIBS	 and	 the	 domestic	 intermediate	
demand	 coming	 from	 NR	 is	 likely	 to	 go	 both	 ways;	 while	 we	want	 to	 test	 whether	
increases	 in	 the	 intermediate	 domestic	 demand	 generate	 increases	 in	 the	 export	 of	
KIBS,	it	is	also	possible	that	the	causation’s	direction	may	go	the	other	way,	through	a	
simultaneous	effect.		
In	order	to	deal	with	both	these	issues,	we	opt	for	an	autoregressive	model,	including	
the	 lag	 of	 the	 outcome	 variable	 on	 the	 right-hand	 side	 of	 the	 equation,	𝑑𝑣𝑎_𝑘𝑏𝑠_𝑐𝑎𝑝!"!!,	 and	 use	 a	 system	 GMM,	 which	 allows	 instrumenting	 our	
endogenous	variables	with	its	own	past	lags.		
We	also	cluster	the	standard	errors	by	country	and	perform	the	robust	version	of	the	
system	GMM	with	Windmeijer's	(2005)	correction	for	finite	sample.		
All	of	the	variables	we	have	computed	with	the	ICIO	tables	are	per	capita	measures	of	
DVA	 flows	across	 sectors	 (for	 the	explanatory	variables),	and	 from	one	sector	 to	 the	
rest	 of	 the	 world	 (for	 the	 outcome	 variable).	 This	 is	 to	 account	 for	 countries’	
differences	 in	 size,	 assuming	 that	 population	 is	 a	 good	 proxy	 for	 countries’	 size.																																																									13	Since	we	test	our	results	separately	for	AGR	and	MIN,	we	use	a	dummy	variable	that	takes	value	1	for	
countries	with	an	RCA	in	the	relevant	sector,	either	AGR	or	MIN.	These	RCAs	are	computed	in	the	same	
way	as	discussed	in	Chapter	2.	
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However,	this	may	not	necessarily	apply	to	NRI	in	particular,	whose	size	can	be	driven	
by	 the	 endowment	 of	 natural	 resources	 that	 need	 not	 be	 tightly	 related	 to	 the	
population	of	a	country.	We	present	in	the	Appendix	a	robustness	check	of	our	results,	
accounting	 for	countries’	size	using	Leontieff	 Inverse	coefficients14.	This	captures	NRI	
intensity	 in	 inputs	 from	 KIBS	 and	 high-tech	manufacturing,	 which	 is	 independent	 of	
countries’	size	and	on	countries’	population.		
Before	discussing	our	econometric	results	 in	the	next	section,	we	present	here	some	
descriptive	 evidence	 concerning	 the	 relationship	 between	 intermediate	 NR-KIBS	
domestic	demand	and	KIBS	domestic	value	added	in	exports.		
	
3.4	Descriptive	evidence	
In	this	section	we	present	some	preliminary	evidence	supporting	our	main	conjecture	
that	 larger	 domestic	 intermediate	 demand	 from	 NRI	 has	 a	 positive	 effect	 on	 DVA	
export	of	KIBS.		
Figure	 3.1	 plots	 the	 natural	 logs	 of	 DVA	 from	 the	 KIBS	 sector	 and	 the	 logs	 of	
intermediate	 demand	 emanating	 from	 the	NR	 sector	 for	 KIBS.	 The	 dots	 in	 blue	 and	
green	correspond	to	countries	with	and	without	an	RCA	in	NRI,	respectively.	The	same	
applies	 for	 the	 fitted	 lines	 in	 light	blue	and	dark	green,	while	 the	 fitted	 line	 in	 red	 is	
plotted	without	distinguishing	between	countries	with	or	without	an	RCA.		
																																																								14	See	Tables	A8	and	A9	in	the	Appendix	
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Figure	3.1:	Natural	 logs	of	domestic	 intermediate	demand	per	capita	 from	NRI	and	natural	
logs	of	KIBS	domestic	value	added	in	export	per	capita.	
Source:	authors’	own	calculation	with	ICIO	tables.	
Note:	figure	3.1	plots	the	natural	log	of	intermediate	domestic	demand	per	capita	from	NRI	against	the	
natural	log	of	KIBS	DVA	per	capita.	These	are	all	negative	because	the	original	data	from	the	ICIO	tables	
are	measured	in	millions	of	USD,	which	yields	values	below	1	when	divided	by	the	population	to	obtain	
per	capita	measures.		
We	find	a	strong	and	positive	relationship	between	our	two	variables.	We	also	see	that	
the	countries	without	an	RCA	in	NRI	tend	to	have	higher	levels	of	KIBS	DVA,	although	
the	fitted	line	has	a	slightly	lower	slope;	this	suggests	that	the	relationship	may	be	less	
strong.	Countries	without	an	RCA	in	NRI	have	in	fact	higher	variability	of	KIBS	DVA	for	
similar	levels	of	intermediate	demand	for	KIBS	from	NRI.		
As	we	mentioned,	our	econometric	analysis	will	look	at	AGR	and	MIN	separately,	so	we	
now	offer	some	descriptive	evidence	on	the	relationship	between	these	two	sectors’	
intermediate	demand	and	DVA	in	KIBS.		
The	positive	association	detected	in	Figure	3.1	 is	borne	even	more	strongly	when	we	
look	at	the	AGR	sector	alone,	in	Figure	3.2:	the	colour	legend	in	this	figure	is	the	same	
for	Figure	3.1.	We	see	again	that	the	countries	without	an	RCA	in	AGR	tend	to	cluster	
in	 the	 upper-right	 corner	 of	 the	 graph,	 which	 means	 that	 they	 usually	 have	 higher	
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levels	of	both	intermediate	domestic	demand	from	AGR	and	KIBS	DVA.	However,	the	
slope	of	the	fitted	line	is	smaller	when	compared	to	the	subsample	of	countries	with	
an	 RCA	 in	 AGR,	which	 suggests	 that	 the	 relationship	 between	 intermediate	 demand	
from	AGR	and	 the	export	of	KIBS	DVA	may	be	stronger	 for	countries	with	an	RCA	 in	
AGR.		
This	also	brings	 support	 to	 the	 idea	 that	 the	 relative	 size	of	 the	NR	sector	may	be	a	
factor	 influencing	 the	 relationship	 between	 the	 intermediate	 domestic	 demand	
originating	from	this	sector	and	the	DVA	exported	by	KIBS.		
	
Figure	3.2:	Natural	logs	of	domestic	intermediate	demand	per	capita	from	AGR	and	natural	
logs	of	KIBS	domestic	value	added	in	exports	per	capita.	
Source:	authors’	own	calculation	with	ICIO	tables.	
Note:	figure	3.2	plots	the	natural	log	of	intermediate	domestic	demand	per	capita	from	AGR	against	the	
natural	log	of	KIBS	DVA	per	capita.	These	are	all	negative	because	the	original	data	from	the	ICIO	tables	
are	measured	in	millions	of	USD,	which	yields	values	below	1	when	divided	by	the	population	to	obtain	
per	capita	measures.		
When	 we	 turn	 to	 the	 MIN	 sector	 in	 Figure	 3.3,	 we	 find	 once	 again	 a	 positive	
association	between	our	variables;	interestingly	we	find	here	that	countries	without	an	
RCA	are	 located	more	 towards	 the	upper-left	quarter	of	 the	graph.	This	hints	at	 the	
fact	that	they	have	rather	 lower	 levels	of	 intermediate	demand	from	MIN	but	higher	
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levels	of	DVA	KIBS.	In	contrast,	countries	with	an	RCA	in	MIN	tend	to	have	lower	levels	
of	export	of	KIBS.		
	
Figure	3.3:	Natural	logs	of	domestic	intermediate	demand	per	capita	from	MIN	and	natural	
logs	of	KIBS	domestic	value	added	in	exports	per	capita.	
Source:	authors’	own	calculation	with	ICIO	tables.	
Note:	figure	3.3	plots	the	natural	log	of	intermediate	domestic	demand	per	capita	from	MIN	against	the	
natural	log	of	KIBS	DVA	per	capita.	These	are	all	negative	because	the	original	data	from	the	ICIO	tables	
are	measured	in	millions	of	USD,	which	yields	values	below	1	when	divided	by	the	population	to	obtain	
per	capita	measures.		
This	descriptive	 analysis	 provides	 some	preliminary	evidence	 to	our	main	 conjecture	
on	 the	 positive	 effect	 of	 NRI	 intermediate	 domestic	 demand	 and	 DVA	 exported	 by	
KIBS.		
Relating	back	to	Venables'	(2016)	distinction	between	renewable	(AGR)	and	extractive	
industries	 (MIN),	 we	 find	 some	 interesting	 differences.	 The	 positive	 relationship	 we	
detect	seems	to	be	particularly	strong	for	the	AGR	sector,	rather	than	MIN.	This	may	
suggest	 that	 the	 enclave	 thesis	may	 apply	 to	 backward	 linkages	 from	extractive	NRI	
more	 than	 to	 renewable	 NRI.	 This	 would	 lend	 further	 support	 to	 Venables	 (2016)	
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conclusion	 that	 renewable	 natural	 resources	 may	 have	 fewer	 negative	 effects	 on	
countries’	economic	performance.		
These	figures	offer	prima	facie	evidence	about	the	relationship	between	intermediate	
domestic	 demand	 and	 DVA	 exports	 of	 KIBS,	 which	 is	 likely	 to	 be	 riddled	 with	
endogeneity,	particularly	due	to	reverse	causality	and	simultaneity	of	the	relationship.	
As	discussed	above,	our	econometric	approach	deals	with	these	issues;	we	present	the	
main	results	in	the	next	section.		
	
3.5	Econometric	results	
3.5.1	NRI	and	backward	linked	KIBS	
In	the	following	tables	we	present	our	main	results,	we	also	look	separately	at	the	two	
sectors	 (AGR	 and	 MIN)	 that	 are	 included	 in	 the	 NR	 sector.	 Re-computing	 our	
explanatory	variables	and	RCA	accordingly,	Table	A2	 in	the	appendix	summarises	the	
list	of	relevant	variables	and	the	associated	acronyms.		
In	Table	3.1	we	find	a	positive	and	significant	effect	of	intermediate	demand	from	NRI	
on	the	per	capita	export	of	value	added	of	KIBS,	both	when	we	look	at	AGR	and	MIN	as	
two	 separate	 outcome	 variables.	 The	 interacted	 terms	 are	 also	 significant,	 which	
suggests	that	the	positive	effect	of	NRI	intermediate	demand	on	the	export	of	KIBS	is	
stronger	for	countries	with	an	RCA	in	NRI.		
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Table	3.1:	The	effect	of	NRI	intermediate	demand	on	the	DVA	of	KIBS	in	export	per	
capita	–	System	GMM	estimation	
VARIABLES	 AGR	 MIN	
	 	 	
dva_kbs_capt-1	 0.792***	 0.922***	
	 (0.0778)	 (0.0450)	
dd_kbs_agr_cap	 0.205**	 	
	 (0.0952)	 	
dd_kbs_agr_cap*agr_rca	 0.212**	 	
	 	 	
schooling	 0.00572	 0.00304	
	 (0.00348)	 (0.00252)	
Internet	access	 -0.00256	 -0.000871	
	 (0.00256)	 (0.00190)	
dd_kbs_min_cap	 	 0.0720**	
	 	 (0.0363)	
dd_kbs_min_cap*min_rca	 	 0.0738**	
	 	 (0.0359)	
Constant	 0	 0.0937	
	 (0)	 (0.816)	
	 	 	
Observations	 1,756	 1,756	
Number	of	geo-sectors	 122	 122	
AR(2)	 0.289	 0.166	
Hansen	test	
overidentification	 0.529	 0.740	
Difference-in-Hansen	 0.680	 0.865	
System	GMM	estimation	for	the	effect	of	the	natural	log	of	intermediate	demand	per	capita	of	AGR	
(col.	1)	and	MIN	(col.	2)	on	the	DVA	in	export	per	capita	of	KIBS.	The	analysis	is	carried	out	at	the	
geo-sector	level,	i.e.	for	each	country-sector	combination,	where	the	sectors	are	two	KIBS	sectors:		
Computer	and	related	activities	(ITS);	R&D	and	other	business	services	(BZS).	The	variables	agr_rca	
and	min_rca	are	binary	variables	taking	value	1	if	the	country	has	an	RCA	(in	value	added	terms,	
rather	than	gross	export)	in	AGR	or	MIN,	respectively.	Schooling	is	gross	enrolment	in	secondary	
education	and	internet	access	is	internet	users	per	thousand	inhabitants.		
Standard	errors	in	parentheses	
***	p<0.01,	**	p<0.05,	*	p<0.1	
dva	and	dd	variables	in	logs	
For	the	AR	and	Hansen	tests	the	p	values	are	reported.	
Source:	authors’	own	calculation	on	ICIO	tables.		
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These	results	suggest	that	intermediate	demand	from	the	NR	sector	exerts	a	positive	
effect	on	the	export	of	KIBS,	and	even	more	so	in	those	countries	that	have	an	RCA	in	
this	sector.	
As	mentioned	above,	we	chose	 the	RCA	 index	as	a	measure	of	 specialisation	 in	NRI;	
however,	this	has	some	implications	on	how	these	results	can	be	interpreted.	The	RCA	
is	 a	measure	 of	 relative	 specialisation:	 a	 country	with	 an	RCA	 in	NRI	 above	one	 is	 a	
country	in	which	NRI	represents	a	higher	proportion	in	its	exports	than	it	does	in	the	
world’s	 exports	 (Balassa	 1965).	 The	 underlying	 idea	 of	 the	 RCA	 is	 that	 countries	
specialise	 in	sectors	whose	production	requirements	they	are	best	equipped	to	meet	
(Chor	2010),	which	may	 lead	to	equating	specialisation	and	competitiveness	 (Hidalgo	
et	al.	2007).		
Competitiveness	 in	 a	 sector	 is	often	 related	 to	productivity:	 countries	 that	 are	more	
efficient	at	producing	in	a	given	sector	will	be	more	likely	to	be	more	competitive	(and	
specialise)	in	this	sector	(Chor	2010).		
However,	a	country	may	develop	a	specialisation	in	NRI,	which	would	only	be	captured	
by	the	RCA	index	because	of	its	endowment	in	NR	and	lack	of	other	sectors,	regardless	
of	 the	 sector’s	 productivity.	 This	 has	 bearing	 on	 the	 interpretation	 of	 our	 results,	
depending	on	the	source	of	RCA	in	NRI:	
- A	very	productive	NR	sector	allows	a	country	to	develop	an	RCA	in	NRI,	hence	
requiring	 more	 and/or	 higher	 quality	 KIBS	 inputs,	 therefore	 increasing	 KIBS	
export	performance;	there	would	thus	be	a	‘quality’	effect	of	the	intermediate	
demand	stemming	from	NRI	on	the	export	performance	of	KIBS;	
- A	 very	 large	 NR	 sector,	 regardless	 of	 its	 productivity,	 provides	 a	 very	 large	
intermediate	demand	and	this	‘scale’	(or	quantity)	effect	improves	KIBS	export	
performance.		
These	two	channels	are	not	mutually	exclusive,	but	it	is	important	to	disentangle	them	
to	understand	for	which	countries	our	results	will	be	relevant.		
On	the	one	hand,	if	improvements	in	the	export	of	KIBS	are	conditional	on	the	‘quality’	
of	 the	 intermediate	demand	 to	which	 they	are	exposed,	 countries	 relying	mainly	on	
the	 size	 of	 the	NR	 sectors	 (which	 are	 often	 developing	 ones)	will	 be	 unlikely	 to	 see	
their	KIBS	sector	benefit	from	NRI	domestic	intermediate	demand.		
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On	the	other	hand,	if	the	‘scale’	effect	is	at	play,	countries	can	exploit	the	size	of	the	
NRI	 intermediate	 demand,	 regardless	 of	 its	 ‘quality’,	 to	 improve	 KIBS	 export	
performance.	
In	order	 to	ascertain	 this,	we	need	to	control	 for	 the	 ‘quality’	effect	 that	could	drive	
countries’	specialisation	in	NRI.	We	proxy	the	quality	of	the	intermediate	demand	with	
an	 index	 of	 productivity	 of	 the	 NR	 sector15,	 which	 we	 compute	 by	 dividing	 the	
domestic	value	added	of	the	NR	sector	by	its	inputs,	i.e.	its	intermediate	demand.	This	
is	admittedly	a	crude	measure	of	productivity,	but	it	has	the	advantage	of	being	readily	
computable	at	the	sectoral	level	in	our	data16.	It	is	also	close	to	the	idea	of	productivity	
as	efficiency	in	production,	as	it	captures	how	much	value	added	is	produced	given	the	
input	required	by	the	production	process.		
Part	 of	 the	 intermediate	 demand	 of	 the	 NR	 sector	 is	 already	 included	 in	 our	 main	
explanatory	variable;	we	therefore	exclude	this	portion	of	intermediate	demand	from	
the	calculation	of	our	productivity	index.		
𝑉𝐴𝐼𝐶 = 𝑉𝐴(𝐼𝐶 − 𝐼𝐶!"!!"#$) 
Where	VA	is	domestic	value	added	and	the	denominator	is	intermediate	consumption	
(IC)	minus	the	intermediate	consumption	met	by	the	KIBS	sectors	(ICNR-KIBS).	Table	3.2	
shows	the	results	of	the	estimation	that	includes	this	additional	control.		
	 	
																																																								15	As	above,	we	refer	in	the	text	to	NRI	in	general;	naturally,	in	the	empirical	analysis,	we	compute	this	
measure	of	productivity	for	AGR	and	MIN	separately.		16	 An	 alternative	 approach	 would	 have	 been	 to	 compute	 labour	 productivity	 at	 the	 sectoral	 level;	
however,	employment	data	at	the	sectoral	level	for	all	the	countries	in	our	sample	is	not	available.	The	
world	input-output	tables	(WIOT)	would	have	been	an	alternative	source	as	they	include	inter-country	
input-output	tables	and	sectoral	levels	of	employment,	but	they	cover	a	significantly	smaller	number	of	
countries,	including	few	developing	countries.		
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Table	3.2:	The	effect	of	NRI	intermediate	demand	on	the	DVA	of	KIBS	in	exports	per	
capita,	controlling	for	NRI	productivity	–	System	GMM	estimation	
VARIABLES	 AGR	 MIN	
		 		 		
dva_kbs_capt-1	 0.852***	 0.925***	
	 (0.0796)	 (0.0443)	
dd_kbs_agr_cap	 0.206**	 	
	 (0.104)	 	
dd_kbs_agr_cap*agr_rca	 0.213**	
(0.101)	 		
	 	 	
schooling	 0.00155	 0.00155	
	 (0.00336)	 (0.00268)	
internetaccess	 -0.00470**	 -0.000820	
	 (0.00207)	 (0.00171)	
vaic_agr	 0.0272	 	
	 (0.122)	 	
dd_kbs_min_cap	 	 0.0520	
	 	 (0.0330)	
dd_kbs_min_cap*min_rca	 	 0.0595*	
	 	 (0.0334)	
vaic_min	 	 -0.0721	
	 	 (0.0938)	
Constant	 2.084	 0.248	
	 (1.294)	 (0.726)	
	 	 	
Observations	 1,756	 1,756	
Number	of	geo-sectors	 122	 122	
AR(2)	 0.665	 0.217	
Hansen	test	overidentification	 0.845	 0.801	
Difference-in-Hansen	 0.262	 0.752	
System	GMM	estimation	for	the	effect	of	the	natural	log	of	intermediate	demand	per	
capita	of	AGR	(col.	1)	and	MIN	(col.	2)	on	the	DVA	in	export	per	capita	of	KIBS.	The	
analysis	is	carried	out	at	the	geo-sector	level,	i.e.	for	each	country-sector	combination,	
where	the	sectors	are	two	KIBS	sectors:		Computer	and	related	activities	(ITS);	R&D	
and	other	business	services	(BZS).	The	variables	agr_rca	and	min_rca	are	binary	
variables	taking	value	1	if	the	country	has	an	RCA	(in	value	added	terms,	rather	than	
gross	export)	in	AGR	or	MIN,	respectively.	Schooling	is	gross	enrolment	in	secondary	
education	and	internet	access	is	internet	users	per	thousand	inhabitants.		
The	two	additional	controls	are	vaic_agr	and	vaic_min	which	are	the	ratio	between	
AGR	and	MIN,	respectively,	total	value	added	divided	by	their	respective	total	
intermediate	consumption,	excluding	the	intermediate	consumption	of	KIBS.		
Standard	errors	in	parentheses	
***	p<0.01,	**	p<0.05,	*	p<0.1	
dva,	dd	and	vaic	variables	in	logs	
For	the	AR	and	Hansen	tests	the	p	values	are	reported.	
Source:	authors’	own	calculation	on	ICIO	tables.		
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We	find	our	results	to	be	robust,	 in	particular	when	looking	at	the	agriculture	sector.	
We	find	that	the	intermediate	domestic	demand	has	a	positive	effect	for	all	countries	
and	 the	 interaction	 term	 is	 also	 positive	 and	 significant;	 this	 suggests	 that	 such	 a	
relationship	 is	 even	 stronger	 for	 countries	 with	 an	 RCA	 in	 the	 AGR	 sector.	 For	 the	
mining	sector,	we	find	significant	results,	at	the	10%	level,	only	for	countries	with	an	
RCA	in	NRI.		
So,	the	positive	effect	between	NRI,	especially	AGR,	intermediate	domestic	demand	on	
KIBS	export	does	not	seem	to	be	driven	by	the	‘quality’	of	the	intermediate	demand:	
our	 results	 suggest	 that	 in	 countries	 with	 a	 specialisation	 in	 NRI,	 the	 domestic	
intermediate	demand	originating	from	this	sector	exerts	a	positive	effect	on	the	export	
of	KIBS,	through	a	scale	effect,	regardless	of	productivity.	This	is	also	supported	by	the	
fact	that	the	productivity	measures	of	either	NRI	never	shows	a	statistically	significant	
coefficient,	suggesting	that	NRI	productivity	is	unrelated	to	exports	of	domestic	value	
added	in	KIBS.		
In	 conclusion	 it	 would	 appear	 that,	 in	 contrast	 with	 a	 dominant	 view	 of	 natural	
resources	as	an	enclave	sector	with	weak	domestic	inter-sectoral	linkages	with	the	rest	
of	 the	 economy,	 domestic	 intermediate	 demand	 emanating	 from	 NRI	 can	 foster	
exports	for	value	added	in	the	KIBS	sector.		
Our	empirical	results	lend	support	to	our	initial	conjecture	relating	to	the	Hirschman-
Linder	 hypothesis.	 Lopez-Gonzalez	 et	 al.	 (2015)	 have	 already	 shown	 that	
manufacturing	 intermediate	demand	could	 foster	GVC	participation	 in	KIBS;	we	now	
find	that	the	same	mechanism	is	also	valid	for	backward	linkages	from	NRI.		
It	 is	 important	 to	 stress,	 however,	 that	 these	 results	 should	 not	 be	 interpreted	 as	 a	
rationale	for	developing	a	specialisation	in	NRI,	but	rather	that	countries	that	already	
have	an	economic	structure	 in	which	such	industries	play	a	pivotal	role	should	foster	
the	domestic	backward	 linkages	 to	other	 sectors	 to	 spur	 the	emergence	of	KIBS	and	
achieve	economic	diversification.		
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In	 particular	 we	 show	 that	 export	 diversification	 away	 from	 NRI	 may	 be	 possible	
through	backward,	rather	than	the	more	studied	forward	linkages,	putting	forward	an	
interesting	alternative	to	beneficiation	policies,	which	have	often	proved	unsuccessful.		
Such	policies	did	not	focus	on	KIBS	but	on	manufacturing.	The	rationale	for	this	was	to	
allow	 countries	 to	 use	 the	 output	 of	 their	 NRI	 as	 input	 for	 low-tech	manufacturing	
activity,	 using	 it	 to	 trigger	 structural	 change	 and	 gradually	 upgrade	 to	 high-tech	
manufacturing	activities.	Since	these	were	the	ultimate	goals	of	beneficiation	policies,	
we	wish	to	test	whether	backward	 linkages	 from	NRI	can	also	provide	an	avenue	for	
the	emergence	of	exports	in	high-tech	manufacturing,	as	we	see	is	the	case	for	KIBS.		
Such	 services	 can	 include	 both	 knowledge	 intensive	 activities	 in	 the	 legal	 and	
managerial	domain,	as	well	as	technical	services	and	engineering	activities	both	for	the	
mining	 and	 agricultural	 sector	 (Francois	 and	Woerz,	 2008;	 Kaplan,	 2012;	 Varela	 and	
Hollweg,	2016).	
3.5.2	NRI	and	backward	linked	High-Tech	Manufacturing		
As	emphasised	when	 reviewing	 the	 literature,	most	of	 the	 scholarship	has	 looked	at	
the	 inter-sectoral	 linkages	 originating	 from	 NRI	 to	 downstream	 manufacturing	
activities,	 often	 arguing	 that	 these	were	 not	 a	 viable	 path	 to	 diversification	 towards	
the	manufacturing	sector	(Auty	1986;	Hausmann,	B	Klinger,	et	al.	2008).	We	aim	here	
to	explore	the	potential	of	backward	linkages.		
We	saw	in	the	previous	section	that	such	linkages	can	indeed	spur	the	emergence	of	
KIBS	 exports.	 We	 now	 wish	 to	 test	 whether	 this	 hypothesis	 applies	 to	 high-tech	
manufacturing	 and	 thus	 whether	 backward	 linkages	 can	 constitute	 a	 path	 to	 the	
emergence	 of	 high-tech	 and	 knowledge	 intensive	 sectors,	 both	 in	 services	 and	
manufacturing.		
In	this	section	we	define	high-tech	manufacturing	based	on	the	OECD	classification17,	
and	 carry	out	 the	 same	empirical	 analysis	 as	we	did	 for	DVA	 in	KIBS	 in	 the	previous	
section.		
																																																								17	See	Table	A1	in	the	Appendix	for	a	full	list	of	sectors.	
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In	 Table	 3.3,	we	 again	 find	 positive	 and	 significant	 effects	 of	 domestic	 intermediate	
demand	on	the	export	of	high-tech	manufacturing	value	added,	for	both	AGR	and	MIN.	
In	both	 these	 cases,	 the	 interaction	 terms	are	positive	and	 significant,	 corroborating	
the	 idea	 that	 the	 positive	 relationship	 between	 NRI	 intermediate	 demand	 and	 the	
export	of	high-tech	manufacturing	is	stronger	for	countries	that	have	an	RCA	in	NRI.		
Table	3.3:	The	effect	of	NRI	intermediate	demand	on	the	DVA	of	high-tech	
manufacturing	in	exports	per	capita	–	System	GMM	estimation	
VARIABLES	 AGR	 MIN	
		 		 		
dva_htm_capt-1	 0.884***	 0.891***	
	 (0.0686)	 (0.0602)	
dd_htm_agr_cap	 0.0838***	 	
	 (0.0270)	 	
dd_htm_agr_cap*agr_rca	 0.0799***	 	
	 (0.0276)	 	
schooling	 0.00544	 0.00466	
	 (0.00463)	 (0.00437)	
internetaccess	 -0.000307	 0.000230	
	 (0.00276)	 (0.00203)	
dd_htm_min_cap	 	 0.0496***	
	 	 (0.0190)	
dd_htm_min_cap*min_rca	 	 0.0435**	
	 	 (0.0198)	
Constant	 -0.518	 -0.633	
	 (1.486)	 (1.213)	
	 	 	
Observations	 5,268	 5,268	
Number	of	geo-sectors	 366	 366	
AR(2)	 0.153	 0.677	
Hansen	test	overidentification	 0.385	 0.235	
Difference-in-Hansen	 0.129	 0.458	
System	GMM	estimation	for	the	effect	of	the	natural	log	of	intermediate	demand	per	
capita	of	AGR	(col.	1)	and	MIN	(col.	2)	on	the	DVA	in	export	per	capita	of	high-tech	
manufacturing.	The	analysis	is	carried	out	at	the	geo-sector	level,	i.e.	for	each	country-
sector	combination,	where	the	sectors	are	six	high-tech	manufacturing	sectors,	the	full	
list	can	be	found	in	the	appendix	table	A1.	The	variables	agr_rca	and	min_rca	are	binary	
variables	taking	value	1	if	the	country	has	an	RCA	(in	value	added	terms,	rather	than	
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gross	export)	in	AGR	or	MIN,	respectively.	Schooling	is	gross	enrolment	in	secondary	
education	and	internet	access	is	internet	users	per	thousand	inhabitants.		
Standard	errors	in	parentheses	
***	p<0.01,	**	p<0.05,	*	p<0.1	
dva	and	dd	variables	in	logs	
For	the	AR	and	Hansen	tests	the	p	values	are	reported.	
Source:	authors’	own	calculation	on	ICIO	tables.		
These	 results	 expand	 the	 existing	 debate	 around	 beneficiation	 and	 NRI	 forward	
linkages	 to	manufacturing,	 suggesting	 that	 backward	 linkages	may	 be	 a	 pathway	 to	
industrialisation	for	countries	with	a	specialisation	in	NRI.		
In	the	previous	section	we	discussed	how	an	RCA	in	NRI	may	arise	because	the	country	
is	 very	 efficient	 in	 the	 production	 process,	 or	 simply	 because	 the	 country	 is	 largely	
endowed	and	lacks	other	sectors	of	comparable	size.		
For	 this	 reason	we	now	 replicate	 in	 Table	3.4	 the	model	 from	Table	3.3,	 adding	our	
measure	of	productivity	of	the	NR	sector	as	an	additional	control.		
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Table	3.4:	The	effect	of	NRI	intermediate	demand	on	the	DVA	of	high-tech	
manufacturing	in	exports	per	capita,	controlling	for	NRI	productivity	–	System	GMM	
estimation	
VARIABLES	 AGR	 MIN	
		 		 		
dva_htm_capt-1	 0.955***	 0.839***	
	 (0.0419)	 (0.0390)	
dd_htm_agr_cap	 0.0440	 	
	 (0.0426)	 	
dd_htm_agr_cap*agr_rca	 0.0379	 	
	 (0.0403)	 	
schooling	 0.000789	 0.00732***	
	 (0.00254)	 (0.00257)	
internetaccess	 0.000126	 0.00127	
	 (0.00160)	 (0.00182)	
vaic_agr	 -0.156	 	
	 (0.186)	 	
dd_htm_min_cap	 	 0.0415***	
	 	 (0.0140)	
dd_htm_min_cap*min_rca	 	 0.0383**	
	 	 (0.0165)	
vaic_min	 	 -0.0147	
	 	 (0.0324)	
Constant	 0.287	 -1.200	
	 (0.735)	 (0.734)	
	 	 	
Observations	 5,268	 5,268	
Number	of	geosecid	 366	 366	
AR(2)	 0.016	 0.068	
Hansen	test	
overidentification	 0.213	 0.643	
Difference-in-Hansen	 0.147	 0.817	
System	GMM	estimation	for	the	effect	of	the	natural	log	of	intermediate	demand	per	capita	of	AGR	
(col.	1)	and	MIN	(col.	2)	on	the	DVA	in	export	per	capita	of	high-tech	manufacturing.	The	analysis	is	
carried	out	at	the	geo-sector	level,	i.e.	for	each	country-sector	combination,	where	the	sectors	are	
six	high-tech	manufacturing	sectors,	the	full	list	can	be	found	in	the	appendix	table	A1.		
The	variables	agr_rca	and	min_rca	are	binary	variables	taking	value	1	if	the	country	has	an	RCA	(in	
value	added	terms,	rather	than	gross	export)	in	AGR	or	MIN,	respectively.	Schooling	is	gross	
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enrolment	in	secondary	education	and	internet	access	is	internet	users	per	thousand	inhabitants.		
The	two	additional	controls	are	vaic_agr	and	vaic_min	which	are	the	ratio	between	AGR	and	MIN,	
respectively,	total	value	added	divided	by	their	respective	total	intermediate	consumption,	
excluding	the	intermediate	consumption	of	high-tech	manufacturing.		
Standard	errors	in	parentheses	
***	p<0.01,	**	p<0.05,	*	p<0.1	
dva,	dd	and	vaic	variables	in	logs	
For	the	AR	and	Hansen	tests	the	p	values	are	reported.	
Source:	authors’	own	calculation	on	ICIO	tables.		
We	 now	 find	 rather	 different	 results.	 In	 the	 case	 of	 high-tech	 manufacturing,	
intermediate	backward	linkages	from	the	AGR	sector	do	not	play	any	significant	role,	
once	we	 control	 for	 the	 productivity	 of	 the	AGR	 sector	 and	 thus	 for	 the	 ‘quality’	 of	
input	 it	 demands.	 	 This	 suggests	 that	 the	previous	positive	 results	 in	 Table	3.3	were	
picking	up	an	effect	related	to	the	productivity	of	AGR	and	that,	once	we	account	for	
that,	the	strength	of	the	intermediate	demand	becomes	irrelevant.		
In	contrast	we	find	a	positive	and	significant	effect	of	the	intermediate	demand	from	
the	MIN	sector,	as	well	as	 the	 interaction	 terms	with	 the	RCA	dummy.	This	 suggests	
that	the	intermediate	demand	from	the	MIN	sector	does	have	a	positive	impact	on	the	
DVA	export	per	capita	of	the	high-tech	manufacturing	and	that	this	effect	 is	stronger	
for	countries	with	an	RCA	in	MIN.		
This	 is	 an	 interesting	 result,	 especially	 when	 compared	 to	 the	 different	 results	
obtained	for	KIBS.	Intermediate	demand	from	the	natural	resource	sector	seems	to	be	
a	 successful	 strategy	 to	 develop	 exports	 of	 KIBS,	 regardless	 of	 whether	 we	 look	 at	
extractive	 (MIN)	 or	 not	 (AGR)	 industries.	 Exports	 in	 high-tech	 manufacturing	 in	
contrast	seems	to	be	affected	by	the	intermediate	demand	of	only	the	mining	sectors,	
once	we	control	for	the	productivity	of	NRI.		
So,	in	the	previous	section	we	find	that	our	Hirschman-Linder	hypothesis	does	apply	to	
NRI-KIBS	 backward	 linkages	 and	 that	 this	 result	 is	 robust,	 even	when	 controlling	 for	
productivity	in	NRI.		Concerning	high-tech	manufacturing	we	only	find	support	for	our	
Hirschman-Linder	 hypothesis	 only	 for	 the	MIN	 sector;	 this	 is	 particularly	 interesting	
with	 respect	 to	 the	 well-established	 literature	 that	 has	 looked	 with	 scepticism	 at	
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resource	based	industrialisation	(RBI)	strategies,	focusing	on	forward	linkages	from	NRI	
(Auty	1986;	Hausmann,	et	al.	2008).		
This	 Chapter	 puts	 forward	 new	 evidence	 suggesting	 to	 use	 backward,	 rather	 than	
forward,	linkages	to	foster	exports	in	high-tech	manufacturing.	Overall,	we	propose	a	
novel	 and	 alternative	 way	 for	 countries	 with	 large	 NRI	 to	 diversify	 their	 exports	
towards	manufacturing,	relying	on	NRI’s	intermediate	demand	rather	than	output.	We	
find	 this	 path	 to	 be	 viable	 for	 export	 diversification	 towards	 KIBS	 and	 high-tech	
manufacturing,	though	for	the	mining	sector	only.		
It	 is	 also	 worth	 pointing	 out	 that	 while	 our	 main	 conjecture	 is	 borne	 out	 by	 the	
evidence	 concerning	 KIBS,	 this	 appears	 to	 be	 the	 case	 only	 for	 countries	 with	 a	
specialisation	in	either	AGR	or	MIN,	when	we	control	for	the	NRI	sectors	productivity.		
This	 in	turn	confirms	our	hypothesis	that	NRI	backward	linkages	would	be	a	driver	of	
DVA	exports	in	KIBS	for	countries	with	a	specialisation	in	NRI.		
	
3.6	Conclusions		
This	Chapter	has	offered	novel	empirical	 evidence	 in	 support	of	exploiting	backward	
and	 forward	 linkages	 à	 la	 Hirschman	 (López-Gonzalez	 et	 al.	 2014),	 in	 a	 context	 of	
emerging	countries	 that	 face	 the	opportunities	and	challenges	of	having	 to	 ‘diversify	
away’	from	NRI,	when	NR	abundant	or	dependent.	In	doing	so,	we	aim	to	contribute	to	
the	old-age	debate	on	the	NR	“curse”,	which	has	been	recently	revamped.		
The	topic	of	how	to	better	achieve	export	diversification	as	a	development	strategy	is	
of	high	 relevance	among	academic	and	policy	makers,	 despite	 it	 not	being	new.	We	
have	 offered	 here	 a	 new	angle	 in	 two	 respects.	 The	 first	 is	 in	 revisiting	 the	 issue	 of	
backward	and	forward	linkage	à	la	Hirschman,	together	with	some	trade	scholars	(see	
for	 instance,	 Venables	 et	 al.	 2015),	 although	 in	 a	 context	 of	 NRI	 specialisation.	 The	
second	 is	 tackling	 the	 age-old	 issue	 of	 diversification	 via	beneficiation	 –	 that	 is,	 the	
development	 of	 downstream,	 forward	 linked	 manufacturing	 industries	 that	 process	
raw	materials	and	natural	resources	(Hausmann	et	al.	2008)	–	from	the	perspective	of	
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backward	linkages	with	industries	that	have	been	relatively	overlooked	in	the	debate	
on	NRI.		
We	have	 looked	at	whether	specialisation	 in	NRI	overall,	and	separately	 in	extractive	
industries	 and	 agriculture,	 might	 represent	 a	 sizeable	 and	 quality	 “representative	
domestic	 demand”	 à	 la	 Linder	 that	 can	 spur	 the	 creation	 of	 KIBS	 and	 high-tech	
manufacturing	 sectors	 as	 an	 option	 for	 export	 specialisation.	 We	 explore	 whether	
there	is	a	causal	 link	between	NRI	specialisation	and	export	performance	of	KIBS	and	
high-tech	manufacturing.	We	find	robust	evidence	in	support	of	our	conjectures.		
Countries	specialised	 in	NR,	most	especially	 in	agriculture,	show	a	positive	 impact	on	
KIBS	and	high	tech	manufacturing’s	export	performance.	This	result	is	stronger	for	KIBS	
only,	in	countries	with	a	revealed	comparative	advantage	in	NRI,	when	we	control	for	
NRI’s	productivity	performance.		
In	 the	 case	 of	 high-tech	manufacturing,	 it	 seems	 that	 the	 positive	 impact	 on	 export	
performance	of	manufacturing	of	the	intermediate	demand	of	NRI	is	absorbed	by	the	
productivity	 of	 the	 NR	 sector	 itself	 for	 the	 AGR	 sector,	 while	 our	 results	 are	 robust	
when	we	look	at	the	intermediate	domestic	demand	of	MIN.		
This	seems	to	support	the	view	that	–	after	all	–	vertical	linkages	matter	when	it	comes	
to	identifying	patterns	of	diversification	that	“build	upon”	NRI	rather	than	“away	from”	
NRI.	Looking	at	backward	linked	sectors	–	and	especially	KIBS	-	is	a	way	of	rewriting	the	
narrative	 around	 NRI,	 and	 surely	 one	 that	 contributes	 to	 the	 debate	 around	
‘premature	deindustrialisation’	recently	put	forward	(Rodrik,	2015).		
While	 we	 do	 not	 explicitly	 provide	 grounded	 evidence	 for	 specific	 industrial	 policy	
tools,	 we	 hope	 to	 provide	 a	 background	 narrative	 that	 supports	 new	 directions	 of	
these.	More	 in	 general,	 it	 is	 not	 straightforward	 to	 identify	 appropriate	 policy	 tools	
that	 support	 domestic	 and	 trade	 diversification	 in	 emerging	 countries,	 that	 allow	
‘quality’	 industrialisation	 or	 indeed	 ‘quality’	 servification,	 all	 the	 more	 so	 when	
countries	start	from	a	specialisation	in	NR.		
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However,	 based	 on	 our	 results,	 we	 can	 offer	 a	 few	 general	 reflections	 on	 the	
importance	of	a	coherent	set	of	industrial	and	innovation	policies	that	aim	to	support	
industrial	development	in	NR-based	emerging	countries.		
First,	countries,	particularly	those	abundant	and/or	specialised	in	NR,	could	exploit	this	
to	identify	related	backward	or	forward	linked	sectors	that	do	not	necessarily	need	to	
be	 on	 the	 technological	 frontier	 but	 nevertheless	 represent	 feasible	 directions	 for	
structural	 transformation.	While	 this	 is	not,	 in	principle,	new,	 for	 instance	within	 the	
product	space	framework	(Hidalgo	et	al.	2007;	Hausmann	et	al.	2007),	we	argue	that	
the	ability	of	countries	to	transition	from	one	set	of	activities	to	another	one	is	based	
on	a	deliberate	policy	effort	to	support	technological	and	sectoral	upgrading	(Ciarli	et	
al.	2018).		
Second,	 such	a	deliberate	effort	would	entail	a	new	narrative	around	the	support	 to	
international	 technology	 transfer,	 via,	 for	 instance,	Multinational	 Enterprises	 (MNEs)	
presence,	 most	 especially	 in	 NR-based	 countries.	 The	 development	 of	 domestic	
capabilities	for	upgrading	is	the	result	of	a	patient	and	long-term	process	of	interaction	
of	 foreign	 and	 domestic	 firms,	 all	 the	 more	 so	 in	 a	 context	 of	 international	
fragmentation	of	production.	Currently	 there	 is	 little	 reflection,	and	only	 from	a	 few	
scholars,	on	the	link	between	international	technology	transfer,	export	diversification,	
and	 domestic	 technology	 upgrading	 as	 an	 explicit	 policy	 goal	 that	 aims	 to	 ensure	
quality	directions	to	structural	transformation	(Bell	2009;	Barrientos	et	al.	2011;	Fu	et	
al.	2011;	Pietrobelli	et	al.	2011).	The	conjecture	and	empirical	evidence	put	forward	in	
this	 Chapter	 have	 aimed	 to	 contribute	 to	 the	 narratives	 that	 might	 support	 these	
reflections.		
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4.	Power	and	export	sophistication	in	buyer-supplier	
relationships:	insights	from	Colombian	customs	data	
	
Abstract	
	
This	 Chapter	 investigates	 the	 association	 between	 buyer-supplier	 international	 trade	
relationships	 and	 supplier’s	 product	 upgrading.	 We	 proxy	 the	 suppliers’	 upgrading	 with	 a	
measure	 of	 product	 sophistication.	 We	 first	 propose	 a	 measure	 of	 power	 in	 the	 trade	
relationship,	combining	the	dependence	of	each	firm	on	the	trading	partner	and	their	market	
shares.	 Using	 transaction	 data	 from	 Colombia,	 we	 next	 estimate	 if	 the	 measure	 of	 power	
relationship	predicts	a	supplier’s	export	sophistication,	the	probability	of	adding	a	new	product	
in	the	trading	relationship,	and	that	of	increasing	export	sophistication.	
We	find	that	suppliers	that	are	highly	dependent	on	buyer’s	imports	are	more	likely	to	fall	into	
a	specialisation	 trap	 in	 low	sophistication	products.	Buyers	with	 large	market	shares	 trade	 in	
sophisticated	products,	therefore	with	little	margin	for	upgrading;	suppliers	with	large	market	
shares	are	more	likely	to	introduce	new	products,	but	trade	pairs	where	the	buyer	depends	on	
the	supplier	are	more	likely	to	upgrade.	We	further	test	whether	these	relationships	hold	across	
different	destination	countries,	 finding	 in	particular	that	buyers	dominating	the	market	 in	the	
US	tend	to	import	low-sophistication	products	and	make	it	harder	for	suppliers	to	upgrade.		
We	contribute	to	the	recent	 literature	on	buyer-supplier	 relationships	by	explicitly	 including	a	
measure	 of	 power	 into	 our	 analysis.	 In	 doing	 this,	 we	 also	 offer	 further	 support	 and	
complement	 the	 qualitative	 evidence	 put	 forward	 by	 the	 literature	 on	 governance	 in	 global	
value	chains	(GVCs).	
	
	
4.1	Introduction	
The	 positive	 association	 between	 export	 and	 growth	 is	 an	 established	 empirical	
regularity	 (Pack	 and	 Saggi	 2001;	 Baldwin	 and	 Yan	 2014;	 Lee	 2011;	 Iacovone	 and	
Javorcik	 2010;	 Iacovone	 and	 Javorcik	 2009).	More	 recently,	 it	 has	 been	 pointed	 out	
that	 it	 is	 not	 just	 the	 quantity	 but	 also	 the	 quality	 and	 sophistication	 of	 what	 one	
exports	that	affects	growth	prospects	(Hausmann	et	al.	2007;	Poncet	and	Starosta	de	
Waldemar	2013;	Jarreau	and	Poncet	2012).	 Increases	 in	the	sophistication	of	exports	
often	 means	 trading	 in	 more	 value-added	 products,	 increasing	 the	 stock	 of	 human	
capital	 and	 capabilities	 in	 the	 country,	 which	 can,	 in	 turn,	 foster	 economic	
development	(Lall	et	al.	2006;	Hidalgo	et	al.	2007;	Minondo	2010;	Zhu	and	Fu	2013).	
Consistent	with	this	view,	the	literature	has	put	forward	evidence	of	the	importance	of	
exports	 for	 firms’	 productivity	 and	 learning	 opportunities	 (Wu	 2012;	 Antolín	 et	 al.	
2012),	stressing	the	importance	of	different	products	and	destinations	(Fontagné	et	al.	
2018;	Iacovone	and	Javorcik	2010;	Eckel	et	al.	2015;	Bernard	et	al.	2015).	The	literature	
on	the	relationship	between	exports	and	firm	performance	is	very	large.	Martins	and	
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Yang	 (2009)	 review	 the	 evidence	 and	 conclude	 that	 exports	 have	 larger	 positive	
impacts	 on	 firms	 in	 developing	 countries,	 especially	 during	 their	 first	 years	 of	
exporting;	this	makes	Colombia	a	relevant	country	to	study.		
Trade	has	both	 increased	and	changed	 in	nature	 in	 recent	decades,	 shifting	 towards	
trade	in	intermediates	and	leading	to	the	emergence	of	global	value	chains	(GVCs).	
From	 a	 development	 perspective,	 GVCs	 have	 often	 been	 regarded	 as	 a	 new	
opportunity	 for	 firms	 in	 developing	 countries	 to	 access	 the	 global	 market,	 tap	 into	
foreign	 knowledge	 and	 know-how	 and,	 ultimately,	 achieve	 upgrading	 (Gereffi	 et	 al.	
2005;	Kaplinsky	2004;	Baldwin	2011).	
Upgrading	via	trade	can	happen	through	the	exchange	of	knowledge	between	buyers	
and	 suppliers,	 such	 as	 product	 specifications	 (Pietrobelli	 and	 Saliola	 2008),	 and	
cooperation	 through	 tight	 relationships	 between	 the	 buyer	 and	 the	 supplier,	 going	
well	beyond	pure	market	 relationships	 (Gereffi	et	al.	2005;	Giuliani	et	al.	2005b).	An	
implication	of	 this	 is	 that	 flows	of	knowledge	are	not	automatic	and	depend	on	how	
much	the	buyer	relies	on	their	supplier,	how	skilled	the	supplier	 is,	and	what	kind	of	
transactions	 take	 place	 between	 the	 two	 (Gereffi	 et	 al.	 2005;	 Giuliani	 et	 al.	 2005b).	
Moreover,	suppliers	that	manage	to	participate	in	GVCs	need	to	do	so	by	securing	and	
maintaining	a	position	within	the	chain	that	 is	protected	from	other	competitors	and	
grants	them	bargaining	power	vis-à-vis	their	buyers	(Kaplinsky	2004).	For	the	supplier,	
therefore,	 upgrading	 through	 participation	 in	 GVCs	 ultimately	 depends	 on	 the	
governance	 under	which	 firms	 operate	within	 a	 GVC:	 power	 relationships	 along	 the	
chain	shape	firms’	governance	and,	thus,	upgrading	(Gereffi	et	al.	2005;	Humphrey	and	
Schmitz	2002;	Pietrobelli	and	Saliola	2008).		
In	 parallel,	 albeit	 separately,	 with	 this	 debate,	 a	 growing	 literature	 has	 emerged	 in	
recent	 years	 using	 quantitative	 data	 on	 firm	 level	 transactions	 to	 explore	 firm	
heterogeneity	in	trade	(Melitz	2003;	Bernard	et	al.	2014;	Carballo	et	al.	2013;	Bernard	
et	 al.	 2011;	 Eaton	 et	 al.	 2007)	 and	 buyer-supplier	 matching	 (Sugita	 et	 al.	 2015;	
Dragusanu	2014).	Stemming	from	this,	a	stream	of	research	has	been	using	matched	
buyer-supplier	data	at	the	transaction	level	to	explore	the	importance	of	relationships	
(which	 this	 literature	 also	 refers	 to	 as	 “value	 of	 the	 relationship”),	 between	 trading	
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parties,	 especially	 in	 the	 context	 of	 low	 contract-enforceability	 (Macchiavello	 2010;	
Macchiavello	 and	Morjaria	 2015;	Macchiavello	 and	Morjaria	 2016;	Macchiavello	 and	
Miquel-Florensa	2017).	
The	key	finding	of	this	literature	is	that	as	buyers	and	suppliers	trade	with	each	other	
over	 time,	 they	 also	 learn	 about	 and	 trust	 each	 other	 more;	 this	 is	 particularly	
important	 in	 context	 with	 low	 contract	 enforceability.	 Reputation	 in	 such	 a	 context	
becomes	 crucial	 and	 its	 value	 increases	 with	 the	 age	 of	 the	 relationship,	 reducing	
opportunistic	behaviour	in	trade	relationships.		
Despite	 this	 growing	 evidence	 on	 the	 importance	 of	 relationships,	 this	 stream	 of	
literature	 has	 not	 directly	 tackled	 the	 issue	 of	 upgrading	 or	 power	 within	 buyer-
supplier	relationships.		
This	 Chapter	 aims	 to	 remedy	 this	 with	 a	 quantitative	 approach;	 we	 answer	 the	
question	of	whether	power	 in	buyer-supplier	 relationships	 is	 a	 predictor	 of	 levels	 of	
export	 sophistication,	 the	 likelihood	 of	 introducing	 new	 products,	 and	 that	 of	
increasing	sophistication.		
We	 operationalise	 the	 concept	 of	 power,	 in	 particular	 distinguishing	 between	 the	
dependence	 of	 each	 trading	 party	 on	 each	 other	 and	 each	 trading	 party’s	 market	
share.	 We	 investigate	 whether	 these	 two	 different	 understandings	 of	 power	 are	
related	 in	different	ways	 to	export	 sophistication	and	upgrading,	 as	well	 as	whether	
such	relationships	change	across	destination	countries.		
Our	main	 source	 of	 data	 is	 the	 Colombian	 Customs,	 with	 information	 on	 all	 export	
transactions	 between	 2008	 and	 2014.	We	merge	 this	 with	 data	 both	 on	 exporters’	
financial	 statements	 and	 product	 measures	 of	 complexity	 from	 the	 Atlas	 of	
Complexity18,	compiled	by	Harvard	University.		
In	 our	 analysis	 we	 provide	 some	 descriptive	 evidence	 on	 the	 relationship	 between	
power	within	buyer-supplier	pairs	and	the	sophistication	of	the	products	traded.	This	is																																																									18	The	terms	‘complexity’	and	‘sophisticated’	can	be	used	interchangeably.	For	clarity	’s	sake,	however,	
in	 the	 remainder	 of	 the	 thesis	 we	 use	 the	 term	 ‘sophistication’	 in	 line	 with	 the	 literature	 on	 export	
sophistication	and	upgrading.	We	revert	to	complexity	(or	complexity	measure)	when	explicitly	referring	
to	the	product	complexity	index	(pci)	from	the	Atlas	of	Complexity.	
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supported	by	a	regression	analysis	to	produce	more	comprehensive	results,	controlling	
for	supplier’s	productivity	and	buyer-supplier	pairs’	characteristics.		
Therefore,	our	 level	of	analysis	 is	 the	pair,	 for	which	we	observe	both	the	buyer	and	
the	 supplier,	 and	 the	 products	 and	 quantities	 they	 exchange.	 However,	 our	 main	
interest	 lies	with	the	supplier,	which	is	the	one	ultimately	engaging	in	upgrading.	For	
this	 reason	we	also	rely	on	financial	data	on	the	suppliers	 from	the	SIREM	database,	
which	allows	controlling	for	time	varying	characteristics	of	the	suppliers.		
We	 find	 that	 when	 a	 supplier	 trades	 with	 a	 powerful	 buyer,	 both	 the	 level	 of	
sophistication	and	the	chances	of	upgrading	will	vary	depending	on	the	source	of	the	
buyer’s	power.	 If	this	 is	due	to	the	fact	that	the	supplier	 is	heavily	dependent	on	the	
buyer,	the	supplier	will	usually	be	trading	in	low-sophistication	products	and	have	little	
chance	of	upgrading.		
If,	instead,	the	buyer’s	power	is	due	to	its	own	large	market	share	it	is	more	likely	that	
the	buyer	will	be	purchasing	sophisticated	products.	However,	this	will	also	leave	little	
room	for	the	supplier	to	further	upgrade,	arguably	because	it	is	already	at	the	frontier.	
This	 relationship	 is	 reversed	 when	 we	 look	 at	 relationships	 between	 Colombian	
exporters	and	US	importers,	which	suggests	that	firms	exporting	to	buyers	dominating	
the	market	in	high-income	countries	may	find	it	harder	to	both	trade	in	sophisticated	
products	 and	 improve	 their	 export	 sophistication.	 This	 is	 interesting	 because	 it	
suggests	 that	 destination	 countries,	 and	 knowledge	 asymmetries	 among	 these,	may	
have	 an	 impact	 on	 how	 buyer-supplier	 relationships	 are	 related	 to	 export	
sophistication.		
Concerning	powerful	suppliers,	we	find	that	when	power	comes	from	a	 large	market	
share,	they	are	more	likely	to	introduce	new	products.	However,	it	is	the	dependence	
of	the	buyer	on	the	supplier	that	is	positively	related	to	increases	in	sophistication	of	
the	supplier’s	export	and	upgrading.		
We	also	expand	the	existing	quantitative	evidence	on	the	value	of	the	relationship	in	
trade	at	the	firm	and	transaction	level.	This	is	done	by	including	the	concepts	of	power	
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into	 our	 analysis,	 which	 the	 established	 literature	 on	 GVCs	 has	 put	 forward	 as	 a	
determinant	of	upgrading	and,	ultimately,	economic	development.	
In	doing	 this,	we	also	add	 to	 this	mainly	qualitative	 literature	on	GVCs:	we	carry	out	
new	quantitative	analysis	of	transaction	 level	trade	data	to	offer	support	to	the	view	
that	power	is	relevant	to	trade	relationships’	outcomes.		
We	also	contribute	to	this	 literature	by	disentangling	the	mechanisms	through	which	
power	manifests	itself	in	buyer-supplier	relationships.	
The	remainder	of	the	Chapter	is	structured	as	follows:	section	2	deals	with	the	relevant	
literature.	Section	3	presents	the	Chapter’s	research	questions	and	contributions;	we	
then	 turn	 to	 the	data	 and	 the	 construction	of	 the	 variables	 and	describe	Colombian	
buyer-supplier	 relationships	 in	 terms	 of	 power	 and	 sophistication	 in	 section	 4.	 The	
penultimate	section	discusses	the	results	from	our	empirical	analysis,	and	the	section	6	
concludes.		
	
4.2 Literature	review	
This	 section	 starts	 by	 reviewing	 the	 literature	 on	 GVCs,	 emphasising	 the	 theoretical	
and	 empirical	 contributions	 on	power	 in	 buyer-supplier	 relationships	 and	upgrading.	
We	 integrate	 these	 concepts	 into	 the	 analysis	 of	 transaction	 level	 trade	data,	which	
has	only	recently	started	to	explore	the	importance	of	buyer-supplier	relationships.	In	
order	to	include	power	into	this	growing	strand	of	work,	we	draw	on	the	measurement	
of	 this	 provided	 in	 the	 literature	 on	 industrial	 organisation	 and	 supply	 chain	
management.	
4.2.1:	Global	value	chains:	power	and	upgrading	
The	 international	 fragmentation	 of	 production	 has	 raised	 attention	 on	 the	
relationships	 among	 firms	 across	 borders,	 and	 the	 extent	 to	 which	 local	 suppliers	
(often	 in	 developing	 countries)	 can	 learn	 from	 global	 suppliers	 (Gereffi	 1994;	
Humphrey	and	Schmitz	2002).	
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The	 GVC	 framework	 views	 this	 learning	 process	 as	 tightly	 linked	 to	 innovation	 and	
firms’	 access	 to	 new	 technology.	Within	 this,	 it	 is	 argued	 that	 power	 within	 buyer-
supplier	relationships	affects	the	availability	of	knowledge	to	suppliers.		
One	 of	 the	main	 contentions	 of	 this	 literature	 is	 that	 the	 nature	 of	 the	 relationship	
between	 buyers	 and	 suppliers	 can	 influence	 suppliers’	 scope	 for	 progressing	 in	 the	
value	chain.	Within	this	framework,	scholars	refer	to	the	nature	of	the	relationship	as	
its	 governance;	 this	 determines	 “who	 does	 what”,	 “when”	 and	 “how	 much”.	
Humphrey	and	Schmitz	(2002)	put	forward	an	initial	taxonomy	including	(i)	networks	in	
which	all	firms	hold	similar	levels	of	power	and	share	their	capabilities	along	the	chain,	
(ii)	quasi-hierarchical	value	chains	are	characterised	by	 independent	firms	where	one	
holds	 a	 considerably	 larger	 amount	 of	 power	 over	 the	 others,	 and	 (iii)	 hierarchical	
value	chains	characterised	by	direct	ownership.		
Building	on	this,	Gereffi	et	al.	(2005)	propose	a	further	refined	taxonomy	identifying:		
- Arm’s	 length	 market	 relationships,	 with	 little	 level	 of	 commitment	 and	 low	
switching	costs;		
- Modular	 value	 chains	 in	 which	 the	 supplier	 takes	 care	 of	 all	 the	 process	
technology	 and	 delivers	 a	 turnkey	 product.	 However,	 it	 does	 so	with	 generic	
machinery	and	low	levels	of	transaction-specific	investment;		
- Relational	 value	 chains	 are	 within	 sophisticated	 relationships	 between	 buyer	
and	 supplier	 and	 high	 level	 of	mutual	 dependence,	 usually	 relying	 on	 spatial	
proximity	of	trust	that	is	built	up	over	time;		
- Captive	 value	 chains	 in	which	 small	 suppliers	 are	dependent	on	 large	buyers,	
with	a	degree	of	control	and	monitoring	on	the	buyer’s	part;		
- Hierarchical	 value	 chains,	 where	 there	 is	 a	 direct	 ownership	 link	 between	
headquarters	and	subsidiaries.		
This	 categorisation	of	 different	 kinds	of	 governance	 and	buyer-supplier	 relationships	
lends	 itself	 very	well	 to	 qualitative	 studies;	 however,	 it	 does	 not	 provide	 a	 clear-cut	
definition	of	the	concept	of	power	or	a	measurement	that	would	ensure	comparability	
across	cases.	We	 later	discuss	contributions	 from	other	strands	of	 literature	that	put	
forward	 different	 approaches	 to	 power	 that	 lend	 themselves	more	 to	measurement	
and	synthesis.		
The	other	main	focus	of	the	GVC	literature	is	opportunities	for	suppliers	to	engage	in	
upgrading;	however,	this	remains	rather	elusive	and	not	clearly	defined.	In	its	broadest	
87		
definition,	 upgrading	 refers	 to	 the	 improvement	 of	 firms’	 performance,	 through	
“making	 better	 products,	making	 them	more	 efficiently	 or	moving	 into	more	 skilled	
activities”	(Giuliani	et	al.	2005,	p.552).		
The	value	chain	scholarship	has	adopted	a	framework	to	encompass	the	different	ways	
in	which	upgrading	can	take	place.	Process	and	product	upgrading	are	closely	related	
to	 product	 and	 process	 innovation,	 and	 correspond	 to	 a	 supplier	 introducing	 a	 new	
product	 or	 a	 new	production	process,	 respectively.	Function	 upgrading	 refers	 to	 the	
inclusion	of	new,	higher-value	added	activities	within	 the	GVC	of	which	a	 supplier	 is	
already	a	part,	while	value	 chain	 upgrading	usually	 implies	 a	moving	 to	a	new	value	
chain	altogether	(Humphrey	and	Schmitz	2002;	Gereffi	et	al.	2005).		
While	these	issues	are	very	relevant	to	GVC	analysis,	many	studies	do	not	provide	any	
explicit	definition	of	what	they	exactly	mean	by	upgrading	(Morrison	et	al.	2006).	The	
concept	 of	 upgrading	 is	 still	 very	 broad:	 it	 is	 particularly	 hard	 to	 distinguish	 from	
innovation	 and	 whether	 the	 two	 co-occur	 or	 one	 is	 the	 consequence	 of	 the	 other	
(Morrison	et	al.	2006).	As	a	consequence	upgrading	has	often	been	operationalised	in	
many	different	ways	across	the	literature	(Morrison	et	al.	2006).	
The	 fuzziness	 around	 the	 definition	 of	 these	 concepts	 represents	 a	 considerable	
obstacle	 to	 providing	 evidence	 based	 on	 large	 quantitative	 samples,	 which	 would	
favour	the	generalisation	of	the	insights	from	the	GVC	literature.	
The	 literature	 has	 tried	 to	 overcome	 this	 problem	 by	 constructing	 measures	 of	
sophistication,	 or	 complexity,	 which	 we	 use	 henceforth	 interchangeably.	 Focusing	
mainly	 on	 the	 country	 level,	 there	 is	 an	 established	 literature	 emphasising	 the	
importance	for	economies	to	introduce	new	products	into	their	export	portfolio	(Amiti	
and	Freund	2010;	Koujianou	Goldberg	et	al.	2010;	Klenow	and	Hummels	2005;	Broda	
and	Weinstein	2006).	The	growing	literature	on	export	sophistication	expands	on	this	
by	qualifying	the	new	varieties	 included	in	the	export	portfolio,	positing	that	 it	 is	not	
only	 about	 including	more	 products	 in	 the	 export	 portfolio,	 but	 also	 including	more	
sophisticated	 (and	 thus,	 in	 this	 approach,	 of	 higher	 quality)	 ones	 (Zhu	 and	 Fu	 2013;	
Minondo	2010;	Hausmann	et	al.	2007;	Hidalgo	et	al.	2007).	
88		
Lall	et	al.	(2006)	are	among	the	first	to	devise	a	methodological	approach	to	measuring	
export	 sophistication	 by	 inferring	 the	 sophistication	 of	 a	 product	 from	 the	
characteristics	of	the	country	exporting	it,	mainly	its	average	income,	rather	than	the	
product’s	characteristics.	Building	on	 this	approach,	 the	most	 remarkable	attempt	 to	
compute	a	measure	of	sophistication	is	arguably	in	the	contribution	from	Hidalgo	et	al.	
(2007),	who	propose	a	data-driven	approach	to	capabilities.	This	is	further	developed	
in	 Hidalgo	 and	 Hausmann	 (2009),	 where	 they	 detach	 the	measure	 of	 sophistication	
from	income	per	capita	–	as	was	case	 in	Lall	et	al.	 (2006)	and	Hidalgo	et	al.	 (2007)	–	
rather	relying	on	a	product’s	ubiquity	and	the	exporter’s	diversification.		
The	most	sophisticated	products	are	those	that	are	being	exported	by	few	and	highly	
diversified	 countries.	 The	 intuition	 behind	 this	 is	 that	 sophistication	 can	 be	 inferred	
through	 a	 product’s	 ubiquity	 and	 countries’	 diversification.	 The	 most	 sophisticated	
economies	 will	 have	 a	 large	 set	 of	 capabilities	 and	 therefore	 will	 export	 many	
products.	On	the	other	hand,	sophisticated	products	will	be	exported	by	few	countries	
(i.e.	they	will	show	low	ubiquity)	with	a	large	set	of	capabilities	and	a	highly	diversified	
export	basket.		
In	 this	 approach,	 therefore,	 countries’	 and	 products’	 complexity	 define	 each	 other	
through	measures	of	diversification	and	ubiquity,	respectively.		
Hidalgo	 and	 co-authors	 resort	 therefore	 to	 algorithms	 based	 on	 the	 method	 of	
reflection,	 to	 compute	 a	 complexity	 measure	 for	 both	 products	 (based	 on	 their	
ubiquity	 and	 the	 diversification	 of	 the	 economies	 exporting	 them)	 and	 economies	
(based	on	the	diversification	of	their	export	portfolio	and	the	ubiquity	of	the	products	
they	export).		
This	measure	of	 complexity	has	been	used	 in	 the	 literature	at	mainly	 the	country	or	
municipality	 level	 (Bustos	 et	 al.	 2012;	 Poncet	 and	 Starosta	 de	 Waldemar	 2013).	
However,	 the	 complexity	 index	 refers	 to	 products	 and	 can	 also	 be	 applied	 to	micro	
level	data	to	study	changes	in	exporters’	portfolio	to	capture	upgrading.	
This	 would	 allow	 carrying	 out	 quantitative	 analysis	 at	 the	 firm	 level,	 proxying	
upgrading	 through	 complexity	 measures	 and	 studying	 its	 relationship	 with	 buyer-
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supplier	 relationships’	 characteristics.	 It	 would	 thus	 be	 possible	 to	 test	 the	 insights	
from	the	GVC	 literature	reviewed	 in	this	section	 in	a	quantitative	setting,	concerning	
the	 importance	 of	 power	 in	 buyer-supplier’s	 relationships	 as	 a	 determinant	 of	
upgrading.		
To	do	this,	 it	 is	 important	to	first	review	the	contributions	of	the	recent	 literature	to	
firms’	heterogeneity	and	exports,	using	micro	level	data,	focusing	in	particular	on	the	
recent	 work	 that	 has	 recognised	 the	 importance	 of	 buyer-supplier	 relationships	
(Macchiavello	and	Morjaria	2015).		
4.2.2	Exploring	the	value	of	buyer-supplier	relationships	with	micro	data.	
The	 literature	 on	 trade	 at	 the	 firm	 level	 starts	 from	 rather	 different	 theoretical	
premises	from	the	GVC	literature.	In	fact,	it	initially	focused	on	trade	models	of	firms’	
heterogeneity,	 stemming	 from	Melitz's	 (2003)	 seminal	work,	 emphasising	 that	 firms’	
different	characteristics	impact	trade	patterns	and	behaviour.		
This	has	then	led	scholars	to	study	how	heterogeneous	buyers	and	suppliers	match	in	
the	first	place,	i.e.	assortative	matching,	what	are	the	factors	influencing	this	matching	
process,	and	how	costly	it	is	to	switch	trade	partner	(Sugita	et	al.	2015;	Bernard	et	al.	
2011;	Bernard	et	al.	2014;	Blum	et	al.	2014;	Eaton	et	al.	2007).		
However,	 a	 subset	 of	 this	 literature	 has	 focused	 on	 the	 importance	 of	 long-lasting	
relationships,	 which	 is	 related	 to	 ideas	 of	 trust	 and,	 crucially	 to	 our	 purpose	 here,	
acknowledges	 that	 relationships	 can	 be	 of	 a	 different	 nature.	 We	 revisit	 these	
contributions	 here	 and	 emphasise	 the	 overlap	 with	 the	 focus	 of	 the	 GVC	 literature	
discussed	in	the	previous	section.			
A	first	major	contribution	from	this	literature	concerns	the	importance	for	buyers	and	
suppliers	 to	 acquire	 information	 about	 each	 other.	 Evidence	 has	 shown	 that	 firms	
trading	in	differentiated	products	tend	to	switch	suppliers	more	often,	either	because	
they	are	more	likely	to	find	more	competitive	suppliers	or	because	the	supplier	fails	to	
meet	 their	 requirements	 (Monarch	 and	 Schmidt-Eisenlohr	 2015).	 The	 search	 efforts	
are	also	higher	in	markets	in	which	there	is	a	higher	heterogeneity	of	suppliers	(Grossi	
Cajal	2016).		
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The	 matching	 process	 is	 often	 unsuccessful,	 and	 even	 when	 it	 is	 the	 literature	 has	
shown	that	as	a	relationship’s	duration	increases	so	does	the	likelihood	of	it	breaking	
down	(Macchiavello	2010).	However,	long-lasting	relationships	are	important	because	
firms	in	such	trading	relationships	tend	to	trade	with	higher	FOB	prices	(Macchiavello	
2010).	Moreover,	while	 long-lasting	 relationships	 are	 a	 small	 proportion	of	 the	 total	
number	 of	 relationships,	 they	 account	 for	 a	 significant	 share	 of	 total	 trade	 flows	
(Monarch	and	Schmidt-Eisenlohr	2015).	
Mutual	knowledge	and	trust	are	crucial	to	long-lasting	relationships	and	become	even	
more	important	factors	in	the	context	of	low	contract	enforceability	(Macchiavello	and	
Morjaria	2015).	 Further	 support	 for	 this	 is	 also	offered	by	Macchiavello	 and	Miquel-
Florensa	(2017)	who	study	the	 likelihood	of	exporters	selling	outside	the	relationship	
and	how	trading	partners	need	assurances	concerning	the	persistence	of	both	demand	
and	 supply	 in	 a	 low	 contract-enforceability	 context.	 They	 find	 that	 long	 term	
relationships	provide	such	assurances,	although	not	as	much	as	vertical	integration.	
There	 is	an	 increasing	body	of	evidence	on	buyer-supplier	 relationships	and	how	the	
trust	 within	 these	 is	 relevant	 to	 trade	 flows	 and	 patterns.	 These	 show	 that	 not	 all	
buyer-supplier	 relationships	 are	 the	 same	 and	 that	 their	 importance,	 which	 many	
contributions	in	this	strand	of	work	refer	to	as	value	(Monarch	and	Schmidt-Eisenlohr	
2015;	Macchiavello	and	Morjaria	2015),	increases	over	time.		
As	mentioned	 in	 the	previous	 section,	 the	 literature	on	GVCs	also	posits	 that	not	all	
trade	relationships	are	the	same	and	that	trust	and	mutual	knowledge	build	over	time:	
it	 emphasises	 the	 importance	 of	 power	 asymmetries	 within	 buyer-supplier	
relationships.		
Despite	the	proximity	in	both	topics	and	concepts,	there	is	still	very	little	quantitative	
evidence	 looking	 explicitly	 at	 GVCs	 at	 the	 transaction	 level,	 with	 few	 exceptions	
looking	at	global	supply	chains	and	production	networks.		
Dragusanu	 (2014)	 develops	 a	model	 of	 sequential	 production	 to	 explore	 assortative	
matching,	which	she	finds	to	be	particularly	strong	for	downstream	products,	i.e.	close	
to	final	use.	Bernard	et	al.	(2014)	refer	to	production	networks,	using	the	extension	of	
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a	high-speed	train	line	in	Japan	to	show	that	the	searching	activity	of	trading	partners	
is	 the	 outcome	 of	 their	 geographic	 location	 and	 access	 to	 many	 partners.	 Finally,	
Bernard	and	Moxnes	(2018)	review	the	existing	literature	on	firm-to-firm	connections	
in	trade	and	emphasise	how	research	on	production	networks	is	sorely	needed,	both	
at	the	firm	and	macro	level.	
This	 literature	 has	mainly	 looked	 at	 determinants	 of	 the	matching	 process	 between	
buyers	 and	 suppliers	 and	 the	 importance	 of	 long-lasting	 relationships.	 The	 GVC	
literature	reviewed	previously,	however,	suggests	that	it	is	not	only	mutual	knowledge	
and	trust	that	will	affect	a	firm’s	trade	and	performance,	but	that	power	may	also	be	a	
relevant	dimension.		
Firms	may	indeed	engage	in	long-lasting,	captive	relationships,	with	very	little	chance	
of	 improving	 their	 trade	 performance	 and	 upgrade.	 In	 contrast,	 relational	 GVC	
relationships	are	also	long-lasting	but	usually	entail	more	balanced	power	relationships	
and	 involvement	 of	 suppliers	 in	 the	 production	 process.	 This	 would	 be	 through	
frequent	 interactions	and	knowledge	exchange,	 therefore	favouring	upgrading	of	 the	
supplier	(Gereffi	et	al.	2005;	Humphrey	and	Schmitz	2002).	
To	 the	 best	 of	 our	 knowledge,	 virtually	 no	 contribution	 has	 so	 far	 incorporated	
upgrading	and	power	 into	an	analysis	with	transaction	level	data.	The	reason	for	this	
lack	of	quantitative	evidence	is	likely	that	power	and	upgrading	are	not	easily	defined,	
let	alone	uniquely	measured	in	a	quantitative	context.		
4.2.3:	Quantitative	approaches	to	power	in	buyer-supplier	relationships	
In	this	section	we	draw	on	contributions	outside	of	the	GVC	literature	that	distinguish	
the	 sources	 of	 power.	 These	 have	 to	 do	 with	 features	 of	 the	 market	 in	 which	 the	
buyer-supplier	 relationship	 takes	place,	as	well	as	with	specific	aspects	of	 the	buyer-
supplier	match.	 In	 addition	 to	 a	 theoretical	 discussion	 of	 the	 concept	 of	 power,	we	
focus	on	the	empirical	approaches	and	indicators	put	forward	to	measure	it.		
4.2.3.a:	Understanding	power:	market	and	relational	aspects	
In	the	economic	literature,	market	power	is	often	referred	to	as	a	firm’s	ability	to	sell	
at	 prices	 above	 their	 marginal	 cost	 and	 obtain	 profits	 through	 a	 mark-up.	 Market	
power	 is	 usually	 the	 result	 of	market	 structure:	 in	 perfect	 competitions	 there	 are	 a	
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large	number	of	firms	displaying	atomistic	behaviour,	none	of	which	can	sell	at	a	price	
higher	than	the	marginal	cost,	lest	all	customers	prefer	its	competitors.		
On	the	other	hand,	if	there	is	a	low	level	of	competition,	firms	enjoy	market	power	and	
can	sell	at	prices	above	their	marginal	cost	and	enjoy	profits	above	zero.	Based	on	this,	
the	literature	on	industrial	organisation	often	regards	market	structure	as	an	outcome	
of	 power;	 in	 particular,	market	 concentration	 and	 firms’	 shares	 in	 a	 given	 sector	 or	
industry	are	considered	tell-tale	signs	of	market	power.	This	view	on	market	power	is	
more	concerned	with	firms’	ability	to	charge	prices	above	the	marginal	cost.	This	has	
however	bearing	on	 firms’	ability	 to	engage	 in	upgrading	 too,	 since	 firms	benefitting	
market	 power	 will	 be	 have	 a	 larger	 amount	 of	 resources	 to	 invest	 in	 product	
development	and	upgrading.	Moreover,	as	firms	in	concentrated	industries	are	able	to	
exact	 higher	 prices	 from	 their	 customers,	 they	 can	 also	 appropriate	 larger	 shares	 of	
value	added	along	the	chain,	as	discussed	in	the	previous	subsection	(Kaplinsky,	2004;	
Gereffi	et	al,	2005)		
The	 literature	on	supply	chain	management	takes	a	different	view,	which	 is	closer	to	
the	GVC	literature’s	view	of	power	and	stems	from	other	disciplines	such	as	sociology	
and	 political	 science,	which	 look	 at	 power	 as	 a	 relational	 concept.	 In	 the	 context	 of	
inter-firm	relationships,	this	translates	as	the	ability	of	buyers	(or	suppliers)	to	coerce	
their	suppliers	(or	buyers)	to	their	will.		
These	 two	views	on	market	power	are	well	examined	by	Shervani	et	al.	 (2016),	who	
define	market	 structure’s	 power	 as	 a	 firm’s	market	 or	 bargaining	 power	 in	 product-
market	 or	 industry.	 Henceforth,	We	 refer	 to	 this	 as	 the	 “market	 aspect”	 of	 power.	
Inter-firms’	 market	 power	 is	 defined	 as	 a	 firm’s	 power	 within	 the	 inter-firm	
relationships	 or	 a	 specialised	 network	 of	 firms.	 Henceforth,	 we	 refer	 to	 this	 as	 the	
“relational	aspect”	of	power.	
4.2.3.b:	Quantitative	approaches	to	buyer-supplier	relationships	and	power	
From	 a	methodological	 point	 of	 view,	 the	majority	 of	 the	 literature	 in	 supply	 chain	
management	relies	on	surveys	(Liu	et	al.	2009;	Shervani	et	al.	2016;	Leiblein	and	Miller	
2003).	This	approach	allows	for	a	very	nuanced	characterisation	of	power	relationships	
between	buyers	and	suppliers.		
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For	instance,	power	can	be	mediated,	with	buyers	deploying	explicit	strategies	towards	
their	 suppliers,	 or	 non-mediated	 and	based	on	 relational	 aspects	 (Zhao	 et	 al.	 2008).	
Benton	and	Maloni	(2005)	provide	a	thorough	discussion	of	these	two	kinds	of	power	
and	many	different	subcategories	that	can	affect	buyer-supplier	relationships.		
The	 literature	on	supply	chain	management	explores	 inter-firm	relationships	without	
making	 explicit	 reference	 to	 the	 GVC	 literature.	 One	 of	 the	 first	 papers	 to	 directly	
engage	with	the	literature	on	GVCs	is	the	contribution	by	Pietrobelli	and	Saliola	(2008)	
using	a	Private	Investment	Environment	Survey	(PICS)	administered	by	the	World	Bank	
in	Thailand.	They	try	to	proxy	for	GVC	governance	using	questions	included	in	the	PICS	
on	whether	buyers	had	given	the	suppliers	detailed	specifications	for	production	and	
how	much	they	depended	on	them.	
More	recently,	some	studies	have	used	firm	level	data	from	a	survey	(the	MET	dataset)	
compiled	by	the	Italian	Statistical	Office	(ISTAT).	This	included	information	on	whether	
Italian	 exporters	 were	 engaged	 in	 long-term	 relationships	 with	 their	 buyers,	 and	
whether	they	were	involved	in	the	designing	of	the	products	they	were	exporting.		
Brancati	et	al.	(2017)	rely	on	this	information	to	investigate	different	GVC	governances	
and	 the	 impact	 on	 suppliers’	 performance.	 They	 argue	 that	 firms	 involved	 in	 long-
lasting	relationships,	and	in	the	design	of	products,	are	operating	under	what	Gereffi	
et	 al.	 (2005)	 refer	 to	 as	 “relational”	 governance.	 They	 find	 that	 such	 firms	are	more	
likely	 to	 carry	 out	 innovative	 activities	 and	 prove	 to	 be	 more	 resilient	 to	 the	 2008	
financial	crisis.		
Using	 the	 same	 source	of	 data,	Giovannetti	 et	 al.	 (2015)	 explore	 the	 effect	 of	 being	
part	 of	 a	 value	 chain,	which	 they	 define	 as	 “participation	 in	 a	 specific	 supply	 chain,	
implying	a	continuative	contribution	of	the	firm	to	specific	productions,	provided	that	
this	 activity	 constitutes	 the	majority	 of	 the	 firm’s	 turnover’’(Giovannetti	 et	 al.	 2015,	
p.848).	 They	 find	 that	 firms	 integrated	 in	a	 supply	 chain	are	also	more	 likely	 to	gain	
access	to	international	markets,	and	joining	GVCs.		
These	 recent	 studies	 rely	 on	 specific	 questions	 from	 a	 specific	 survey,	 which	 allows	
distinguishing	market-based	 relationships	 from	 trade	 in	GVCs.	However,	 they	do	not	
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explore	the	role	of	power	in	such	relationships,	which	is	pivotal	in	GVC	analysis	–	and	
the	purpose	of	this	Chapter.		
Another	limitation	of	the	contributions	reviewed	so	far	is	that	they	rely	on	survey	data,	
which	 makes	 their	 methodology	 difficult	 to	 apply	 to	 transaction	 level	 data.	 This	 is	
because	survey	data	often	rely	on	qualitative	assessments,	using	small	samples	and	are	
not	always	accessible,	limiting	the	replicability	of	the	results.	Also,	and	crucially	to	our	
purpose,	survey	data	usually	rely	on	answers	given	by	either	the	buyer	or	the	supplier	
with	respect	to	its	trade	partners;	this	means	they	do	not	allow	observing	each	single	
buyer-supplier	pair	but	only	an	overview	of	the	relationships	in	which	a	firm	engages.		
In	 contrast,	 transaction	 level	 data	 provide	 information	 on	 suppliers’	 and	 buyers’	
identities	and	cover	large	samples	(if	not	the	entire	population).	The	main	drawback	of	
this	kind	of	data	is	usually	the	lack	of	qualitative	insights,	providing	information	only	on	
the	duration	of	the	relationship	and	the	volumes	and	values	exchanged.		
There	are,	however,	studies	that	do	not	rely	on	qualitative	surveys.	Fabbri	and	Klapper	
(2008),	 for	 example,	 rely	 on	 survey	 data	 compiled	 by	 the	 World	 Bank	 providing	
quantitative	data	on	the	market	structure	in	which	a	sample	of	Chinese	SMEs	operate.	
The	 focus	 of	 their	 study	 is	 around	 the	 lack	 of	 market	 power	 for	 suppliers	 and,	
accordingly,	 they	 construct	 a	 set	 of	 dummy	 variables	 to	 study	 the	 (weak)	 market	
power	of	the	supplier.	It	is	also	noteworthy	that	while	these	dummies	are	constructed	
based	 on	 a	 survey,	 they	 can	 also	 be	 computed	 with	 transaction	 data,	 providing	
information	 on	 sales	 between	 each	 buyer	 and	 supplier.	 Moreover,	 they	 include	
information	 on	 both	 the	 dependence	 of	 the	 supplier	 vis-à-vis	 the	 buyer	 and	 the	
structure	 of	 the	 market,	 proxying	 the	 concentration	 with	 market	 shares	 of	 the	
supplier.		
Emphasising	 the	 importance	of	market	 structure,	 research	on	 industrial	 organisation	
has	also	put	forward	a	range	of	measures;	the	most	widely	known	measure	is	probably	
the	 Herfindahl-Hirschman	 index	 (HHI)	 in	 computing,	 consisting	 of	 the	 sum	 of	 the	
squares	of	the	market	shares	of	each	firm	in	a	given	sector.		
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Alternatively,	 the	 Lerner	 index	 is	 based	 on	 the	 difference	 between	 sale	 price	 and	
marginal	 cost,	 rather	 than	 the	 concentration	 of	 the	market	 structure:	 it	 consists	 of	
taking	the	difference	between	the	price	and	marginal	cost	divided	by	the	price.	Datta	
et	al.	(2013)	use	this	index	to	explore	the	relationship	between	market	concentration	
and	 management’s	 earnings.	 This	 index	 may	 prove	 hard	 to	 compute	 with	 matched	
buyer-supplier	data,	because	these	usually	only	 include	thorough	information	on	one	
side	of	the	transaction,	i.e.	either	the	supplier	or	the	buyer.	This	means	that	it	would	
be	possible	to	compute	the	Learner	index	only	for	one	of	the	two	trading	parties.	
A	rather	 interesting	application	of	the	HHI	 is	provided	by	Cowley	(1988).	He	uses	the	
Profit	 Impact	 of	 Market	 Strategies	 (PIMS)	 dataset	 and	 computes	 the	 HHI	 for	 the	
suppliers	 as	well	 as,	 interestingly,	 the	 relative	 size	 of	 the	 supplier,	 i.e.	 the	 supplier’s	
market	 share	 divided	 by	 its	 largest	 competitor’s	market	 share.	 He	 also	 looks	 at	 the	
buyer	 concentration,	 i.e.	 the	 number	 of	 buyers	 taking	 in	 a	 total	 50%	 of	 the	 seller’s	
revenue.		
This	 is	 a	 particularly	 interesting	 approach	 because	 it	 takes	 into	 account	 both	 the	
supplier	and	buyer	side,	using	quantitative	indexes,	rather	than	data	obtained	through	
surveys	or	interviews.	
In	conclusion,	we	have	two	views	of	power	 in	the	context	of	 inter-firm	relationships.	
The	 dyadic	 and	 relational	 aspect	 of	 buyer-supplier	 relationships	 is	 a	 relatively	 well-
established	 fact	 in	 the	 literature	on	 supply	 chain	management,	where	 information	 is	
usually	gathered	concerning	both	parties	 involved	in	the	relationship	(Liu	et	al.	2010;	
Nyaga	et	 al.	 2013).	 This	 can	be	 captured	by	 looking	 at	 the	 share	 that	 the	purchases	
(sales)	of	the	buyer	(supplier)	represent	in	the	sales	(purchases)	of	the	supplier	(buyer).	
A	 potential	 drawback	 of	 this	 approach	 is	 that	 dependence	 may	 include	 more	 than	
simply	sale	shares	measured	in	trade	volume:	a	supplier	may	depend	on	their	buyer’s	
knowledge	 or	 other	 assets.	 However,	 transaction	 level	 data	 do	 not	 typically	 include	
such	 information	 for	 both	 trade	 parties,	 which	 makes	 it	 hard	 to	 circumvent	 this	
obstacle.	A	second	limitation	of	only	looking	at	the	relational	aspect	of	power	is	that	it	
does	not	 take	 into	account	each	 firms’	position	within	their	market;	some	firms	may	
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have	 a	 strategic	 position	 that	 makes	 them	 particularly	 important	 for	 their	 trade	
partners.		
For	this	reason,	it	is	also	worthwhile	including	the	market	aspect	in	the	analysis.	This	is	
to	take	into	account	each	trading	partner’s	importance	with	respect	to	other	actors	in	
the	 same	market	 and	 can	 be	 captured	with	market	 shares	 (Cowley	 1988).	 This	may	
represent	a	challenge	for	firms	that	trade	in	more	than	one	product,	since	their	market	
shares	may	change	across	these	products.	A	remedy	to	this	 is	to	take	the	average	of	
market	shares	across	products,	weighted	on	how	much	each	product	represents	of	the	
firms’	 total	 trade.	 Market	 share	 will	 not,	 however,	 capture	 all	 factors	 underlying	
market	 power.	 This	 can	 also	 depend	 on	 capabilities,	 intellectual	 property	 or	 other	
assets;	still,	they	have	the	advantage	of	being	relatively	easy	to	compute	with	values	of	
transaction	level	trade	data.		
We	try	to	take	stock	on	both	these	views	of	power	 in	buyer-supplier	relationships	 in	
our	 empirical	 approach,	 which	 we	 detail	 later.	 We	 discuss	 the	 Chapter’s	 research	
questions	and	contributions	in	the	following	section.		
	
4.3	Chapter’s	research	questions	and	contributions	
This	 Chapter’s	 overarching	 goal	 is	 to	 study	 the	 relationship	 between	 power	 and	
upgrading	in	buyer-supplier	relationships.	The	scholarship	has	mainly	studied	this	with	
a	 GVC	 approach	 largely	 based	 on	 case	 studies;	 this	 has	 led	 to	 the	 view	 that	 power	
shapes	 different	 kinds	 of	 governance	 that,	 in	 turn,	 shape	 suppliers’	 possibilities	 to	
upgrade	 (Gereffi	 et	 al.	 2005;	 Humphrey	 and	 Schimitz	 2002;	 Giuliani	 et	 al.	 2005a;	
Morrison	et	al.	2006).		
There	 remains,	however,	 some	ambiguity	around	 the	concept	of	upgrading,	which	 is	
particularly	 hard	 to	 disentangle	 from	 innovation	 and	 generally	 lacks	 an	 agreed	
definition	 in	 the	 scholarship.	 Recent	 contributions	 have	 put	 forward	 the	measure	 of	
complexity	 (Hidalgo	 and	 Hausmann	 2009),	 which	 has	 been	 used	 to	 study	 export	
upgrading	(Zhu	and	Fu	2013;	Jarreau	and	Poncet	2012).	
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Concerning	power,	there	is	no	unanimous	definition	or	measure	in	the	scholarship.	A	
burgeoning	 literature	 has	 been	 studying	 trade	 at	 the	 firm	 level,	 focusing	 on	 how	
heterogeneous	 firms	 match	 with	 each	 other	 (Sugita	 et	 al.	 2015;	 Eaton	 et	 al.	 2015;	
Eslava	et	al.	2015;	Grossi	Cajal	2016),	and	emphasising	the	importance	of	long-lasting	
relationships	(Monarch	and	Schmidt-Eisenlohr	2015;	Macchiavello	and	Morjaria	2015;	
Macchiavello	and	Miquel-Florensa	2017).		
However,	 trade	 relationships	may	 have	 similar	 duration	 and	 levels	 of	 trust	 but	 very	
different	 power	 dynamics,	 leading	 also	 to	 different	 outcomes	 in	 terms	 of	 trade	
performance	 and	 export	 upgrading.	 So	 far,	 this	 has	 not	 been	 acknowledged	 by	 the	
scholarship	 studying	 firm	 heterogeneity	 in	 trade	 and	 the	 buyer-supplier	 matching	
process.	
By	 testing	 hypotheses	 from	 the	 GVC	 literature	with	 buyer-supplier	 transaction	 level	
data	we	wish	to	bridge	these	two	strands	of	work,	to	include	power	and	upgrading	in	
the	 quantitative	 literature	 on	 buyer-supplier	 relationships.	We	 also	 aim	 to	 take	 into	
account	 that	 power	 entails	 different	 aspects	 that	 may	 be	 related	 to	 upgrading	 in	
different	ways.	We	specifically	aim	to	answer	the	two	following	questions:		
1. Is	power	in	buyer-supplier	relationships	a	predictor	of	upgrading?		
2. Does	this	relationship	change	depending	on	different	aspects	of	power?		
In	order	 to	shed	 light	on	 these	questions	 it	 is	crucial	 to	devise	a	way	of	proxying	 for	
power	in	the	context	of	buyer-supplier	relationships.	The	literature	has	often	studied	
power	 relying	 on	 surveys	 providing	 qualitative	 information	 on	 the	 kinds	 of	
relationships	buyers	and	suppliers	were	forming.	Transaction	level	data	rarely	include	
such	kinds	of	information,	but,	in	contrast,	allows	the	identification	of	each	individual	
pair	of	buyers	and	suppliers.		
Our	second	research	question	implies	that	there	are	different	kinds	of	power.	This	is	in	
turn	 based	 on	 the	 view	 put	 forward	 in	 the	 literature	 that	 power	 is	 a	 multifaceted	
concept	with	a	relational	and	a	market	aspect	(Shervani	et	al.	2016);	this	 is	captured	
through	dependence	measures	and	market	shares,	respectively.	
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By	taking	this	approach	we	also	try	to	open	up	the	black	box	that	power	is	often	in	GVC	
analysis.	We	 unpack	 whether	 the	 buyer’s	 (or	 supplier’s)	 power	 comes	 from	market	
issues	that	have	to	do	with	the	concentration	of	the	market,	or	from	relational	aspects	
that	are	specific	to	the	buyer-supplier	relationship.		
In	 the	 next	 section	 we	 detail	 how	 we	 use	 computed	measures	 of	 dependence	 and	
market	shares	to	capture	the	relational	and	market	aspects	of	power,	respectively.	
We	combine	 these	measures	with	 the	 complexity	measure	 to	empirically	 investigate	
the	relationship	between	the	two	aspects	of	power	and,	(i)	the	level	of	sophistication	
of	 exports,	 (ii)	 the	 likelihood	 of	 introducing	 new	 products,	 and	 (iii)	 the	 likelihood	 of	
increasing	export	sophistication,	which	we	use	to	identify	upgrading.		
Finally,	 we	 also	 explore	 whether	 these	 relationships	 between	 power	 and	 upgrading	
vary	across	destination	countries,	shedding	light	on	the	importance	of	country	specific	
factors	for	suppliers’	upgrading	prospects.	
	
4.4	The	data	and	variables	
We	 use	 data	 from	 the	 Colombian	 Customs	 (DIAN)	 on	 all	 export	 transactions	 from	
Colombia	to	the	rest	of	the	world	for	the	years	2007-2014.	We	match	these	data	with	
data	from	SIREM19	on	firms’	financial	balance	sheets,	and	with	data	from	the	Atlas	of	
Complexity	for	Colombia	(DATLAS	henceforth,	http://datlascolombia.com).		
The	DIAN	data	provide	information	on	each	transaction	between	a	Colombian	exporter	
and	 an	 importer	 from	 the	 rest	 of	 the	world	 (RoW).	 The	 supplier	 is	 identified	 by	 its	
national	tax	number	(NIT);	the	buyer	is	identified	by	the	company	name,	country,	city	
and	address,	as	reported	by	the	exporter.20		
Each	transaction	is	 identified	by	a	product	code.	Colombia	uses	the	NANDINA	system	
to	 identify	 products,	 which	 matches	 the	 Harmonised	 System	 (HS)	 at	 6-digits.	 We																																																									19	SIREM	is	a	public	body	in	charge	of	financial	surveillance,	to	which	all	firms	that	are	not	publicly	listed	
and	have	either	turnover	or	total	asset	larger	than	30	times	the	minimum	monthly	wage	must	disclose	
their	financial	statements.		20	Henceforth	we	will	use	exporter	and	importer	interchangeably	with	supplier	and	buyer,	respectively.	
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aggregate	products	 to	 4-digit	 level	 industries	 based	on	 the	 1992	HS,	 to	match	 them	
with	the	data	on	complexity	from	DATLAS.		
Our	 data	 also	 provide	 information	 on	 the	 quantity	 of	 products	 traded	 in	 each	
transaction,	in	units,	gross	and	net	weight	as	well	as	value	in	Colombian	pesos	(COP).	
We	retrieved	deflators	for	the	export	sector21	from	the	Colombian	National	Bureau	of	
Statistics	 (DANE),	 which	 we	 use	 to	 make	 product	 values	 comparable	 across	 years,	
taking	2009	as	the	reference	year.	
SIREM	data	are	made	publicly	available	by	SIREM	and	provide	useful	 information	on	
firms’	 characteristics,	 which	 we	 use	 to	 compute	 productivity;	 these	 can	 be	 readily	
matched	with	the	NIT	in	the	DIAN	data.		
It	 is	 important	 to	 stress	 that	 our	 data	 cover	 all	 transactions	 between	 firms	 (direct	
purchases	from	individuals	abroad	have	been	excluded	from	our	analysis)	and	do	not	
allow	clear	distinction	between	 trade	 tout	 court	 and	 trade	 in	GVCs.	The	 literature	at	
the	macro	 and	 sectoral	 level	 distinguishes	 these	 two	 concepts	 by	 referring	 to	 gross	
export	(for	the	former)	and	trade	in	value	added	(for	the	latter);	at	the	micro	level	the	
debate	on	how	to	capture	such	distinction	is	still	on-going	and	no	single	approach	has	
been	put	forward	(Johnson,	2017).		
The	 ideal	 approach	 would	 consist	 in	 measuring	 firms’	 value	 added	 content	 in	 their	
exports,	but	the	DIAN	data	(nor,	to	the	best	of	our	knowledge,	any	other	data	source)	
do	 not	 provide	 such	 information.	 However	 they	 do	 allow	 observing	 the	 interactions	
between	 Colombian	 exporters	 and	 their	 suppliers	 and	 to	 understand	 these	 in	 GVC	
framework,	by	focusing	on	power	relationships.		
This	section	details	how	we	match	the	data	from	DIAN	with	our	other	sources,	how	we	
use	complexity	measures	as	proxies	of	export	sophistication,	as	well	as	our	approach	
to	capturing	power	relationships	based	on	our	theoretical	discussion	in	section	4.2	and	
the	rich	 information	at	our	disposal	on	transactions	between	buyers	and	suppliers	 in	
Colombia.		
																																																								21	 The	 deflators	 compiled	 by	 DANE	 are	 available	 from	 the	 Colombian	 Central	 Bank	 webstie:	
http://www.banrep.gov.co/es/ipp	
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In	the	previous	section	we	discussed	the	difficulty	of	measuring	firms’	capabilities	and	
upgrading,	 highlighting	 the	 interesting	 approach	 taken	 by	 Hidalgo	 and	 Hausmann	
(2009).	 The	 Harvard	 University’s	 Centre	 for	 International	 Development	 (CID)	 has	
compiled	 the	DATLAS	dataset	 for	 Colombia,	with	 complexity	 indexes	 for	 products	 at	
the	4-digit	level	of	disaggregation,	from	2008	to	2014.	
This	 index	 relies	 on	 goods’	 ubiquity	 and	 countries’	 export	 diversification.	 As	 a	
consequence	 it	 is	 computed	 separately	 each	 year	 and	 changes	 could	 be	 driven	 by	
changes	in	other	countries’	export	portfolio.	However,	it	seems	reasonable	to	consider	
the	complexity	of	a	product	as	a	 time	 invariant	characteristic;	we	 therefore	 take	 the	
average	across	years	for	each	product.	This	is	important	because	we	wish	to	use	these	
data	as	a	proxy	for	upgrading,	which	also	happens	over	time;	therefore	it	is	crucial	that	
changes	 in	 complexity	measure	are	driven	by	changes	 in	 the	product	mix	 in	which	a	
firm	trades	and	not	by	the	change	of	complexity	 index	of	products	 from	one	year	 to	
another.		
We	exclude	from	our	data	all	transactions	involving	mining	and	oil	and	gas	products22.	
This	is	because	the	large	majority	of	these	transactions	did	not	report	any	information	
on	the	buyer,	so	our	analysis	only	refers	to	the	manufacturing	and	agriculture	sector.	
So	far,	we	have	used	the	term	relationship	in	a	rather	loose	way	to	refer	to	both	the	
buyer-supplier	 pairs	 and	 to	 buyer-supplier-product	 combinations.	 For	 the	 sake	 of	
clarity,	in	the	remainder	of	our	discussion	we	identify	a	relationship	as	a	pair	of	buyer	
and	 supplier,	 trading	 in	 a	 given	 destination	 country,	 in	 a	 given	 year	 and	 a	 given	
product.	In	the	remainder	of	the	thesis	we	will	refer	to	buyer-supplier	pairs	(or	simply	
pairs)	as	buyer-supplier	matches,	i.e.	including	all	the	products	they	exchange.	To	give	
an	example,	 two	 firms	 trading	 three	products	 in	a	given	year	would	constitute	 three	
relationships	but	only	one	pair.		
After	matching	year	by	year	with	the	exporter	in	the	DIAN	and	SIREM	data,	using	their	
NIT,	 in	 the	 data	 we	 observe	 4,956,935	 export	 transactions	 between	 a	 Colombian	
exporter	 and	an	 importer	 from	 the	 rest	of	 the	World.	 Importers	 are	 identified	using	
the	 company	name	and	country	of	 shipment	 (the	addresses	are	noisy	and	 therefore																																																									22	This	includes	all	transactions	falling	under	the	2-digit	product	category	27	in	the	harmonised	system.	
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are	 not	 used	 to	 clean	 the	 list	 of	 firms).	 Due	 to	misspelling	 and	 the	 use	 of	 different	
names	to	refer	to	the	same	company,	two	transactions	between	one	pair	may	appear	
in	 the	 data	 as	 two	 transactions	 between	 one	 exporter	 and	 two	 different	 importers,	
yielding	 duplicate	 importers.	 To	 correctly	 identify	 the	 importer,	 we	 proceed	 with	
cleaning	their	names,	by	country.		
As	a	 first	step	we	harmonise	the	 importer	names,	excluding	common	words,	such	as	
SPA,	SRL,	LTD,	and	country	specific	names,	such	as	names	of	cities	(such	as	“Arequipa”)	
or	adjectives	of	nationality	like	“Peruana”	(which	translates	to	“Peruvian”).		
Some	 companies	 are	 reported	 with	 two	 names,	 distinguished	 by	 “Y/O”,	 which	 is	
Spanish	 for	“and/or”.	There	 is	no	way	of	understanding	which	of	 the	two	companies	
listed	 is	 the	 correct	 one	 so	we	 drop	 these	 observations.	 This	 amounts	 to	 5%	 of	 the	
total	transactions	and	5.2%	of	total	exports	covered	in	our	sample.		
After	 this	 initial	 harmonisation	 we	 perform	 a	 fuzzy	 matching	 between	 the	 181,535	
unique	 importers’	 names	 in	our	data	and	 the	 full	 list	of	 firms	with	positive	 turnover	
available	in	ORBIS	(approximately	8	million	companies),	i.e.	firms’	official	name.		
After	checking	manually	on	a	subsample	of	firms,	we	chose	to	use	the	Jaro	distance	to	
measure	similarity	across	 firm	names	 in	our	dataset	and	 in	ORBIS.	This	choice	 is	also	
supported	by	the	literature	(Van	der	Loo	2014);	the	Jaro	distance	is	in	fact	designed	to	
deal	with	human-made	typing	mistakes	 in	strings	of	short	 length,	such	as	names	and	
addresses,	which	is	very	close	to	our	case.		
The	 Jaro	 distance	 goes	 from	 0	 (two	 strings	 are	 identical)	 to	 1	 (two	 strings	 have	 no	
elements	 in	 common).	We	 tried	 different	 thresholds	 to	 identify	 a	match	 and	 found	
0.15	to	be	the	one	to	minimise	the	number	of	false	positives	and	negatives.		
We	perform	this	first	round	of	fuzzy	matching	as	follows:	for	each	firm	in	our	data	we	
select	the	closest	match	in	ORBIS	and	we	also	report	the	Jaro	distance	as	a	score	of	the	
quality	of	the	match.	While	0.15	is	the	threshold	we	identified	as	optimal,	we	choose	
to	 be	 slightly	 less	 conservative	 and	 automatically	 reject	 the	 closest	 matches	 with	 a	
score	above	0.16,	while	manually	checking	all	other	matches.	
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During	this	check	we	noted	that	some	matches	with	high	Jaro	distance	were	correct,	
which	hinted	at	the	possibility	of	a	large	number	of	false	negatives.	To	address	this	we	
ran	a	second	round	of	fuzzy	matching	between	firms	in	the	data	that	had	not	matched	
with	ORBIS	and	firms	that	were	matched	with	ORBIS.		
We	 consider	 a	 match	 a	 firm	 that,	 despite	 not	 having	matched	 with	 ORBIS,	 is	 quite	
similar	 to	 another	 firm	 that	 has	matched	with	ORBIS.	 Like	 before,	we	 automatically	
reject	the	matches	with	a	score	above	0.16	and	manually	check	the	matches	below	this	
threshold.		
While	manually	checking	 the	matches	we	have	also	created	a	 list	of	well-known	and	
commonly	recurring	firm	names	(such	as	Panasonic,	L’Oréal,	Schneider	Electric).		
We	use	this	to	further	harmonise	our	data,	grouping	all	firms	containing	these	names.	
In	 this	way	we	group	together	 importers’	names	that	are	 likely	 to	correspond	to	 the	
same	 firm,	 but	 that	 the	 automatic	matching	 did	 not	 pick	 up.	We	 therefore	 take	 an	
approach	of	relying	on	automated	fuzzy	matches,	while	the	hand-checking	procedure	
ensures	that	firms	recurring	under	different	names,	and	that	have	not	been	matched	
with	the	automated	procedure,	are	correctly	clustered	together.		
Using	 the	 harmonised	 list	 of	 matched	 company	 names	 we	 perform	 a	 clustering	
procedure	based	again	on	the	Jaro	distance.	We	create	clusters	of	firms	whose	names	
have	a	string	distance	below	0.15,	by	country.	We	end	up	with	74,856	buyer-country	
clusters.	 We	 match	 these	 with	 the	 exporters	 and	 aggregate	 our	 initial	 4,965,935	
transactions	 by	 buyer-supplier-product-country	 (relationships)	 obtaining	 286,225	
relationships	over	7	years	yielding	an	unbalanced	panel	of	527,010	observations.		
There	 are	 only	 7,093	 exporters,	 although	when	we	 look	 at	 exporters	 by	 destination	
country	 the	 number	 rises	 to	 40,003.	 When	 we	 aggregate	 this	 across	 products	 we	
obtain	a	panel	with	267,320	pairs,	i.e.	buyer-supplier-country	combinations	(pairs).		
Because	we	identify	the	importers	at	the	country	level,	assuming	that	two	importers	in	
two	 different	 countries	 are,	 from	 a	 trade	 relations	 stand	 point,	 two	 different	
importers,	we	compute	our	power	measures	at	the	importer-country	level.		
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We	use	the	cleaned	data	to	compute	measures	of	pair’s	sophistication	and	power.	We	
have	also	computed	four	product	invariant	measures	of	pair’s	sophistication23:	
1. the	upper	bound	sophistication	of	the	pair,	i.e.	the	most	sophisticated	(i.e.	the	
one	with	the	higher	complexity	index)	product	exchanged	in	a	given	year	within	
the	pair;	
2. the	lower	bound	sophistication	of	the	pair,	i.e.	the	least	sophisticated	product	
exchanged	in	a	given	year	within	the	pair;		
3. the	 median	 sophistication	 of	 the	 pair:	 this	 is	 the	 median	 product,	 based	 on	
sophistication,	weighted	on	trade	value	 in	 the	pair.	This	variable	captures	 the	
sophistication	of	the	“core”	of	trade	taking	place	in	a	pair;	
4. the	 average	 sophistication	 of	 the	 pair	 is	 the	 average	 of	 the	 sophistication	 of	
each	 product	 traded	 within	 the	 pair,	 weighted	 on	 the	 trade	 value	 of	 each	
product	in	the	pair.	This	is	an	alternative	measure	of	the	“core”	sophistication	
of	 the	 pair,	 although	 it	 should	 be	 noted	 that	 the	 number	 of	 products	 traded	
within	 the	 pair	 also	 affects	 this	measure.	 As	 a	 consequence,	 a	 pair	 exporting	
two	 products	 will	 have	 a	 higher	 average	 sophistication	 than	 another	 pair	
exporting	 the	 same	 two	products	plus	another	one	with	 sophistication	below	
the	average	of	the	other	two	products	traded.		
We	 now	 turn	 to	 power	 and	 how	 to	measure	 it.	 Bear	 in	mind	 that	 power	 has	 been	
conceptualised	 in	 the	 literature	as	having	both	a	“relational”	aspect	 (inherent	 to	 the	
power	asymmetry	of	a	supplier	vis-à-vis	its	buyer),	and	a	“market”	aspect	with	regards	
to	the	supplier’s	(buyer’s)	position	within	the	market	(Shervani	et	al.	2016).		
To	take	full	account	of	these	two	facets	of	market	power,	we	compute	the	following	
four	measures.	
The	components	of	the	buyer’s	power	are:		
1. the	supplier’s	dependence	vis-à-vis	 the	buyer	 in	a	given	 relationship24.	This	 is	
computed	 as	 the	 share	 that	 sales	 x	 of	 product	 p	 from	 supplier	 s	 to	 buyer	 b	
represents	 in	all	 the	sales	 (i.e.	across	all	products)	of	supplier	s.	This	 is	bound	
between	 0	 and	 1;	 when	 it	 approaches	 the	 latter	 it	 means	 that	 the	 supplier	
exports	most	of	its	product	p	to	the	buyer	b	and	has	a	high	level	of	dependence	
vis-à-vis	its	buyer.	This	measure	thus	increases	the	buyer’s	power.	We	are	using	
here	 the	 total	export	of	our	 supplier	as	a	denominator;	 an	alternative	option	
would	 have	 been	 to	 use	 the	 total	 sales,	 i.e.	 both	 domestic	 and	 foreign.	We	
decided	against	this,	because	we	also	wish	to	compute	the	same	dependence																																																									23	 In	 the	 section	 on	 our	 empirical	 approach	 we	 discuss	 these	measures	 more	 at	 length,	 focusing	 in	
particular	on	the	extent	to	which	these	can	capture	upgrading	of	the	supplier.	24	Remember	that	relationships	are	 identified	at	the	buyer-supplier-product	 level,	with	pairs	simply	at	
the	buyer-supplier	level.	
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index	for	the	buyer	(see	point	3	below),	for	which	however	we	can	only	rely	on	
its	purchases	from	Colombia.		
To	ensure	that	our	two	dependence	 indexes	are	computed	 in	a	coherent	way	
and	 are	 as	 symmetric	 as	 possible,	we	 choose	 to	 look	 at	 foreign	 sales	 for	 the	
supplier	 and	 foreign	 purchases	 for	 the	 buyer.	 This	 still	 leaves	 unresolved	 the	
fact	 that	 while	 we	 observe	 all	 export	 destinations	 for	 the	 suppliers	 we	 only	
observe	what	 the	buyers	 import	 from	Colombia.	We	detail	how	we	deal	with	
this	later	in	this	section.		 𝑠𝑑𝑝!"# =  𝑥!"#𝑥!"#!"  
2. The	market	share	of	buyer	b	in	product	p,	i.e.	the	share	that	the	purchases	x	of	
buyer	b	in	product	p	of	total	export	(i.e.	across	all	suppliers)	of	product	p	from	
Colombia,	 i.e.	 the	degree	of	monopsony.	A	higher	market	 share	of	 the	buyer	
increases	the	market	component	of	the	buyer’s	power	over	the	supplier.		𝑏𝑠ℎ!" =  𝑥!"#! 𝑥!"#!"  
The	 two	 components	 of	 the	 supplier’s	 power	 are	 computed	 in	 a	 specular	 way	 as	
follows:	
3. The	buyer’s	dependence	vis-à-vis	the	supplier	in	a	given	relationship.	This	is	the	
share	that	the	purchases	x	of	product	p	of	buyer	b	from	supplier	s	represents	in	
all	the	purchases	of	buyer	b	in	Colombia.	When	it	gravitates	towards	1	it	means	
that	buyer	b	imports	most	of	product	p	from	supplier	s,	i.e.	is	highly	dependent	
on	its	supplier,	which	increases	its	power	over	the	buyer.		𝑏𝑑𝑝!"# =  𝑥!"#𝑥!"#!"  
4. The	 market	 share	 of	 supplier	 s	 in	 product	 p,	 i.e.	 the	 share	 that	 sales	 x	 of	
supplier	s	 in	product	p	 represents	of	 total	exports	 (i.e.	across	all	 suppliers)	of	
product	p	 from	Colombia.	This	measure	captures	the	market	aspect	of	power	
and	reflects	the	position	that	the	supplier	occupies	in	the	market	of	the	product	
traded.	As	 the	measure	approaches	1	 it	means	 that	 the	supplier	 represents	a	
higher	share	of	the	market	and	has	therefore	a	higher	market	power.		𝑠𝑠ℎ!" =  𝑥!"#! 𝑥!"#!  
Based	on	the	discussion	above,	we	distinguish	different	kinds	of	power	depending	on	
its	 source.	 We	 argue	 that	 buyers’	 (and	 suppliers’)	 power	 is	 determined	 by	 a	
“relational”	 aspect	 (or	 source),	 captured	 here	 with	 the	 dependence	 of	 the	 supplier	
(buyer)	vis-à-vis	the	buyer	(supplier)	and	by	a	“market”	aspect.	This	is	not	based	on	the	
bargaining	power	in	a	buyer-supplier	dyad,	but	is	the	outcome	of	the	market	structure	
that	we	proxy	here	with	the	market	share	of	the	buyer	(supplier).	We	summarise	this	
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in	Table	4.1	below,	detailing	the	sources	of	both	buyer	and	supplier’s	power,	together	
with	the	literature	that	has	emphasised	this.	
Table	4.1:	Power’s	components	indexes	
Power	Types	by	Source	 Literature	
Relational:	
Supplier’s	dependence	on	the	buyer	
(sdp).	
Supply	chain	
management	lit.	 Buyer’s	power	in	the	GVC	
literature	
Market:	
Buyer’s	market	share	(bsh).	
Industrial	Organisation	
lit.	
Relational:	
Buyer’s	dependence	on	the	supplier	
(mdp).	
Supply	chain	
management	lit.	 Supplier’s	power	in	the	
GVC	literature	
Market:	
Supplier’s	market	share	(ssh).	
Industrial	Organisation	
lit.	
Source:	Author’s	own	taxonomy.	
The	power	indexes	presented	above	are	computed	at	the	relationship	level,	while	our	
sophistication	 measures	 are	 at	 the	 pair	 level.	 Therefore,	 we	 aggregate	 the	 power	
indexes	 at	 the	 pair	 level,	 taking	 the	 averages	 across	 the	 products	 exchanged	within	
each	 pair	 in	 each	 year,	 weighting	 this	 on	 each	 product’s	 share	 in	 total	 COP	 traded	
within	each	pair.	
Because	 of	 the	 nature	 of	 our	 data,	 as	 mentioned	 above,	 we	 also	 face	 another	
challenge	in	creating	the	power	measures.	We	only	have	information	on	exports	from	
Colombia	 to	 the	 rest	of	 the	world;	however,	 foreign	buyers	may	be	purchasing	 from	
other	suppliers	in	third	countries,	which	remains	unobserved.	This	is	likely	to	create	an	
upward	bias	for	the	measures	of	buyer	dependence	and	supplier’s	market	share.		
To	mitigate	this,	we	limit	our	analysis	to	the	buyer-supplier	pairs	between	Colombian	
suppliers	 and	 buyers	 in	 the	 three	main	 destination	 countries,	 i.e.	 the	US,	 Venezuela	
and	 Ecuador.	We	 then	 compute	 the	 share	 that	 Colombian	 exports	 represent	 in	 the	
imports	 of	 all	 products	 for	 each	 of	 these	 three	 countries.	 This	 captures	 how	 likely	
buyers	 are	 to	 find	 other	 suppliers	 in	 third	 countries;	 we	 multiply	 the	 buyer’s	
dependence	and	the	supplier’s	market	share	by	these	shares,	like	this	respectively:	
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Where	Mshc	is	the	share	that	exports	from	Colombia	represent	in	the	total	imports	of	
product	p	by	country	C	(which	can	be:	US,	Venezuela	or	Ecuador).		
A	 caveat	 of	 this	 approach	 that	 is	 worth	 mentioning	 is	 that	 in	 adjusting	 these	 two	
indexes	we	are	not	considering	buyers’	 individual	diversification	or	size.	A	buyer	 in	a	
sector	of	which	Colombia	represents	a	small	share	of	the	country’s	total	 imports,	say	
optical	lenses,	may	be	very	small	and	thus	depend	heavily	on	its	Colombian	importer.	
To	 avoid	 this	 shortcoming,	 however,	 we	 would	 need	 to	 observe	 buyers’	 true	 size,	
which	are	not	included	in	our	data.	
Finally,	 despite	 focusing	 only	 on	 three	 destination	 countries,	 our	 subsample	 still	
accounts	for	45%	of	total	COP	traded	and	34%	of	the	total	number	of	transactions	in	
our	sample,	after	cleaning.		
Now	 that	 we	 have	 presented	 our	 core	 measures,	 we	 provide	 some	 descriptive	
evidence	to	explore	our	data	and	sketch	some	stylised	facts.	We	start	by	looking	at	the	
distribution	of	the	power	indexes.		
All	these	indexes	are	bound	between	0	and	125.	From	Table	4.2	we	see	that	suppliers	
tend	 to	 be	more	 dependent	 on	 buyers	 (col.	 1)	 than	 vice	 versa	 (col.	 3).	 At	 the	 same	
time,	buyers’	share	 (col.	2)	 tends	to	be	 larger	than	that	of	 the	suppliers	 (col.	4).	This	
suggests	 that,	 in	our	data,	buyers	are	overall	more	powerful	 than	suppliers.	We	also	
note	 that	 the	distribution	of	 these	 indexes	 is	 rather	 skewed;	positively	 for	 all	 power	
indexes	except	the	supplier’s	dependence,	which	shows	a	negative	skew.	This	means	
that	most	pairs	 are	made	up	of	 trading	partners	with	 little	power,	while	a	 few	pairs	
consist	of	very	powerful	trading	partners.																																																									25	The	index	is	bound	(0;1]	because,	for	a	pair	to	exist,	some	trade	flows	must	exist	between	the	buyer	
and	the	supplier;	this	means	that	the	buyer	will	always	account	for	more	than	0%	of	the	supplier’s	sale	
and	vice	versa.	In	the	Table	4.2	we	find	that	the	minimum	of	the	distribution	of	the	indexes	is	0,	but	this	
is	simply	due	to	rounding	down	of	very	small	indexes.	
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Table	4.2:	Distribution	of	power	indexes	
Supplier’s	
dependence	(sdp)	
Buyer’s	market	share	
(bsh)	
Buyer’s	dependence	
(mdp)	
Supplier’s	market	
share	(ssh)	
Min.:	 0.00000	 Min.:	 0.000000	 Min.:	 0.000000	 Min.:	 0.000000	
1st	Qu.:	 0.01408	 1st	Qu.:	 0.002606	 1st	Qu.:	 0.002567	 1st	Qu.:	 0.000963	
Median:	 0.09040	 Median:	 0.019883	 Median:	 0.023596	 Median:	 0.005093	
Mean:	 0.27170	 Mean:	 0.102890	 Mean:	 0.098896	 Mean:	 0.037449	
3rd	Qu.:	 0.44111	 3rd	Qu.:	 0.110813	 3rd	Qu.:	 0.122374	 3rd	Qu.:	 0.025470	
Max.:	 1.00000	 Max.:	 1.000000	 Max.:	 1.000000	 Max.:	 1.000000	
Source:	Author’s	own	calculation	
Our	main	variable	of	interest	is	the	complexity	index,	which	we	use	here	to	proxy	for	
the	sophistication	of	supplier’s	exports.	 In	Table	4.3,	we	report	the	distribution	of	all	
four	measures;	the	complexity	measure	is	bounded	between	-4.6560	and	5.3018,	it	is	
worth	 recalling	 that	 these	 are	 computed	 through	 the	method	 of	 reflection	 and	 are	
therefore	not	meaningful	per	se,	they	give	us	however	an	idea	of	the	upper	and	lower	
bounds	between	which	our	measure	varies;	this	index	is	therefore	meaningful	only	in	
relative	 terms,	consistently	with	 this	 in	our	analysis	we	 focus	on	comparing	 levels	of	
complexity	and	estimating	the	likelihood	of	increases.	Upper	bound	complexity	covers	
the	whole	span	of	the	measure,	meaning	that	there	are	some	firms	that	are	exporting	
only	the	least	complex	product.	In	contrast,	we	note	that	the	lower	bound	complexity	
never	reaches	5.3018,	which	suggests	that	pairs	trading	in	the	most	complex	products	
are	also	trading	in	other	less	complex	products.		
Table	4.3:	Complexity	measures	distribution	
Upper	bound	
Sophistication	
Lower	bound	
Sophistication	
Median	
Sophistication	
Average	
Sophistication	
Min.:	 -4.6560	 Min.:	 -4.6560	 Min.:	 -4.6560	 Min.:	 -4.6560	
1st	Qu.:	 -1.5106	 1st	Qu.:	 -2.2427	 1st	Qu.:	 -2.1339	 1st	Qu.:	 -2.0857	
Median:	 1.1494	 Median:	 0.2720	 Median:	 0.6860	 Median:	 0.9186	
Mean:	 0.7371	 Mean:	 0.1469	 Mean:	 0.3317	 Mean:	 0.4235	
3rd	Qu.:	 2.6369	 3rd	Qu.:	 1.9461	 3rd	Qu.:	 2.0800	 3rd	Qu.:	 2.1646	
Max.:	 5.3018	 Max.:	 4.9684	 Max.:	 4.9684	 Max.:	 5.0313	
Source:	Author’s	own	calculation	
This	suggests	that	the	number	of	products	and	the	sophistication	are	related	to	each	
other.	This	is	relevant	because	we	know	that	the	measure	of	complexity	is	computed	
based	on	economies’	diversification,	 together	with	 the	ubiquity	of	products	 (Hidalgo	
and	Hausmann	2009).		
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We	are	carrying	out	our	analysis	here	at	the	firm	level,	so	there	is	no	mechanical	link	
between	how	a	product’s	sophistication	is	computed	(with	export	data	at	the	country	
level)	 and	 suppliers’	 (buyers’)	 diversification.	 It	 is	 nonetheless	 interesting	 to	 explore	
how	these	two	measures	are	related	since	 firms’	diversification	relates	 to	 the	power	
measures.	
Table	4.4	details	 the	distribution	of	 three	measures	of	diversification:	 the	number	of	
products	 traded	within	 each	 pair,	 the	 number	 of	 buyers	 for	 each	 supplier	 and,	 vice	
versa,	the	number	of	suppliers	for	each	buyer.		
Table	4.4:	Distribution	of	diversification	measures	
Number	of	
products	traded	
Number	of		
buyers	
Number	of	
suppliers	
Min.:	 1.000	 Min.:	 1.00	 Min.:	 1.00	
1st	Qu.:	 1.000	 1st	Qu.:	 5.00	 1st	Qu.:	 1.00	
Median:	 1.000	 Median:	 14.00	 Median:	 4.00	
Mean:	 2.034	 Mean:	 30.41	 Mean:	 10.83	
3rd	Qu.:	 2.000	 3rd	Qu.:	 35.00	 3rd	Qu.:	 12.00	
Max.:	 113.000	 Max.:	 324.00	 Max.:	 128.00	
Source:	Author’s	own	calculation	
We	see	that	more	than	half	the	pairs	only	trade	in	one	product	(col.	1):	suppliers	also	
appear	to	be	more	diversified	(col.	2)	than	the	buyers	(col.	3).	This	 is	 to	be	expected	
since	with	our	data	we	observe	all	the	buyers	that	the	suppliers	sell	to,	but	not	all	the	
suppliers	 the	 buyers	 buy	 from;	 this	 is	 because	 we	 only	 observe	 the	 transactions	
between	 Colombia	 and	 the	 rest	 of	 the	world.	 These	 proportions	 are	 also	 similar	 to	
what	has	been	found	in	the	literature	(Bernard	et	al.	2014)26,	which	is	reassuring	with	
respect	 to	 our	methodology	 to	 clean	 the	 names	 of	 the	 buyers,	 avoiding	 a	 too	 high	
number	of	duplicates.	
It	is	worth	noting	that	looking	at	the	diversification	measures	the	buyers	appear	to	be	
less	diversified	than	the	suppliers,	which	would	suggest	that	they	have,	on	average,	a	
higher	level	of	dependence	than	that	of	the	suppliers.	In	Table	4.2	we	saw	that	this	is	
not	the	case;	the	reason	for	this	is	the	fact	that	we	adjust	the	two	components	(i.e.	the																																																									26	 Bernard	 et	 al.	 (2014)	 find	 lower	 numbers	 of	 both	 exporters	 and	 importers,	 because	 they	 propose	
evidence	 for	 each	destination	 country	 separately.	Here	we	are	 looking	 at	 the	 total	 number	of	 buyers	
that	a	supplier	has	across	all	destination	countries.		
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buyer’s	dependence	and	the	supplier’s	market	share)	of	our	supplier’s	power	index	by	
the	shares	of	Colombia	imports,	as	previously	described.		
None	of	the	issues	discussed	above	affects	the	number	of	products	traded,	so	we	start	
exploring	the	relationship	between	this	measure	and	sophistication.	We	first	focus	on	
this	in	the	two	following	figures.	
First,	in	Figure	4.1	we	plot	the	number	of	products	against	the	upper	bound	complexity	
with	the	line	of	best	fit,	using	lower	bound	complexity	to	colour	the	dots.	In	Figure	4.2	
we	plot	the	number	of	products	traded	within	each	pair	against	the	lower	complexity	
and	use	upper	bound	complexity	to	colour.		
In	 Figure	 4.1	 we	 see	 a	 slightly	 positive	 relationship	 between	 our	 two	 measures.	
Interestingly	 we	 can	 also	 see	 that	 while	 there	 are	 pairs	 trading	 at	 all	 levels	 of	
sophistication	 regardless	 of	 the	 number	 of	 products,	 we	 find	 that	 there	 are	 pairs	
trading	in	many	products	only	when	they	have	high	levels	of	upper	bound	complexity.		
However,	as	the	number	of	products	increases,	the	lower	bound	complexity	seems	to	
decrease	and	we	only	find	pairs	with	low	levels	of	lower	bound	complexity	(coloured	in	
light	blue)	for	low	numbers	of	traded	products.		
This	 suggests	 that	 as	 a	 supplier	 diversifies	 the	number	of	 products	 they	 sell	 to	 their	
buyer,	 they	tend	to	 include	more	unsophisticated	products	 in	their	basket.	However,	
suppliers	that	only	trade	in	sophisticated	products	(i.e.	with	high	levels	of	both	upper	
and	lower	bound	complexity)	trade	a	small	number	of	products.		
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Figure	4.1:	Upper	bound	complexity	and	number	of	traded	products	
Source:	Author’s	own	calculation	
Note:	The	figure	plots	the	upper	bound	complexity	of	each	buyer-supplier	pair	against	the	number	of	
products	traded,	using	the	lower	bound	complexity	of	the	pair	to	colour	the	dots.		
Figure	 4.2	 offers	 further	 support	 to	 this	 conjecture,	 showing	 a	 slightly	 negative	
relationship	 between	 the	 number	 of	 products	 and	 the	 lower	 bound	 complexity.	
Looking	at	the	colouring	of	the	dots,	we	see	a	clear	positive	relationship	between	the	
number	of	products	being	traded	and	the	upper	bound	complexity.		
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Figure	4.2:	Lower	bound	complexity	and	number	of	traded	products	
Source:	Author’s	own	calculation	
Note:	The	figure	plots	the	lower	bound	complexity	of	each	buyer-supplier	pair	against	the	number	of	
products	traded,	using	the	upper	bound	complexity	of	the	pair	to	colour	the	dots.		
As	 in	 Figure	 4.1,	we	 find	 that	 products	 that	 have	 both	 high	 upper	 bound	 and	 lower	
bound	complexity	(i.e.	those	in	light	blue	towards	the	right-hand	side	of	the	graph)	are	
concentrated	at	the	bottom	of	the	graph.	This	means	that	these	pairs	trade	in	a	small	
number	of	products.		
So,	a	first	stylised	fact	we	can	draw	from	these	figures	is	that	as	suppliers	diversify	by	
increasing	the	number	of	products	they	sell	to	their	buyers,	this	is	positively	related	to	
both	the	upper	and	lower	bound	complexity	of	their	export.	This	means	that	product	
diversification	does	not	necessarily	 improve	 the	overall	 sophistication	of	 a	 supplier’s	
exports,	but	is	attained	by	introducing	both	more	and	less	sophisticated	products.	
We	 now	 include	 into	 our	 analysis	 another	 kind	 of	 diversification	 -	 looking	 at	 the	
number	of	trading	partners	both	buyers	and	suppliers	have	and	whether	this	is	related	
to	the	sophistication	of	their	exports.		
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In	 Figure	 4.3	 we	 plot	 the	 number	 of	 traded	 products	 by	 each	 supplier	 against	 the	
number	of	 buyers	 and	 colour	 this	 based	on	 the	 centile	 in	which	 the	 supplier	 falls	 in	
terms	of	upper	bound	complexity.		
We	 find	 that	 suppliers	 that	 trade	many	 products	 tend	 to	 be	 not	 very	 diversified	 in	
terms	of	buyers	and	vice	versa.	This	means	that	suppliers	either	sell	a	large	number	of	
products	to	few	buyers,	or	a	small	number	of	products	to	a	large	number	of	buyers.		
This	suggests	that	suppliers	able	to	cater	to	many	buyers	tend	to	do	so	by	selling	few	
products	 that	 are	 likely	 to	 be	 fairly	 unsophisticated	 (such	 as	 commodities).	 This	 is	
supported	 by	 Figure	 4.3	with	 the	majority	 of	 the	 dots	 coloured	 in	 dark	 blue	 (which	
corresponds	to	low	complexity)	being	clustered	on	the	left-hand	side	of	the	graph.		
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Figure	4.3:	Suppliers’	number	of	traded	products	and	number	of	buyers	
Source:	Author’s	own	calculation	
Note:	The	figure	plots	the	traded	products	of	each	supplier	against	the	number	of	buyers,	coloured	with	
the	upper	bound	complexity	of	each	supplier.		
When	we	turn	to	the	relationship	between	the	number	of	suppliers	and	products	that	
buyers	have,	we	find	a	similar	pattern	(see	Figure	4.4),	although	there	are	a	few	buyers	
with	 high	 upper	 bound	 complexity	 that	 manage	 to	 have	 both	 a	 large	 number	 of	
suppliers	and	of	products	they	purchase.		
Overall,	however,	we	find	here	again	that	buyers	either	buy	many	products	from	few	
suppliers	with	 high	 sophistication	 levels	 (the	 dots	 in	 light	 blue	 at	 the	 bottom	of	 the	
graph)	or	few,	unsophisticated,	products	from	a	variety	of	suppliers.		
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Figure	4.4:	Buyer’s	number	of	traded	products	and	number	of	suppliers	
Source:	Author’s	own	calculation	
Note:	The	figure	plots	the	number	of	traded	products	against	the	number	of	suppliers	of	each	buyer,	
coloured	with	the	upper	bound	complexity	of	the	buyer.	The	scale	of	shades	is	based	on	the	centile	in	
which	the	buyer	falls,	from	lowest	(darkest)	to	highest	(lightest).	
So,	 while	 product	 diversification	 (i.e.	 increases	 in	 the	 number	 of	 products	 traded	
within	a	pair)	seems	to	be	associated	both	to	increases	in	the	upper	bound	complexity	
and	 decreases	 in	 the	 lower	 bound	 complexity,	 diversification	 in	 terms	 of	 trading	
partners	seems	to	be	negatively	associated	with	upper	bound	complexity.		
This	 is	 purely	 explorative	 evidence.	 As	mentioned	 above,	 the	 components	 of	 power	
(both	 for	 the	buyer	and	 the	 supplier)	are	also	 likely	 to	be	 related	 to	each	other.	For	
example,	a	supplier	that	trades	with	buyers	with	a	large	market	share	is	also	likely	to	
be	dependent	on	their	buyer	and,	conversely,	suppliers	with	a	large	market	share	are	
more	likely	to	trade	with	buyers	that	depend	on	them.		
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We	 find	 both	 of	 these	 conjectures	 to	 be	 borne	 out	 in	 the	 data,	 although	 with	 a	
significant	variability,	as	shown	in	Figures	4.9	and	4.10.	In	these	two	figures	we	plot	the	
supplier’s	(buyer’s)	dependence	against	the	buyer’s	(supplier’s)	market	share,	 i.e.	the	
two	components	of	the	buyer’s	(supplier’s)	market	power.	 In	contrast	with	the	other	
figures	 here	 each	 observation	 is	 a	 buyer-supplier	 pair,	which	means	 that	we	 have	 a	
very	 high	 number	 of	 observations;	 to	 maximise	 readability	 of	 the	 graphs	 we	 have	
therefore	 use	 a	 transparency	 parameter	 alpha,	 which	 allows	 plotting	 overlapping	
observations	by	making	these	a	slightly	transparent.	This,	coupled	with	a	high	diversity	
of	 the	 relationships	 we	 observe,	 causes	 a	 blur	 in	 the	 visualisation	 of	 these	
relationships.	To	mitigate	this	we	have	therefore	added	the	line	of	best	fit	to	provide	
an	indication	of	the	direction	of	the	relationship.	We	find	in	both	figures	that	the	two	
components	of	buyer’s	 (supplier’s)	market	power	are	positively	correlated	with	each	
other.		
Interestingly,	 we	 note	 quite	 a	 few	 observations	 clustering	 along	 the	 45-degree	 line.	
Taking	 the	example	of	 the	buyer’s	 power,	 dots	on	 the	45-degree	 line	 correspond	 to	
pairs	 in	 which	 the	 supplier	 does	 not	 have	 rivals	 in	 his	 market.	 Therefore	 his	
dependence,	 which	 is	 computed	 across	 products,	 vis-à-vis	 his	 buyer	 will	 also	
correspond	to	the	buyer’s	share	of	the	market.	In	this	way,	a	pair	in	which	the	supplier	
depends	on	the	buyer	for,	say,	50%	of	its	sales	and	the	buyer	also	accounts	for	50%	of	
the	market.		
This	 very	 same	mechanism	 applies	when	 plotting	 the	 supplier’s	 power	 components,	
i.e.	buyer’s	dependence	and	supplier’s	market	share,	 shown	 in	Figure	4.10.	Unlike	 in	
Figure	 4.9	we	 find	 here	 less	 variability,	 with	 our	 observations	 being	more	 clustered	
around	the	bottom-left	area	of	the	graph,	i.e.	suppliers	with	small	market	shares	and	
buyers	with	little	dependence	on	the	suppliers,	and	a	few	on	the	45-degree	line.		
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Figure	4.9:	Suppliers’	dependence	and	buyers’	market	share	
Source:	Author’s	own	calculation	
Note:	The	figure	plots	for	each	buyer-supplier	pair	the	supplier’s	dependence	and	the	buyer’s	market	
share,	coloured	with	the	pair’s	upper	bound	complexity.	Alpha	is	a	transparency	parameter,	commonly	
used	to	make	dense	scatterplots	easier	to	interpret.	
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Figure	4.10:	Buyers’	dependence	and	suppliers’	market	share	
Source:	Author’s	own	calculation	
Note:	The	figure	plots	for	each	buyer-supplier	pair	the	buyer’s	dependence	and	the	supplier’s	market	
share,	coloured	with	the	pair’s	upper	bound	complexity.	Alpha	is	a	transparency	parameter,	commonly	
used	to	make	dense	scatterplots	easier	to	interpret.	
So	far	we	have	looked	at	all	relationships	across	the	three	main	destination	countries,	
i.e.	the	US,	Venezuela	and	Ecuador.	We	can	however	expect	that	relationships	will	vary	
considerably	across	these	countries,	especially	in	terms	of	sophistication.		
Looking	at	the	three	destination	countries	in	our	subsamples,	we	can	see,	for	example,	
that	 there	 is	a	 stark	difference	 in	 the	average	upper	and	 lower	bound	complexity	of	
exports	of	Colombian	suppliers	to	the	US	as	opposed	to	Ecuador	and	Venezuela.		
In	Figures	4.11	and	4.12,	we	look	at	the	average	sophistication	of	export	of	Colombian	
suppliers	 across	 the	 three	 main	 destination	 countries.	 We	 find	 that	 suppliers	 in	
Colombia	 on	 average	 export	 less	 sophisticated	 products	 to	 US	 than	 to	 Ecuador	 and	
Venezuela.	 A	 possible	 explanation	 for	 this	 finding	 is	 that	 importers	 from	 the	 US	
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purchase	sophisticated	products	from	other	countries	that	are	at	the	frontier	in	those	
products,	 and	 that	 Colombian	 exporters	 only	manage	 to	 trade	with	US	 importers	 in	
unsophisticated	 goods.	 In	 contrast,	 buyers	 in	 Ecuador	 and	 Venezuela,	 that	 both	
neighbour	Colombia	and	have	much	lower	income	levels	than	the	US,	are	more	likely	
to	import	sophisticated	goods	from	Colombia.		
	
	
Figure	4.11:	Average	upper	bound	complexity	across	destination	countries	
Source:	Author’s	own	calculation	
Note:	The	figure	shows	the	average	upper	bound	complexity	of	the	buyer-supplier	pairs	taking	place	
between	Colombian	exporters	and	buyers	based	in	the	three	destination	countries:	Ecuador,	USA	and	
Venezuela.			
These	 differences	 may	 thus	 reflect	 different	 entry	 points	 in	 GVCs	 for	 Colombian	
exporters.	Trade	with	the	US	is	essentially	in	unsophisticated	products,	while	Colombia	
may	 be	 able	 to	 compete	 in	 more	 sophisticated	 goods	 in	 countries	 that	 are	 its	
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neighbours,	 have	 similar	 income	 levels,	 and	 are	 more	 likely	 to	 demand	 the	 same	
varieties	of	products.	
	
Figure	4.12:	Average	lower	bound	complexity	across	destination	countries	
Source:	Author’s	own	calculation	
Note:	The	figure	shows	the	average	lower	bound	complexity	of	the	buyer-supplier	pairs	taking	place	
between	Colombian	exporters	and	buyers	based	in	the	three	destination	countries:	Ecuador,	USA	and	
Venezuela.			
These	figures	are	also	consistent	with	data	from	the	Atlas	of	Complexity,	according	to	
which	the	US	had	an	economic	complexity	index	of	1.53	in	2014,	Colombia	ranks	in	the	
middle	with	-0.067,	followed	by	Venezuela	with	-0,897	and	Ecuador	with	-1.17		
To	 give	 more	 concrete	 examples,	 Colombia	 tends	 to	 export	 more	 sophisticated	
products	to	its	less	sophisticated	trade	partners,	as	can	be	seen	in	Table	4.5	below.	
120		
Table	4.5:	Export	Categories	from	Colombia	to	its	three	main	trading	partners,		
1-digit	product	categories,	excluding	fuels,	lubricant	and	related	materials27	
Destination	Country	 First	product	
category	
Second	product	
category	
Third	product	
category	
USA	 Other	(mainly	gold,	
non-monetary):	
30.82%	
Food	and	live	
animals	for	food:	
28.62%	
Crude	materials	
(mainly	animal	and	
vegetable	materials):	
14.48%	
Venezuela	 Chemicals	and	
related	products:	
37.60%	
Food	and	live	
animals	for	food:	
27.06%	
Manufactured	
goods:	
21.04%	
Ecuador		 Chemicals	and	
related	products:	
32.48%	
Manufactured	
goods:	
22.95%	
Machinery	and	
transport:	
22.63%	
Source:	Atlas	of	Complexity:	http://atlas.cid.harvard.edu	
Note:	percentages	are	of	countries’	total	export	in	2014.	
In	 the	 next	 section	 we	 try	 to	 explore	 these	 relationships	 in	 more	 depth	 through	
regression	analysis.	We	also	discuss	our	empirical	approach	and	results.		
	
4.5	Empirical	approach	and	results	
In	this	section	we	present	the	empirical	strategy	used	to	study	how	our	measures	of	
power	 are	 related	 to	 (i)	 levels	 of	 export	 sophistication,	 to	 investigate	 static	
relationships	between	power	and	export	sophistication,	as	well	as	the	dynamic	effects	
by	looking	at	(ii)	the	likelihood	of	introducing	a	new	product,	and	(iii)	the	likelihood	of	
increasing	 export	 sophistication,	 which	 we	 equate	 in	 our	 approach	 to	 export	
upgrading.	
While	 we	 focus	 on	 the	 relationship	 between	 export	 sophistication	 and	 the	 four	
measures	 of	 power	 discussed	 in	 the	 previous	 section,	 we	 also	 introduce	 a	 set	 of	
controls,	which	we	present	in	this	section.		
																																																								27	We	have	excluded	export	of	oil,	fuel	and	lubricants,	because	this	sector	is	not	covered	in	our	data.	It	
is	worth	noting,	however,	that	this	is	also	a	low	sophistication	sector	that	represents	the	bulk	of	exports	
to	the	US.		
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It	is	worth	emphasising	from	the	onset	that	our	empirical	analysis	is	carried	out	here	at	
the	 pair	 level;	 its	 focus	 is	 however	 the	 sophistication	 of	 the	 products	 traded	 by	 the	
supplier	to	the	buyer.	We	estimate	the	following	equation:	
1                𝑦!" = 𝛽!𝑛ℎ𝑠4!" + 𝛽!𝑠𝑑𝑝!" + 𝛽!𝑏𝑠ℎ!" +  𝛽!𝑏𝑑𝑝!" + 𝛽!𝑠𝑠ℎ!" + 𝛽!𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑠!"+ 𝛽!𝑡𝑓𝑝!" + 𝛽!𝑎𝑔𝑒!! + 𝜏! + 𝜏! + 𝜀!"	
Where,	for	pair	r	and	year	t:	
- the	outcome	variable	y	is	one	of	the	four	sophistication	measures;	
- sdp	is	the	supplier	dependence	vis-à-vis	the	buyer	in	pair	r;	
- bsh	is	the	buyer’s	market	share;	
- bdp	is	the	buyer	dependence	vis-à-vis	the	supplier	in	pair	r;	
- ssh	is	the	supplier	market	share.	
We	also	include	four	controls:	
- nhs4	is	the	number	of	products	(at	the	4-digit	level	in	the	HS)	traded	within	the	
pair;	
- ntrans	is	the	number	of	transactions	taking	place	within	the	pair;	
- tfp	is	the	total	factor	productivity	of	the	supplier;		
- age	is	the	duration	of	the	relationship,	measured	in	consecutive	years.		
The	duration	of	 the	 relationship	 is	 an	 important	determinant	of	 firms’	behaviour:	 as	
trading	 partners	 acquire	 information	 about	 each	 other,	 they	 also	 build	 trust	
(Macchiavello	and	Morjaria	2015;	Monarch	and	Schmidt-Eisenlohr	2015).		
In	addition	to	the	duration	of	the	relationship,	it	is	also	important	to	take	into	account	
that	pairs	of	buyers	and	suppliers	that	trade	more	frequently	with	each	other	are	also	
likely	 to	 build	 trust	 more	 quickly;	 for	 this	 reason	 we	 also	 look	 at	 the	 number	 of	
transactions	 taking	 place	within	 each	 pair	 in	 every	 year.	 This	 variable	 is	 likely	 to	 be	
related	 to	 the	characteristics	of	 the	product	 traded,	e.g.	 fresh	cut	 flowers	demand	a	
higher	number	of	transactions	per	year	than,	say,	furniture.		
To	deal	with	this,	the	number	of	transactions	is	standardised	across	products	and	then	
aggregated	 at	 the	 pair	 level.	 This	 captures	 how	 often	 two	 firms	 interact	 with	 each	
other	and	can	proxy	the	level	of	trust	existing	between	a	buyer	and	a	supplier.	This	is	
likely	 to	 affect	 both	 the	 power	 in	 the	 relationship	 and	 the	 sophistication	 of	 the	
products	exchanged.		
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In	addition	to	the	duration	and	frequency	of	a	relationship,	we	are	also	 interested	 in	
looking	at	the	breadth	of	it,	by	looking	at	the	number	of	products	being	traded	within	
each	pair.	This	is	for	three	reasons;	first,	the	higher	the	number	of	products	two	firms	
trade,	 the	more	 likely	 they	 are	 to	 learn	 about	 each	 other;	 second,	 trading	 in	more	
products	also	means	that	the	two	partners	will	be	operating	in	more	than	one	market	
in	which	the	market	aspect	of	power	may	vary	and,	third,	our	complexity	measures	are	
related	 to	 diversification	 itself,	 therefore	 one	 might	 expect	 that	 more	 diversified	
relationships	are	also	more	likely	to	be	trading	in	more	sophisticated	products.		
Total	factor	productivity	(TFP)	is	included	because	more	productive	suppliers	are	likely	
to	 be	more	 sophisticated	 and	 productivity	 is	 also	 a	 determinant	 of	 the	 governance	
(and	power	relationships)	under	which	firms	are	likely	to	operate	(Gereffi	et	al.	2005).	
We	 computed	TFP	using	data	 from	balance	 sheets	 provided	by	 SIREM.	 This	 includes	
information	on	fixed	costs,	 i.e.	 those	costs	 firms	will	have	to	sustain	regardless	of	 its	
production	level,	such	as	wages	and	variable	costs	that	are,	 in	contrast,	a	function	of	
the	production	such	as	inputs.		
We	 follow	 Wooldridge	 (2009)28	 and	 estimate	 a	 Cobb	 Douglas	 production	 function	
where	total	revenue	is	a	function	of	total	fixed	costs	to	capture	wages	(free	variable),	
total	 asset	 captures	 capital	 (state	 variable)	 and	 inputs	 as	 a	 proxy	 variable	 for	
productivity	itself.		
In	 this	 framework	 two	 assumptions	 are	 made:	 (i)	 that	 productivity	 is	 an	 unknown	
function	of	the	state	variable	and	the	proxy,	and	(ii)	it	is	also	an	unknown	function	of	
its	lagged	levels.	Under	these	assumptions,	a	GMM	approach	is	performed	to	use	past	
levels	of	these	variables	as	instruments	for	productivity29.	
Finally,	 we	 also	 include	 time	 and	 pair	 dummies,	 τt	 and	 τp	 respectively	 to	 take	 into	
account	 trends	 and	 pair-wise	 idiosyncratic	 time	 invariant	 effects;	 crucially,	 this	 also	
accounts	for	buyers’	and	suppliers’	fixed	effects.																																																										28	We	provide	more	details,	together	with	the	equation	we	estimate,	in	the	appendix.	For	full	details	on	
this	procedure	the	reader	can	refer	to	the	Wooldridge	(2009)paper	and	the	vignette	of	the	R	package	
prodest.	29	Section	4.2	of	the	Appendix	provides	further	details	on	the	estimation	of	productivity	
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A	challenge	posed	by	fixed	effects	with	such	a	large	number	of	dummy	variables	is	that	
this	 will	 yield	 a	 very	 sparse	 matrix,	 i.e.	 with	 very	 few	 non-zero	 elements;	 this	 may	
prevent	computing	a	generalised	inverse	of	the	estimation	matrix.		
To	 estimate	 this	 model	 with	 high-dimensionality,	 categorical	 variables	 such	 as	 the	
dummy	for	each	pair,	we	follow	Grossi	Cajal	(2016)	and	Abowd	et	al.	(1999),	as	well	as	
Gaure	(2013)	for	the	implementation	in	R30.		
This	model	 is	very	 likely	to	be	affected	by	reverse	causality	and	does	not	allow	us	to	
draw	any	conclusions	on	causal	relationships.	To	mitigate	this	we	take	the	lag	of	all	our	
explanatory	variables	except	the	pair	duration	(age)	and	TFP.	
Despite	this	attempt	to	moderate	the	effect	of	reverse	causality,	we	refrain	from	any	
direct	 inference	on	 causality;	nonetheless,	our	main	objective	 is	 to	 test	whether	 the	
hypotheses	 put	 forward	 by	 the	 GVC	 literature,	 regarding	 power	 in	 buyer-supplier	
relationships	 as	 related	 to	 supplier’s	 upgrading	 perspectives,	 are	 supported	 by	 a	
quantitative	approach	relying	on	a	 large	sample	and	highly	disaggregated	transaction	
data.	Our	approach	allows	this	to	be	done,	while	also	contributing	to	the	growing	body	
of	 evidence	 at	 the	 transaction	 level,	 emphasising	 the	 importance	 of	 buyer-supplier	
relationships	for	trade	patterns.		
The	measures	of	complexity	we	have	presented	so	far,	of	course,	capture	the	level	of	
sophistication	 at	 which	 each	 supplier	 is	 trading	with	 a	 buyer.	 However,	 they	 tell	 us	
little	on	the	supplier’s	perspective	of	 improving,	which	 is	more	closely	related	to	the	
concept	of	upgrading.	To	also	include	this	more	dynamic	dimension	into	our	study,	we	
perform	a	 linear	probability	model	 to	 see	whether	 (lagged)	 levels	of	 the	 four	power	
components	are	related	to	the	probability	of	a	supplier	introducing	a	new	product	and	
increasing	its	sophistication.	We	estimate	the	following	equation:	
																																																								30	Abowd	et	al.	 (1999)	develop	this	method	to	retrieve	the	fixed	effects	for	employers	and	employee,	
and	Grossi	Cajal	(2016)	applies	this	to	buyer-supplier	matched	trade	data.		
We	are	not	interested	here	in	estimating	such	effects,	but	merely	to	control	for	them.	To	do	this,	we	use	
specifically	the	package	lfe	in	R,	which	is	designed	to	yield	the	same	results	of	a	standard	OLS,	but	uses	
the	Method	of	Alternating	projections	to	sweep	out	multiple	group	effects,	years	and	pairs	in	our	case,	
dealing	with	the	problem	of	sparse	matricesm,	as	described	in	Gaure	(2013).	For	more	details	on	how	
the	 package	 works,	 we	 refer	 the	 reader	 to	 the	 vignette	 freely	 available	 from	 the	 CRAN	 repository:	
https://cran.r-project.org/web/packages/lfe/lfe.pdf.		
124		 2               𝑦!" = 𝛽!𝑛ℎ𝑠4!" + 𝛽!𝑠𝑑𝑝!" + 𝛽!𝑏𝑠ℎ!" +  𝛽!𝑏𝑑𝑝!" + 𝛽!𝑠𝑠ℎ!" + 𝛽!𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑠!"+ 𝛽!𝑡𝑓𝑝!" + 𝛽!𝑎𝑔𝑒!" + 𝜏! + 𝜏! + 𝜀!" 
The	 introduction	of	 new	products	 has	 been	 at	 the	 centre	of	 a	 growing	 literature	on	
trade	 (Goldberg	et	al.	2010;	 Iacovone	and	 Javorcik	2009,	2010b),	although	 there	 is	a	
paucity	of	evidence	concerning	power	in	trade	relationships	as	a	determinant.	We	also	
take	 our	 search	 further	 and	 explore	 how	 changes	 in	 the	 product	 portfolio	 of	 the	
supplier	affect	the	sophistication	of	exports,	which	here	is	a	proxy	for	upgrading.		
While	 the	 explanatory	 variables	 remain	 unchanged,	we	use	 as	 outcome	 variables	yrt	
the	following	six	dummy	variables	computed	as	follows:	
1. a	 dummy	 variable	 taking	 value	 1	 if	 the	 pair	 introduced	 a	 new	 product	 with	
respect	to	the	previous	year;	
2. a	dummy	variable	taking	value	1	if	the	pair	introduced	a	new	product	that	the	
supplier	was	not	exporting	the	year	before31;	
3. a	dummy	variable	taking	value	1	if	the	upper	bound	complexity	of	the	pair	has	
increased	from	the	previous	year;	
4. a	dummy	variable	taking	value	1	if	the	lower	bound	complexity	of	the	pair	has	
increased	from	the	previous	year;	
5. a	 dummy	 variable	 taking	 value	 1	 if	 the	 median	 complexity	 of	 the	 pair	 has	
increased	from	the	previous	year;	
6. a	 dummy	 variable	 taking	 value	 1	 if	 the	 average	 complexity	 of	 the	 pair	 has	
increased	from	the	previous	year.	
Concerning	 the	 first	 two	 dummy	 variables,	 we	 assume	 here	 that	 the	 choice	 of	 the	
buyer	to	start	purchasing	a	new	product	is	not	related	to	the	power	relationship	with	
its	suppliers.	These	factors	are	also	relevant	for	the	choice	of	whether	the	new	product	
should	be	purchased	from	the	supplier	with	which	the	buyer	is	already	trading.		
While	 we	 do	 not	 have	 enough	 information	 on	 the	 buyers	 to	 estimate	 what	 factors	
could	 be	 impacting	 their	 purchasing	 strategy,	 it	 seems	 unlikely	 that	 the	 power	
relationship	with	 its	supplier	would	be	a	 factor	 in	the	choice	of	 the	buyer	starting	to	
purchase	new	products.		
It	 is	 in	 contrast	 more	 likely	 that	 buyers	 that	 are	 already	 planning	 on	 buying	 a	 new	
product	will	 choose	whether	 they	want	 to	switch	 to	a	new	supplier	or	stick	 to	 those	
																																																								31	Our	data	only	provide	 information	on	the	products	exported,	so	we	cannot	observe	whether	a	firm	
was	already	producing	a	given	good	and	selling	it	on	the	domestic	market.	
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they	 already	 have	 and	 introduce	 a	 new	 product,	 based	 on	 the	 power	 ruling	 their	
relationship	with	their	existing	supplier.		
With	 respect	 to	 the	 last	 four	 dummy	 variables,	we	 recognise	 that	 these	would	 only	
capture	 a	 fraction	of	what	one	 could	 consider	upgrading.	Referring	back	 to	 the	 four	
kinds	of	upgrading	spelled	out	 in	the	GVC	framework	(product,	process,	function	and	
value	chain)	(Gereffi	et	al.	2005),	upper	bound	complexity	and	the	introduction	of	new	
products	 would	 capture	 product	 upgrading,	 and	 possibly	 function	 and	 value	 chain	
upgrading	depending	on	what	 the	new	product	 introduced	 is	 and	how	different	 it	 is	
from	what	the	pair	was	exchanging	in	the	past.		
Lower	bound,	median	 and	 average	 complexity	 do	not	 necessarily	 refer	 to	 upgrading	
per	 se,	 as	 they	might	 be	 the	 outcome	 of	 a	 pair	 simply	 dropping	 an	 unsophisticated	
product,	 although	 one	might	 expect	 that	 as	 firms	move	 up	 in	 the	 value	 chain	 they	
would	 specialise	 away	 from	 low-sophistication	 products.	 Average	 and	 median	
complexity	in	particular	have	the	advantage	of	capturing	the	sophistication	level	of	the	
bulk	of	the	export	flows	within	a	given	pair.		
So,	 to	 be	 sure,	 our	 complexity	 measures	 will	 not	 capture	 the	 whole	 spectrum	 of	
upgrading.	However,	they	offer	a	so	far	untapped	opportunity	to	look	at	sophistication	
of	 exports	 for	 very	disaggregated	product	 categories,	 using	 transaction	 level	 data	 to	
provide	 new	 quantitative	 evidence	 based	 on	 a	 large	 sample	 of	 buyer-supplier	
relationships.	
We	 present	 the	 different	 results	 in	 the	 remainder	 of	 this	 section,	 in	 separate	
subsections,	starting	with	the	relationship	between	power	and	sophistication,	then	the	
likelihood	of	introducing	a	new	product	and,	finally,	the	likelihood	of	increasing	export	
sophistication,	i.e.	engaging	in	export	upgrading.	In	section	4.3	of	the	Appendix	we	also	
run	a	battery	of	robustness	checks,	finding	our	results	to	be	solid.		
4.5.1	Power	components	and	levels	of	export	sophistication	
Turning	now	to	our	main	results,	Table	4.6	shows	the	relationship	between	the	lagged	
four	measures	of	the	power	and	the	four	measures	of	complexity.		
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Concerning	 the	 two	 components	 of	 the	 buyer’s	 power	 (see	 Table	 4.1),	 these	 results	
suggest	 that	 pairs	 with	 a	 supplier	 that	 is	 heavily	 dependent	 on	 their	 buyer	 tend	 to	
trade	in	less	sophisticated	products.	In	contrast	pairs	with	a	buyer	with	a	large	market	
share	(i.e.	purchasing	a	large	share	of	product	exported	by	the	export	with	which	they	
trade)	 tend	 to	 trade	 in	 more	 sophisticated	 products,	 both	 at	 the	 upper	 and	 lower	
bounds	and	when	looking	at	the	median	and	average	sophistication.	Notwithstanding	
the	 caveats	 mentioned	 above,	 these	 results	 are	 consistent	 with	 the	 (qualitative	
evidence-based)	 intuition	put	forward	 in	the	GVC	literature	that	 large	buyers	tend	to	
be	 larger	 firms	 purchasing	 more	 sophisticated	 products,	 while	 suppliers	 that	 are	
heavily	 dependent	 on	 their	 buyers	 tend	 to	 be	 smaller	 firms	 trading	 in	 low-
sophistication	products.		
Table	4.6:	Power	components	and	sophistication	
	 Upper	bound	 Lower	bound	 Median	 Average	
nhs4	 0.0096	***	(0.0017)	
-0.0133	***	
(0.0016)	
-0.0006			
(0.0011)	
-0.001			
(0.0009)	
sdp	 -0.0835	***	
(0.0243)	
-0.0475	*	
(0.0235)	
-0.0442	**	
(0.0161)	
-0.0428	**	
(0.0133)	
bsh	 0.1119	**	
(0.0364)	
0.0948	**	
(0.0352)	
0.0707	**	
(0.0242)	
0.0429	*	
(0.02)	
bdp	 -0.0045			(0.0518)	
-0.0702			
(0.05)	
-0.0575	°	
(0.0343)	
-0.0531	°	
(0.0284)	
ssh	 -0.0094			(0.0856)	
-0.0882			
(0.0828)	
-0.2238	***	
(0.0568)	
-0.2172	***	
(0.0469)	
tfp	 0.0685	***	
(0.0155)	
-0.0038			
(0.015)	
-0.0057			
(0.0103)	
-0.0175	*	
(0.0085)	
ntrans	 0.0038	**	(0.0012)	
-0.0025	*	
(0.0011)	
-0.0011			
(0.0008)	
-0.0009			
(0.0006)	
age	 -0.0009			(0.0062)	
0.0018			
(0.006)	
-0.0041			
(0.0041)	
-0.0004			
(0.0034)	
N.	obs.	 42741	 42741	 42758	 42758	
R2	 0.94	 0.94	 0.97	 0.98	
OLS	regression	results	with	time	and	buyer-supplier	pair	dummies.		
Dependent	variables	are	upper-,	lower	bound,	median	and	average	complexity	of	the	pair,	
based	on	data	from	http://www.datlascolombia.com	
All	explanatory	variables	are	lagged,	except	TFP	and	age,	which	is	the	duration	(number	of	
consecutive	years)	of	the	pair.	
Signif.	Codes:	0	***;	0.001	**;	0.01	*;	0.05	°	
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Standard	errors	in	parentheses	
Source:	Author’s	own	calculation.	
These	opposing	relationships	between	the	two	components	of	the	buyer’s	power	show	
that	 a	 nuanced	 view	 of	 a	 buyer’s	 power	 may	 be	 required	 when	 looking	 at	 buyer-
supplier	 relationships.	 A	 pair	 in	 which	 the	 power	 of	 the	 buyer	 comes	 from	 high	
dependence	 on	 the	 part	 of	 the	 supplier	 is	 likely	 to	 be	 trading	 in	 unsophisticated	
products,	while	the	opposite	will	be	true	for	pairs	in	which	the	buyer’s	market	share	is	
the	source	of	its	power.		
The	 supplier’s	 power	 components	 seem	 to	 have	 a	 significant	 relationship	 only	 with	
respect	 to	 the	median	and	average	 complexity;	 this	 relationship	 is	negative	 for	both	
variables,	suggesting	that	pairs	with	a	strong	supplier	tend	to	trade	in	unsophisticated	
products.	An	intuitive	explanation	may	have	to	do	with	the	sectors	in	which	suppliers	
with	 large	 market	 shares	 in	 Colombia	 are	 likely	 to	 be	 concentrated,	 such	 as	
commodities	 like	 coffee	 and	 flowers.	 However,	 time-invariant	 effects	 from	 these	
macro	sectors	are	likely	to	be	accounted	for	by	the	supplier	level	fixed	effect.		
Another	possible	explanation	 for	our	 results	 could	be	 that	 suppliers	 in	Colombia	are	
more	 likely	 to	 obtain	 large	 market	 shares	 in	 commodity-based,	 low-sophistication	
products.	On	the	one	hand,	these	are	easier	to	enter	than	more	sophisticated	products	
and,	on	the	other	hand,	enjoy	 large	economies	of	scale	that	explain	the	high	 level	of	
concentration	and	the	large	market	shares	of	the	incumbents.		
While	this	explanation	may	not	apply	to	all	countries,	it	is	likely	to	be	a	predicament	in	
which	many	other	small	emerging	economies	(such	as	Peru	and	Ecuador	for	example)	
are	likely	to	find	themselves.		
As	expected	from	Figures	4.1	and	4.2,	we	see	that	pairs	trading	in	more	products	tend	
to	have	a	higher	upper	bound	complexity.	We	also	detect	a	negative	association	with	
the	lower	bound	complexity,	while	no	relationship	is	detected	with	our	two	measures	
of	centrality	of	sophistication,	i.e.	median	and	average	complexity.		
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This	 suggests	 that	 a	 larger	 number	 of	 products	 traded	 is	 not	 necessarily	 associated	
with	 a	higher	 level	 of	 capabilities,	 but	 rather	 to	 a	diversification	 towards	both	more	
and	less	sophisticated	products.	
The	same	seems	 to	hold	 for	 the	number	of	 transactions:	pairs	with	high	 frequencies	
tend	 to	 trade	 with	 a	 larger	 range	 of	 complexity	 at	 both	 ends,	 which	 again	 hints	 at	
diversification	rather	than	upgrading	per	se.		
Total	 factor	 productivity	 (TFP)	 shows	 a	 positive	 association	 with	 upper	 bound	
complexity,	which	was	to	be	expected.	We	find,	however,	a	negative	association	with	
the	 average	 complexity	 of	 the	 pair;	while	 this	may	 seem	 counter-intuitive	 at	 first,	 a	
possible	 explanation	 for	 this	 is	 that	more	productive	 suppliers	 also	 tend	 to	be	more	
diversified,	which	is	likely	to	drive	down	the	average	complexity;	it	is	also	possible	that	
exporters	 in	Colombia	are	more	productive	 in	 low-complexity	products,	which	would	
also	explain	these	results.	
The	four	complexity	measures	used	so	far	capture	characteristics	of	the	distribution	of	
the	 sophistication	 of	 products	 traded	 within	 each	 pair,	 in	 particular	 the	 maximum,	
minimum,	 the	median	 and	 the	 average.	 They	 shed	 light	 on	 the	 products’	 feature	 of	
different	pairs,	based	on	the	characteristics	of	the	power	relationship	the	suppliers	and	
buyers	 establish	with	 each	other,	 controlling	 for	 each	other,	 and	 a	 number	of	 other	
control	variables.			
4.5.2	Power	measures	and	the	introduction	of	new	products	in	buyer-supplier	pairs	
Aside	 from	 sophistication	 levels,	 we	 are	 also	 interested	 in	 exploring	 the	 dynamic	
aspects	 of	 this,	 in	 particular	 to	 see	 whether	 buyer-supplier	 pairs	 introduce	 new	
products	to	their	product	portfolio;	to	explore	this	possibility	we	also	perform	a	linear	
probability	 model	 with	 two	 different	 outcome	 variables.	 These	 are	 the	 first	 two	
dummy	variables	we	have	already	introduced	as	additional	outcome	variables.		
In	Table	4.7,	 the	first	column	has	as	outcome	variable	a	dummy	taking	value	1	 if	 the	
pair	introduces	a	new	product	from	the	year	before;	we	refer	to	this	as	a	product	new-
to-the-pair.	We	add	here	the	past	level	of	upper	bound	complexity	(pci)	as	a	covariate,	
to	control	 for	past	 levels	of	sophistication	of	 the	pair.	The	second	and	third	columns	
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have	an	outcome	variable	 taking	 value	1	 if	 the	pair	 introduces	 a	product	 that	 is	 not	
only	new	to	the	pair	but	also	to	the	supplier,	 i.e.	 the	supplier	was	not	exporting	this	
product	 in	 the	 year	 before.	 We	 refer	 to	 this	 as	 a	 product	 new-to-the-supplier.	 In	
column	three	of	Table	4.7	we	also	control	for	a	dummy	nhs_d	taking	value	one	if	the	
pair	has	introduced	a	new	product	it	was	not	exporting	in	the	previous	year.		
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Table	4.7:	Linear	probit	on	the	power	components	and	the	introduction	of	new	
products	in	the	pair	
	
New	to	the	
pair	
New	to	the	
supplier	
New	to	the	
supplier	
nhs4	 -0.0109	***	(0.0011)	
-0.0069	***	
(0.001)	
0.0004			
(0.0006)	
pci	 -0.0818	***	(0.0041)	
-0.0413	***	
(0.0036)	
0.0137	***	
(0.0024)	
sdp	 0.0149			(0.015)	
0.1083	***	
(0.0133)	
0.0983	***	
(0.0086)	
bsh	 -0.0375	°	(0.0225)	
-0.048	*	
(0.0198)	
-0.0228	°	
(0.0129)	
bdp	 0.0219			(0.0319)	
-0.0197			
(0.0282)	
-0.0344	°	
(0.0183)	
ssh	 -0.0295			(0.0528)	
0.0705			
(0.0466)	
0.0903	**	
(0.0303)	
tfp	 0.0395	***	
(0.0096)	
0.0365	***	
(0.0085)	
0.01	°	
(0.0055)	
ntrans	 -0.0001			(0.0007)	
-0.0002			
(0.0006)	
-0.0001			
(0.0004)	
age	 -0.0122	**	(0.0038)	
-0.0084	*	
(0.0034)	
-0.0002			
(0.0022)	
nhs_d	 	 	
0.6718	***	
(0.0037)	
N.	obs.	 42739	 42739	 42739	
R2	 0.37	 0.37	 0.73	
Linear	 probability	 model	 with	 year	 and	 buyer-supplier	 pair	
dummies.		
Dependent	variable	 in	col.	1	 is	a	dummy	taking	value	1	 if	 the	pair	
introduces	a	new	product,	col.	2	and	3	use	a	dummy	taking	value	1	
if	 the	 pair	 introduces	 a	 new	 product	 that	 the	 supplier	 wasn’t	
exporting	in	the	year	before.			
All	explanatory	variables	are	lagged,	except	TFP	and	age.	
pci	 is	 the	 lagged	 level	 of	 upper	 bound	 complexity;	 nhs_d	 is	 a	
dummy	taking	value	one	if	the	pair	has	introduced	a	new	product,	
i.e.	the	outcome	variable	in	column	1.	
Signif.	Codes:	0	***;	0.001	**;	0.01	*;	0.05	°	
Standard	errors	in	parentheses	
Source:	Author’s	own	calculation.	
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Concerning	the	four	power	components,	we	find	that	only	the	buyer’s	market	share	is	
significantly	associated	to	the	likelihood	of	introducing	a	new	product,	with	a	negative	
sign.	This	suggests	that,	in	line	with	the	GVC	literature,	buyers	with	large	market	shares	
are	less	likely	to	be	persuaded	by	the	supplier	to	purchase	new	products	and	will	stick	
to	their	current	portfolio	of	products.			
When	we	focus	on	our	second	outcome	variable,	a	product	new	to	the	exporter,	we	
see	 that	 a	 lot	 changes	when	we	 control	 for	 the	dummy	 for	 the	 introduction	of	 new	
products.	 Unsurprisingly,	 this	 new	 control	 is	 strongly	 correlated	 with	 our	 outcome	
variable,	and	the	R-squared	of	our	model	increases	from	0.37	to	0.73.		
We	also	find	all	four	components	of	the	power	relationships	to	be	significantly	related,	
although	with	different	signs.		
A	possible	explanation	 for	 the	 significance	of	 the	coefficients	 for	our	power	 indexes,	
when	 looking	 at	 new-to-the-supplier	 products	 but	 not	 at	 the	 new-to-the-pair,	 could	
have	 to	 do	 with	 the	 risk	 of	 the	 introduction	 of	 products	 that	 the	 supplier	 has	 not	
produced	in	the	past,	and	the	switching	cost	of	finding	a	new	trading	partner,	which	is	
well	documented	 in	 the	 literature	 (Grossi	Cajal	 2016;	Eaton	et	al.	 2015;	 Sugita	et	 al.	
2014;	Dragusanu	2014).		
Therefore,	when	a	buyer	and	a	supplier	are	negotiating	on	whether	to	introduce	a	new	
product	into	their	pair32,	if	the	supplier	is	already	exporting	that	product	it	is	likely	that	
the	buyer	will	not	be	willing	to	sustain	the	switching	cost	of	looking	for	a	new	supplier	
and	that	the	product	will	be	introduced	in	the	pair,	regardless	of	the	power	in	the	pair.	
The	exception	is	the	buyer’s	share,	which	we	have	already	discussed.	
In	contrast,	when	the	product	being	introduced	is	new	to	the	supplier,	the	risk	of	the	
product	 not	meeting	 the	 buyer’s	 requirements	 will	 make	 it	 more	 appealing	 for	 the	
buyer	 to	 sustain	 the	 cost	 of	 looking	 for	 a	 new	 supplier,	 and	 power	will	 be	 a	 factor	
taken	 into	 account	 in	 that	 decision.	 Naturally,	 the	 final	 outcome	 of	 this	 negotiation																																																									32	Bear	in	mind	that	the	subject	of	the	negotiation	we	refer	to	here	is	whether	the	buyer	will	purchase	
the	new	product	from	its	current	supplier,	rather	than	whether	the	buyer	will	decide	to	purchase	a	new	
product	to	begin	with.	We	have	already	discussed	that	we	consider	this	latter	choice	to	be	independent	
from	the	buyer-supplier	power	relationships.		
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between	the	buyer	and	the	supplier	will	depend	on	all	of	the	four	power	indexes.	We	
discuss	them	here	one	by	one	as	factors	shaping	the	 incentives	of	the	buyer	and	the	
supplier.		
In	 particular,	 pairs	 with	 high	 supplier	 dependence	 seem	 more	 likely	 to	 introduce	
products	 that	 the	 supplier	 has	 not	 previously	 exported.	 This	 may	 be	 because	 a	
supplier’s	 dependence	 on	 the	 buyer	means	 that	 it	 has	more	 at	 stake	 and	will	make	
sure	to	comply	with	the	buyer’s	requirements,	which	in	turn	may	convince	the	buyer	
to	“trust”	the	supplier	with	the	production	of	the	new	product.	We	address	the	issue	
of	whether	 these	new	products	 also	 correspond	 to	 an	 increase	 in	 the	 capabilities	 in	
Table	4.8.		
The	buyer’s	share	is	negatively	associated	with	the	introduction	of	products	new	to	the	
pair	and	to	the	supplier.	We	have	already	pointed	out	that	this	is	in	line	with	the	GVC	
literature,	 arguing	 that	 large	 buyers	 will	 be	 hard	 to	 convince	 to	 introduce	 new	
products	and	are	more	likely	to	have	access	to	a	larger	pool	of	suppliers.		
The	dependence	of	the	buyer	is	also	another	factor	that	is	at	play	in	choosing	whether	
to	introduce	a	product	new	to	the	supplier.	Since	the	product	 is	new	to	the	supplier,	
and	sticking	with	it	does	not	necessarily	decrease	the	risk	that	the	new	product	will	not	
meet	the	buyer’s	requirements,	buyers	that	are	heavily	dependent	on	their	suppliers	
may	be	 inclined	to	 find	new	suppliers	 in	order	to	avoid	 increasing	their	dependence.	
This	explains	why	the	index	is	negatively	related	to	our	outcome	variable.		
Finally,	a	large	market	share	for	the	supplier	will	make	it	more	likely	that	the	supplier	
will	 convince	 the	 buyer	 to	 purchase	 a	 product	 that	 the	 supplier	 has	 not	 produced	
before;	 this	 explains	 the	 positive	 relationship	we	detect	 in	 column	3	 of	 Table	 4.7.	 A	
possible	explanation	for	this	is	that	suppliers	that	achieve	large	market	shares	are	also	
likely	to	be	large	companies	with	significant	resources	(on	which	the	buyers	can	rely).	
They	are	also	more	likely	to	be	successful	at	introducing	new	products	to	their	export	
portfolio.		
Turning	 to	 the	 control	 variables,	 in	 the	 first	 column	 of	 Table	 4.7	 we	 see	 that	 the	
number	 of	 products	 exported	 in	 the	 previous	 period,	 the	 upper	 bound	 complexity	
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(pci),	 and	 age	 are	 negatively	 associated	 with	 the	 likelihood	 of	 introducing	 a	 new	
product	in	the	pair.	This	could	be	interpreted	as	a	sort	of	“catching-up”	effect,	showing	
that	young	pairs	exporting	few,	unsophisticated	products	are	more	likely	to	introduce	
new	ones.		
TFP	 has	 a	 positive	 association	 throughout	 our	 table,	 which	 suggests	 that	 more	
productive	firms	are	also	those	who	are	more	likely	to	introduce	new	products.		
With	respect	to	the	likelihood	of	introducing	a	product	new	to	the	supplier,	we	find	a	
positive	relationship	with	past	levels	of	the	upper	bound	complexity.	This	suggests	that	
pairs	that	had	high	sophistication	in	the	past	are	less	likely	to	introduce	a	new	product	
(as	shown	in	column	1	of	Table	4.7),	but	when	they	do	this,	the	product	is	more	likely	
to	be	new	to	the	supplier.		
In	addition	to	the	likelihood	of	introducing	new	products,	we	also	want	to	shed	light	on	
how	these	products	compare	with	the	existing	portfolio	of	products	traded	within	the	
pair	and	whether	 they	 impact	 the	pair’s	 sophistication.	To	 further	explore	 this	 issue,	
we	also	look	at	how	the	power	components	are	related	to	the	likelihood	of	observing	
an	increase	in	the	four	complexity	measures.		
4.5.3	Power	in	buyer-supplier	relationships	and	upgrading	
In	 these	models	 we	 also	 include	 the	 lagged	 level	 of	 the	 sophistication	measure	 we	
used	to	compute	the	relevant	dummy	variable	as	controls.	This	means	that	depending	
on	the	dummy	variable	that	we	use	as	outcome	variable,	we	have	different	controls;	
however,	to	make	the	table	more	compact	we	report	these	controls	as	one	row,	which	
we	call	 lagged_level.	So,	for	example,	in	Table	4.8	 lagged_level	represents	the	lagged	
level	 of	 upper	 bound	 sophistication	 for	 the	 first	 column,	 but	 then	 represents	 lower	
bound	sophistication	in	the	second	column,	and	so	on.		
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Table	4.8:	Linear	probit	on	the	power	components	and	the	likelihood	of	increases	in	
the	sophistication	of	the	pair	
	
Increase	in	the	
upper	bound	
sophistication	
Increase	in	the	
lower	bound	
sophistication	
Increase	in	the	
median	
sophistication	
Increase	in	the	
average	
sophistication	
nhs4	 -0.0056	***	(0.0009)	
0.0071	***	
(0.0008)	
0.0102	***	
(0.001)	
0.0045	***	
(0.0012)	
lagged_leve
l	
-0.2223	***	
(0.0032)	
-0.2425	***	
(0.0032)	
-0.3769	***	
(0.0056)	
-0.4016	***	
(0.0085)	
sdp	 -0.0193	°	(0.0117)	
-0.0201	°	
(0.0113)	
-0.0555	***	
(0.0141)	
-0.0328	°	
(0.0177)	
bsh	 -0.0103			(0.0175)	
0.0214			
(0.0169)	
-0.0126			
(0.0211)	
0.023			
(0.0265)	
bdp	 0.0569	*	(0.0249)	
-0.1067	***	
(0.0239)	
-0.1281	***	
(0.03)	
0.0019			
(0.0379)	
ssh	 -0.0163			(0.0412)	
-0.0095			
(0.0396)	
-0.0568			
(0.0496)	
-0.0279			
(0.0624)	
tfp	 0.0218	**	(0.0075)	
-0.0109			
(0.0072)	
0.0035			
(0.009)	
0.0024			
(0.0113)	
ntrans	 0.0006			(0.0006)	
-0.0006			
(0.0005)	
-0.0005			
(0.0007)	
-0.0002			
(0.0009)	
age	 -0.0024			(0.003)	
0.0049	°	
(0.0029)	
0.0036			
(0.0036)	
0.0006			
(0.0045)	
N.	obs.	 42724	 42724	 42758	 42758	
R2	 0.24	 0.28	 0.32	 0.2	
Linear	probability	model	with	year	and	buyer-supplier	pair	dummies.		
Dependent	variables	in	columns	1-4	are	dummy	variables	taking	value	one	if	the	pair	experiences	
an	 increase	 in	 upper-,	 lower	 bound,	 median	 and	 average	 complexity	 from	 the	 previous	 year,	
respectively.			
All	explanatory	variables	are	lagged,	except	TFP	and	age.	
Lagged_level	 is	 the	 lagged	 level	of	 the	sophistication	measure	on	which	the	outcome	variable	 is	
based:	 col.	 1:	 lagged	 level	 of	 upper	 bound	 complexity;	 col.	 2:	 lagged	 level	 of	 lower	 bound	
complexity;	col.	3:	lagged	level	of	median	complexity;	col.	4:	lagged	level	of	average	complexity.	
Signif.	Codes:	0	***;	0.001	**;	0.01	*;	0.05	°	
Standard	errors	in	parentheses.	
Source:	Author’s	own	calculation.	
We	see	a	consistent	negative	association	between	the	dependence	of	the	supplier	and	
the	likelihood	of	experiencing	increases	in	any	measure	of	complexity.		
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In	the	previous	tables	we	have	seen	that	pairs	with	a	highly	dependent	supplier	tend	to	
trade	in	unsophisticated	products,	but	are	more	likely	to	introduce	new	products.	This	
new	 finding	 suggests,	however,	 that	 the	new	products	 introduced	are	unlikely	 to	be	
more	sophisticated	than	those	in	which	the	pair	 is	already	trading;	this	again	hints	at	
the	risk	 for	highly	dependent	suppliers	of	being	stuck	 in	 low-sophistication	activities.	
This	 is	 something	very	much	 in	 line	with	 the	 findings	of	 the	GVC	 literature,	 stressing	
how	highly	dependent	suppliers	are	unlikely	to	upgrade.		
In	 contrast,	 the	 dependence	 of	 the	 buyer	 has	 a	 negative	 relationship	 with	 the	
likelihood	of	 increasing	 the	median	 and	 lower	 bound	 complexity,	 but	 a	 positive	 one	
with	the	probability	of	increasing	the	upper	bound	complexity.	This	suggests	that	high	
levels	 of	 buyer’s	 dependence	 are	 positively	 related	 to	 upgrading	 at	 the	 top,	 i.e.	
including	new	more	sophisticated	products,	but	negatively	related	to	upgrading	at	the	
bottom,	i.e.	it	is	less	likely	that	the	pair	will	drop	low-sophistication	products.	Because	
average	complexity	 is	 influenced	by	both	upper	and	 lower	bound	sophistication,	 it	 is	
not	 surprising	 that	 we	 do	 not	 find	 a	 significant	 relationship	 with	 the	 buyer’s	
dependence.		
From	these	results	 it	would	seem	that	dependence	of	the	buyer	and	the	supplier	are	
the	two	main	factors	(negatively)	associated	with	the	likelihood	of	changes	in	the	pair’s	
sophistication.	We	see	 that	as	both	dependencies	 increase	 the	chances	of	 increasing	
either	the	median	or	the	lower	bound	sophistication	decrease33.		
This	suggests	that	the	higher	the	dependence	in	a	pair,	the	less	likely	the	pair	is	to	drop	
low-sophistication	products.	However,	we	 see	 that	when	 the	buyer	 is	 dependent	on	
the	supplier	it	is	more	likely	to	improve	the	upper	bound	complexity	of	the	pair.		
These	 findings	 are	 relevant	 to	 the	 GVC	 literature,	 which	 posit	 that	 highly	 mutually	
dependent	buyers	and	suppliers	tend	to	cooperate	more	towards	upgrading,	as	is	the	
																																																								33	It	is	also	worth	noting	that	the	coefficients	for	the	buyer’s	dependence	are	much	larger	than	those	for	
the	supplier’s	dependence.	However,	this	is	to	be	expected	since	the	buyer’s	dependence	is	on	average	
much	 lower	 than	 that	 of	 the	 supplier,	 as	 we	 saw	 in	 Table	 4.2.	 Specifically,	 the	 coefficients	 for	 the	
supplier’s	 dependence	 in	 Table	 4.7	 are	 2-5	 times	 smaller	 than	 the	 coefficients	 for	 the	 buyer’s	
dependence.	 In	 Table	 4.2	 the	 average	 buyer’s	 dependence	 is	 three	 times	 smaller	 than	 the	 average	
supplier’s	dependence.		
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case	 for	 relational	 governance	 (Gereffi	 et	 al.	 2005).	 Our	 results	 suggest	 that	 such	 a	
scenario	would	depend	on	the	buyer’s,	rather	than	the	supplier’s	dependence.		
We	have	found	that	when	a	buyer	depends	heavily	on	the	supplier	it	is	less	likely	that	
the	pair	will	introduce	a	product	that	is	new	to	the	supplier;	this	is	because	the	buyer	
will	have	an	incentive	to	diversify	and	trust	a	new	supplier.	The	fact	that	we	now	find	a	
positive	 effect	 on	 the	 likelihood	 of	 increasing	 the	 pair’s	 upper	 bound	 sophistication	
suggests	 that,	 when	 it	 comes	 to	 introducing	 a	 new	 product	 with	 a	 high	 level	 of	
sophistication	 (which	 is	 likely	 to	 be	 even	 riskier),	 buyers	 are	 likely	 to	 stick	 to	 the	
supplier	from	which	they	are	currently	buying	a	large	share	of	their	total	purchases.	So,	
we	can	conjecture	that	while	buyers	that	are	heavily	dependent	would	try	to	introduce	
new	products	buy	 turning	 to	new	suppliers	 to	diversify	 their	 trade	partner	portfolio,	
they	stick	to	the	suppliers	they	know	when	it	comes	to	sophisticated	products	that	are	
riskier	to	introduce.		
Concerning	the	controls,	we	find	a	positive	relationship	between	TFP	and	increases	in	
the	upper	bound	sophistication,	which	is	to	be	expected.	Interestingly	we	also	see	that	
as	 pairs	 increase	 the	 duration	 of	 their	 partnership,	 the	 likelihood	 of	 dropping	 low-
sophistication	 products	 also	 increases,	 thus	 increasing	 the	 pair’s	 lower	 bound	
complexity.		
Past	levels	of	the	sophistication	measure	are	negatively	associated	with	the	likelihood	
of	 this	measure	 to	 increase.	 This	 again	hints	 at	 a	 sort	 of	 “catching-up”,	 and	 thereby	
upgrading,	 where	 pairs	 that	 are	 at	 lower	 levels	 of	 sophistication	 are	more	 likely	 to	
experience	an	increase	in	this	measure.		
Finally,	we	see	a	negative	association	between	the	number	of	products	traded	in	the	
pair	and	the	likelihood	of	increasing	the	upper	bound	complexity.	However	the	sign	of	
this	relationship	changes	when	we	look	at	the	probability	of	increasing	the	other	three	
measures	 of	 complexity.	 This	 hints	 at	 the	 possibility	 of	 a	 catching	 up	 with	 highly	
diversified	 pairs	 already	 exporting	 sophisticated	 products,	 therefore	 struggling	 to	
increase	 their	upper	bound	complexity.	 They	are,	however,	more	 likely	 to	drop	 low-
complexity	products,	thereby	improving	the	other	complexity	measures.			
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4.5.4	Buyer-supplier	relationships	across	destination	countries	
So	far	we	have	looked	at	the	average	associations	between	our	power	measures	across	
all	destination	countries.	The	time	invariant	effects	of	the	destination	countries,	such	
as	the	demand	for	imports	and	the	destination	countries	innovativeness	are	controlled	
for	 by	 the	 pair	 fixed	 effects,	 because	 pairs	 are	 identified	 as	 buyer-supplier-country.	
There	might,	however,	be	significant	differences	in	the	kind	of	power	relationships	that	
suppliers	are	likely	to	establish	with	their	buyers,	as	well	as	in	the	kind	of	products	that	
each	country	tends	to	demand.	This	will	depend	on	the	countries’	income,	geographic	
position,	 innovation	 system,	 and	 regulations.	 This	 will	 naturally	 affect	 the	 kind	 of	
products	that	suppliers	will	export,	as	well	as	their	sophistication	level	and	upgrading	
perspectives.	
The	preliminary	evidence	presented	 in	Section	4.4	supports	 this	conjecture.	We	now	
explore	this	by	investigating	whether	our	results	change	significantly	when	we	look	at	
buyer-supplier	relationships	with	trade	partners	located	in	a	sophisticated	and	distant	
economy	(US),	as	compared	to	those	located	in	closer	economies	with	similar	or	lower	
sophistication	(Venezuela	and	Ecuador).		
We	estimate	therefore	the	same	relationships	as	in	equations	1	and	2	for	the	US	and	
for	 Ecuador	 and	 Venezuela.	When	 looking	 at	 Ecuador	 and	 Venezuela	 as	 destination	
countries,	 these	 are	 globally	 consistent	with	 the	 results	 of	 our	main	model	 and	 are	
therefore	reported	in	section	4.3	of	the	Appendix.	We	now	discuss	the	results	for	the	
US	subsample	of	pairs	in	more	depth.	
Table	4.9	replicates	equation	1,	 looking	at	the	association	between	past	 levels	of	our	
power	 measures	 on	 the	 current	 complexity	 measures.	 With	 respect	 to	 our	 initial	
model,	 the	 starkest	 difference	 is	 the	 sign	 of	 the	 association	 of	 the	 buyer’s	 market	
share.	We	 find	 in	 fact	 that	 while	 there	 is	 no	 significant	 association	 with	 the	 upper	
bound	complexity,	suppliers	in	pairs	dominated	by	a	buyer	with	a	large	market	share	in	
the	US	tend	to	trade	at	lower	levels	of	complexity	for	the	other	three	measures.	This	
suggests	therefore	that	buyers	from	the	US	with	large	market	shares	tend	to	trade	in	
less	sophisticated	products	than	those	from	Ecuador	and	Venezuela.		
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On	average,	and	accounting	for	destination	countries’	fixed	effects,	buyers	with	large	
market	 shares	 are	 associated	 with	 higher	 levels	 of	 export	 sophistication.	 However,	
buyers	 dominating	 the	 market	 in	 high-income	 countries	 import	 low-sophistication	
products	 from	emerging	economies,	such	as	Colombia,	and	are	 less	 likely	 to	 trade	 in	
sophisticated	products.		
Table	4.9:	Power	components	and	sophistication,	US	subsample	
	 Upper	
bound	
Lower	bound	 Median	 Average	
nhs4	 0.0047			(0.0032)	
-0.0165	***	
(0.0026)	
-0.0039	*	
(0.0017)	
-0.0029	*	
(0.0015)	
sdp	 -0.1404	***	(0.04)	
-0.0309			
(0.0318)	
-0.0228			
(0.0211)	
-0.0348	°	
(0.0182)	
msh	 0.0762			(0.0595)	
-0.1075	*	
(0.0473)	
-0.0732	*	
(0.0315)	
-0.0688	*	
(0.0271)	
mdp	 0.0156			(0.0819)	
0.0112			
(0.0651)	
-0.0088			
(0.0433)	
-0.0215			
(0.0373)	
ssh	 0.5698			(0.7233)	
0.1148			
(0.575)	
-1.3587	***	
(0.3821)	
-1.4402	***	
(0.3292)	
tfp	 0.0493	**	(0.0187)	
0.0095			
(0.0148)	
0.0242	*	
(0.0099)	
0.0027			
(0.0085)	
ntrans	 0.0053	***	(0.0015)	
-0.0019			
(0.0012)	
-0.0008			
(0.0008)	
-0.0006			
(0.0007)	
age	 -0.0159			(0.0109)	
-0.0045			
(0.0087)	
-0.0111	°	
(0.0058)	
-0.0038			
(0.005)	
N.	obs.	 16642	 16642	 16650	 16650	
R2	 0.95	 0.96	 0.98	 0.99	
OLS	regression	results	with	time	and	buyer-supplier	pair	dummies.	Estimates	based	
on	pairs	with	US	based	buyers	only.			
Dependent	 variables	 are	upper-,	 lower	bound,	median	and	average	 complexity	of	
the	pair,	based	on	data	from	http://www.datlascolombia.com	
All	explanatory	variables	are	lagged,	except	TFP	and	age.	
Signif.	Codes:	0	***;	0.001	**;	0.01	*;	0.05	°	
Standard	errors	in	parentheses.	
Source:	Author’s	own	calculation.	
We	now	turn	 to	 the	 likelihood	of	 introducing	a	new	product,	 replicating	Table	4.6	 in	
Table	 4.10	 below.	 Overall,	 we	 find	 rather	 similar	 results,	 with	 some	 minor	 loss	 of	
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significance.	 The	 signs	 of	 the	 coefficients	 are	 essentially	 unchanged,	 which	 suggests	
that	our	main	results’	interpretation	applies	regardless	of	the	destination	country34	
	
	
Table	4.10:	Linear	probit	on	the	power	components	and	the	introduction	of	new	
products	in	the	pair,	US	subsample	
	 New	to	the	
pair	
New	to	the	
supplier	
New	to	the	
supplier	
nhs4	 -0.0127	***	(0.002)	
-0.0089	***	
(0.0017)	
-0.0007			
(0.0011)	
pci	 -0.0676	***	(0.0061)	
-0.0249	***	
(0.0052)	
0.0187	***	
(0.0035)	
dsp	 0.0134			(0.023)	
0.0773	***	
(0.0198)	
0.0687	***	
(0.013)	
msh	 -0.046			(0.0342)	
-0.0619	*	
(0.0294)	
-0.0322	°	
(0.0194)	
mdp	 0.0071			(0.047)	
-0.0208			
(0.0404)	
-0.0253			
(0.0266)	
ssh	 0.348			(0.4157)	
0.6559	°	
(0.3568)	
0.4313	°	
(0.2353)	
tfp	 0.0232	*	(0.0107)	
0.0234	*	
(0.0092)	
0.0084			
(0.0061)	
ntrans	 0.0003			(0.0009)	
0.0003			
(0.0007)	
0.0001			
(0.0005)	
age	 -0.0153	*	(0.0063)	
-0.0072			
(0.0054)	
0.0027			
(0.0036)	
nhs_d	
	
	
0.6453	***	
(0.0059)	
N.	obs.	 16640	 16640	 16640	
R2	 0.39	 0.39	 0.74	
Linear	 probability	 model	 with	 year	 and	 buyer-supplier	 pair	
dummies.	Estimates	based	on	pairs	with	US	based	buyers	only.			
Dependent	variable	in	col.	1	is	a	dummy	taking	value	1	if	the	pair	
introduces	a	new	product,	col.	2	and	3	use	a	dummy	taking	value	1	
if	 the	 pair	 introduces	 a	 new	 product	 that	 the	 supplier	 wasn’t	
exporting	in	the	year	before.																																																											34	The	results	excluding	the	US	are	also	very	consistent	with	our	main	model.		
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All	explanatory	variables	are	lagged,	except	TFP	and	age.	
pci	 is	 the	 lagged	 level	 of	 upper	 bound	 complexity;	 nhs_d	 is	 a	
dummy	taking	value	one	if	the	pair	has	introduced	a	new	product,	
i.e.	the	outcome	variable	in	column	1.	
Signif.	Codes:	0	***;	0.001	**;	0.01	*;	0.05	°	
Standard	errors	in	parentheses	
Source:	Author’s	own	calculation.	
When	 we	 turn	 to	 the	 likelihood	 of	 pairs	 increasing	 their	 sophistication	 through	
increases	 of	 the	 complexity	 measures,	 we	 find	 that	 the	 buyer’s	 dependence	 is	 no	
longer	significant.	In	contrast	it	seems	that	the	market	shares	of	both	the	buyers	and	
suppliers	show	negative	and	significant	associations,	as	shown	in	Table	4.11.	
In	particular,	we	see	that	the	buyer’s	market	share	is	again	negatively	associated	to	the	
likelihood	 of	 increasing	 the	 upper	 bound	 complexity.	 This	 suggests	 that	 suppliers	
trading	with	buyers	with	large	market	shares	from	the	US	are	likely	to	have	low	export	
sophistication	 (as	 seen	 in	 Table	4.9),	 and	are	also	 less	 likely	 to	drop	unsophisticated	
products	and	thus	increase	their	lower	bound	complexity	measure.		
The	supplier’s	market	share	is	also	strongly	significant	with	large	coefficients.	We	find	
that	suppliers	with	large	market	shares	are	less	likely	to	drop	unsophisticated	products	
and	thus	to	 increase	their	 lower	bound,	median	and	average	complexity.	This	can	be	
because	 suppliers	 exporting	 to	 the	US	with	 large	market	 shares	 are	 often	 trading	 in	
unsophisticated	products	and	have	little	chance	to	upgrade	in	other	US	markets,	due	
to	supply	constraints.	Therefore,	their	large	market	share	makes	them	unlikely	to	drop	
the	unsophisticated	products	they	are	already	exporting;	however,	this	does	not	help	
them	in	including	more	sophisticated	products	that	would	increase	their	upper	bound	
complexity.		
Interestingly,	 when	 we	 exclude	 US	 buyers	 from	 our	 sample35,	 we	 find	 that	 the	
supplier’s	 market	 share	 has	 a	 positive	 relationship	 with	 the	 likelihood	 of	 dropping	
unsophisticated	products.		
This	 suggests	 that	 large	 suppliers	 from	 Colombia	 do	 not	 manage	 to	 upgrade	 with	
buyers	from	the	US	and	therefore	remain	“trapped”	in	what	they	do,	using	their	large																																																									35	The	results	of	this	specification	are	presented	in	Table	A18	in	section	4.3	of	the	Appendix.	
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market	 share	 to	 retain	 their	 current	export	portfolio.	 In	 contrast,	when	exporting	 to	
buyers	in	Ecuador	or	Venezuela,	they	manage	to	concentrate	the	bulk	of	their	export	
towards	more	sophisticated	products,	dropping	the	least	complex	ones.		
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Table	4.11:	Linear	probit	on	the	power	components	and	the	likelihood	of	increases	in	
the	sophistication	of	the	pair,	US	subsample	
	
Increase	in	the	
upper	bound	
sophistication	
Increase	in	the	
lower	bound	
sophistication	
Increase	in	the	
median	
sophistication	
Increase	in	the	
average	
sophistication	
nhs4	 -0.0073	***	(0.0016)	
0.0069	***	
(0.0014)	
0.0142	***	
(0.0016)	
0.0108	***	
(0.0022)	
lagged_leve
l	
-0.2032	***	
(0.005)	
-0.2538	***	
(0.0052)	
-0.3572	***	
(0.0088)	
-0.3314	***	
(0.0144)	
sdp	 -0.0143			(0.0187)	
-0.0244			
(0.0161)	
-0.0433	*	
(0.0199)	
-0.027			
(0.0282)	
msh	 0.0221			(0.0278)	
-0.0401	°	
(0.024)	
-0.0375			
(0.0296)	
-0.0485			
(0.0419)	
mdp	 0.0364			(0.0382)	
-0.0316			
(0.0329)	
-0.0379			
(0.0407)	
0.0431			
(0.0577)	
ssh	 0.1618			(0.338)	
-0.648	*	
(0.2907)	
-1.2648	***	
(0.3597)	
-0.8463	°	
(0.5094)	
tfp	 0.0092			(0.0087)	
0.0113			
(0.0075)	
0.0209	*	
(0.0093)	
0.0296	*	
(0.0131)	
ntrans	 0.0007			(0.0007)	
0.0002			
(0.0006)	
-0.0006			
(0.0007)	
-0.0005			
(0.001)	
age	 -0.0026			(0.0051)	
0.0023			
(0.0044)	
0.0001			
(0.0054)	
0.0108			
(0.0077)	
N.	obs.	 16633	 16633	 16650	 16650	
R2	 0.24	 0.32	 0.34	 0.21	
Linear	 probability	model	 with	 year	 and	 buyer-supplier	 pair	 dummies.	 Estimates	 based	 on	 pairs	
with	US	based	buyers	only.			
Dependent	variables	in	columns	1-4	are	dummy	variables	taking	value	one	if	the	pair	experiences	
an	 increase	 in	 upper-,	 lower	 bound,	 median	 and	 average	 complexity	 from	 the	 previous	 year,	
respectively.			
All	explanatory	variables	are	lagged,	except	TFP	and	age.	
Lagged_level	 is	 the	 lagged	 level	of	 the	sophistication	measure	on	which	the	outcome	variable	 is	
based:	 col.	 1:	 lagged	 level	 of	 upper	 bound	 complexity;	 col.	 2:	 lagged	 level	 of	 lower	 bound	
complexity;	col.	3:	lagged	level	of	median	complexity;	col.	4:	lagged	level	of	average	complexity.	
Signif.	Codes:	0	***;	0.001	**;	0.01	*;	0.05	°	
Standard	errors	in	parentheses.	
Source:	Author’s	own	calculation.	
Overall,	we	have	seen	that	power	in	buyer-supplier	pairs	is	an	important	element	with	
respect	to	both	suppliers’	sophistication	and	upgrading	perspectives.		
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Different	kinds	of	power	are	also	associated	in	different	ways	to	upgrading,	depending	
on	 whether	 they	 are	 based	 on	 the	 dyadic	 mutual	 dependence	 of	 the	 two	 trading	
parties	or	the	market	share	that	each	buyer	and	supplier	has.		
We	 have	 also	 shown	 that	 these	 associations	 are	 likely	 to	 change	 depending	 on	 the	
destination	 countries.	When	 looking	 at	 the	 US,	 which	 is	 a	 high-income	 country	 and	
well	integrated	in	the	global	market,	we	find	that	Colombian	exporters	tend	to	trade	in	
less	sophisticated	products,	and	that	the	association	with	the	buyer’s	market	share	is	
different	from	when	we	control	for	destination	countries’	fixed	effects.		
	
4.6	Conclusions	
Based	 on	 the	 wealth	 of	 evidence	 presented,	 we	 now	 attempt	 to	 draw	 some	
conclusions	 on	 how	 power	 in	 buyer-supplier	 relationships	 is	 related	 to	 the	
sophistication	of	products	that	the	supplier	exports,	as	well	as	to	the	likelihood	of	new	
products	being	introduced	and	upgrading	taking	place.		
Our	 overarching	 contribution	 consists	 of	 testing	 insights	 from	 the	 GVC	 literature	 on	
power	and	sophistication	in	a	quantitative	setting,	providing	a	measurable	definition	of	
power	 and	 evidence	 from	 a	 large	 sample	 of	 firms	 from	 a	 developing	 country,	 i.e.	
Colombia.	In	doing	this	we	also	enrich	the	scholarship	on	trade	among	heterogeneous	
firms,	which	has	 largely	overlooked	the	 importance	of	power	and	upgrading	 in	 trade	
patterns.	
In	an	attempt	to	measure	the	relevance	of	power	in	buyer-supplier	relationships	more	
consistently,	 we	 conceptualise	 power	 as	 the	 result	 of	 both	 relational	 and	 dyadic	
aspects	 linked	 to	 the	 relationship	 between	 buyer	 and	 supplier,	 and	market	 aspects	
that	have	to	do	with	the	position	of	each	trading	partner	 in	the	market	 in	which	the	
relationships	are	 taking	place.	We	operationalise	 these	 two	 sources	of	power	 in	 this	
context	as	a	 combination	of	market	 shares	and	dependence,	on	both	 the	buyer	and	
supplier	side	for	each	pair.		
144		
Our	interest	lies	in	the	level	of	sophistication	of	the	products	that	each	supplier	trades	
with	 each	 buyer,	 as	 being	 affected	 by	 power	 structure.	 Export	 sophistication	 has	
attracted	 significant	 attention	 in	 the	 recent	 literature	 because	 it	 is	 often	 positively	
related	 to	 countries’	 economic	 development	 (Hidalgo	 et	 al.	 2007;	 Zhu	 and	 Fu	 2013;	
Klenow	and	Hummels	2005;	Broda	and	Weinstein	2006).	We	measure	 sophistication	
following	Hidalgo	and	Hausmann	(2009),	and	use	the	measure	of	complexity	computed	
in	the	Atlas	of	Complexity	for	Colombia.		
Sophistication	describes	 the	 features	of	 a	 product,	 so	we	analyse	 the	distribution	of	
such	 measure	 for	 each	 supplier’s	 export	 portfolio.	 In	 particular	 we	 consider	 the	
complexity	 of	 the	most,	 least,	median	 and	 average	product	 traded	within	 each	pair.	
Additionally,	we	also	investigate	how	our	power	variables	are	related	to	the	probability	
of	a	pair	introducing	new	products	and	of	seeing	their	sophistication	increase.		
Interestingly,	we	find	that	neither	buyer’s	nor	supplier’s	power	has	a	straightforward	
relationship	 to	 the	 level	 of	 sophistication,	 the	 introduction	 of	 new	 products	 and	
upgrading,	 and	 that	 their	 two	 components	 (relational	 and	 market)	 show	 at	 times	
opposing	 associations.	 This	 suggests	 that	 powerful	 buyers	 (or	 suppliers)	 may	 be	
associated	 with	 different	 patterns	 of	 capabilities	 and	 upgrading,	 depending	 on	 the	
source	of	their	power.		
Concerning	the	buyer’s	power,	we	find	that	supplier’s	dependence	vis-à-vis	the	buyer	
is	 consistently	 negatively	 associated	 with	 all	 four	 measures	 of	 complexity,	 which	
suggests	that	pairs	with	heavily	dependent	suppliers	tend	to	trade	in	unsophisticated	
products.	 Moreover,	 we	 also	 find	 a	 positive	 association	 with	 the	 likelihood	 of	
introducing	 new	 products,	 but	 a	 negative	 one	 with	 seeing	 the	 pair’s	 sophistication	
increase.		
These	 results	 suggest	 that	 pairs	 in	 which	 the	 buyer’s	 power	 is	 due	 to	 a	 highly	
dependent	supplier	are	likely	to	be	stuck	in	low-sophistication	activities,	where	despite	
introducing	new	products,	 these	are	not	more	sophisticated	 than	 those	 they	already	
export.	This	is	consistent	with	the	insights	from	the	GVC	literature	(Kaplinsky	2004).	
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When	we	look	at	the	other	component	of	the	buyer’s	power,	i.e.	its	market	share,	we	
find	in	contrast	that	pairs	with	buyers	accounting	for	a	large	share	in	the	market	tend	
to	 trade	 in	 relatively	 sophisticated	 products,	 but	 are	 not	 likely	 to	 introduce	 new	
products.	 This	 suggests	 that	 such	 pairs	 are	 less	 prone	 to	 introduce	 new	products	 or	
increase	their	sophistication.	However,	this	is	probably	because	pairs	with	buyers	with	
large	market	 shares	 are	 already	 at	 the	 frontier	 of	 sophistication	 and	 therefore	 have	
less	room	for	improvement.		
Consistent	with	this,	when	we	look	at	the	likelihood	of	introducing	a	new	product,	we	
find	that	pairs	already	trading	in	sophisticated	products	are	less	likely	to	introduce	new	
products,	although	when	they	do	they	are	more	likely	to	introduce	products	that	are	
new	to	the	supplier.		
The	 power	 of	 the	 supplier	 also	 shows	 heterogeneous	 correlations	 between	 its	 two	
components	and	our	complexity	measures.	We	find	that	pairs	with	a	strong	supplier,	
either	 because	 of	 large	 market	 shares	 or	 a	 dependent	 buyer,	 tend	 to	 trade	 in	 low	
sophistication	products.	However,	pairs	in	which	the	source	of	the	supplier’s	power	is	
its	market	share	are	more	likely	to	introduce	products	that	are	new	to	the	supplier,	but	
we	 do	 not	 detect	 any	 relationship	 with	 the	 likelihood	 of	 increasing	 any	 of	 the	
complexity	measures.		
In	 contrast,	 we	 find	 that	 pairs	 in	 which	 the	 power	 of	 the	 supplier	 comes	 from	 the	
dependence	of	 the	 buyer	 are	more	 likely	 to	 increase	 their	 upper	 bound	 complexity,	
although	 without	 changes	 in	 the	 other	 measures	 of	 complexity.	 This	 suggests	 that	
these	pairs	are	unlikely	to	drop	unsophisticated	products.		
These	results	apply	to	the	entirety	of	our	sample,	when	controlling	for	time-invariant	
features	of	the	destination	countries.	We	have,	however,	explored	whether	there	are	
differences	across	destination	countries,	focusing	in	particular	on	countries	that	have	a	
significantly	 higher	 level	 of	 economic	 complexity	 and	 are	 likely	 to	 be	 at	 a	 larger	
technological	distance	from	Colombia,	i.e.	the	US.	
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We	have	 found	 that	US-Colombia	 trade	 is,	 on	average,	 less	 sophisticated	 than	 trade	
between	Colombia	and	the	other	two	main	destinations,	 i.e.	Ecuador	and	Venezuela,	
with	lower,	though	closer,	levels	of	economic	complexity.		
Moreover,	in	US-Colombia	pairs	the	buyer’s	market	share	is	negatively	associated	with	
both	the	level	of	export	sophistication	and	the	likelihood	of	improving	the	pair’s	lower	
bound	complexity,	while	the	opposite	is	true	for	our	main	results	and	when	looking	at	
pairs	with	buyers	from	Ecuador	and	Venezuela.	
This	 suggests	 that,	 on	 the	 one	 hand,	 buyers	 in	 the	 US	 purchase	 unsophisticated	
products	from	Colombia,	and	this	is	particularly	the	case	for	buyers	with	large	market	
shares.	 Such	 buyers	 are	 also	 less	 likely	 to	 increase	 the	 sophistication	 of	 their	
purchases.	A	tentative	explanation	for	this	is	that	buyers	in	the	US	are	more	integrated	
in	 the	 global	 market	 and	 will	 purchase	 sophisticated	 products	 from	 suppliers	 from	
other	countries	at	 the	frontier	 in	such	markets.	This	conjecture	would	also	be	 in	 line	
with	the	GVC	literature	that	shows	that	suppliers’	capabilities	(crudely	proxied	here	by	
countries’	economic	complexity)	are	 taken	 into	account	by	 lead	 firms	 in	GVCs,	when	
establishing	governance	along	the	GVC	(Gereffi	et	al.	2005).	
In	 contrast,	 buyers	 in	 sophisticated	 economies	 like	 the	 US	 will	 buy	 unsophisticated	
products	 such	 as	 coffee	 and	 cut	 flowers	 from	 Colombian	 exporters	 (Hausmann	 and	
Rodrik	2003).		
Consistent	with	this,	we	find	that	suppliers	with	large	market	shares	are	more	likely	to	
export	unsophisticated	products	to	US	buyers,	and	their	market	share	is	not	associated	
with	the	likelihood	of	introducing	a	new	more	sophisticated	product	(arguably	because	
of	 a	 lack	 of	 demand),	 while	 it	 makes	 them	 less	 likely	 to	 drop	 the	 unsophisticated	
products	they	are	already	exporting	and	improve	their	lower	bound	complexity.		
So,	we	find	general	support	for	the	main	conjecture	of	the	GVC	literature,	that	power	
is	an	important	element	in	shaping	firms’	prospects	of	upgrading	through	participation	
to	GVCs.	It	seems	particularly	important	for	suppliers	not	to	depend	too	much	on	their	
buyers	 to	 avoid	 being	 stuck	 in	 low-sophistication	 products	 with	 little	 prospect	 of	
upgrading.		
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Our	results	are	a	first	attempt	at	exploring	these	 issues	with	a	quantitative	approach	
and	 through	 statistical	 analysis;	 more	 complete	 data	 would	 help	 to	 account	 for	
ownership	linkages	across	firms	as	well	as	to	identify	firms’	foreign	buyers	with	more	
certainty.	Future	 research	efforts	 should	also	be	devoted	 to	disentangling	 the	causal	
relationship	between	power	and	export	sophistication.		
A	 limitation	 of	 the	 data	 used	 in	 this	 study	 is	 the	 impossibility	 of	 identifying	 the	
proportion	of	 value	added	 that	each	 firm	contributes	 to	 its	own	product;	 this	would	
allow	us	to	distinguish	between	firms	that	carry	out	the	whole	production	process	in-
house	 and	 those	 who	 are	 mere	 assemblers	 depending	 on	 foreign	 imports.	
Unfortunately	our	data	only	allows	to	observe	transactions	between	firms,	but	we	do	
not	know	whether	these	concern	final	or	intermediate	demand.		
This	being	said,	this	Chapter	does	not	only	confirm	some	of	the	general	findings	from	
the	GVC	literature	with	novel,	quantitative	and	generalisable	evidence;	we	also	offer	a	
more	 nuanced	 view	 of	 both	 buyer’s	 and	 supplier’s	 power,	 distinguishing	 between	
market	and	relational	sources	and	showing	that	these	are	associated	in	different	ways	
with	suppliers’	export	sophistication	and	capabilities.		
We	 also	 explore	 these	 associations	 across	 destination	 countries,	 finding	 relevant	
differences,	 especially	 between	 high-income	 countries	 at	 the	 technological	 frontier	
and	other	neighbouring	emerging	economies.	
In	 doing	 this	 we	 also	 expand	 the	 growing	 literature	 using	 transaction	 level	 data	 to	
explore	the	buyer-supplier	relationship.	Starting	from	the	insights	of	the	GVC	literature	
on	power	and	upgrading,	we	integrate	these	concepts	with	the	evidence	on	the	buyer-
supplier	matching	process	and	heterogeneity	 in	 trade.	As	part	of	 this	effort,	we	also	
put	 forward	 a	 novel	 empirical	 approach	 to	 compute	 power	 and	 sophistication	 with	
transaction	 level	 trade	 data	 from	 customs,	 which	 are	 a	 recent	 and	 increasingly	
available	 source	 of	 data	 for	 researchers	 interested	 in	 exploring	 the	 micro	 level	
mechanisms	shaping	trade	patterns	and	growth.	
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5.	Conclusions	
The	 overall	 goal	 of	 this	 thesis	 was	 to	 explore	 the	 relationship	 between	 GVCs	
participation	 and	 structural	 change	 at	 the	 macro,	 meso-	 and	 micro	 level.	 We	 have	
delved	 in	 particular	 into	 the	 issues	 of	 (i)	 countries’	 specialisation	 and	 their	
performance	 in	GVCs,	 (ii)	 the	opportunities	the	domestic	structure,	and	 intermediate	
domestic	 demand	 from	 natural	 resource	 industries	 in	 particular,	 offers	 to	 diversify	
through	GVC	participation	 in	KIBS	and,	 finally,	 (iii)	 the	association	between	power	 in	
trade	relationships	and	export	sophistication.		
We	 now	 review	 our	main	 findings	 and	 draw	 some	 conclusions	 with	 a	 focus	 on	 the	
policy	 implications,	which	are	particularly	 relevant	 following	 the	 recent	 re-ignition	of	
the	debate	around	 industrial	policy,	 its	pertinence	and	 scope	 (Hausmann	and	Rodrik	
2003;	Lin	2009;	Lin	and	Chang	2009;	Stiglitz	et	al.	2013).	
5.1	Domestic	productive	structure	and	global	value	chains	
This	thesis	has	shown	that	the	emergence	of	GVCs	requires	re-thinking	the	importance	
of	 countries’	 economic	 structure	 and	 the	 transformation	 process	 it	 undergoes	 as	
countries	develop.	Economies’	specialisation	trajectories	have	become	the	outcome	of	
cross-country	 interdependencies,	 in	 which	 all	 countries	 are	 co-producers	 in	 GVCs,	
rather	 than	 the	 result	 of	 independent	 domestic	 production	 processes.	 As	 a	
consequence	of	this,	the	relationship	between	export	specialisation	and	the	underlying	
domestic	 productive	 structure	 has	 changed,	 as	 gross	 exports	 are	 increasingly	 the	
outcome	of	both	foreign	import	and	domestic	production.		
Based	on	 this	novel	 theoretical	understanding	of	 the	relationship	between	economic	
structure,	 its	 transformation	 process	 and	 GVCs,	 we	 have	 explored	 the	 relationship	
between	trade	specialisation	and	performance	with	a	value-added	approach.		
In	 doing	 this,	we	 not	 only	 looked	 at	 the	 direction	 of	 countries’	 specialisation,	 i.e.	 in	
which	 sectors	 countries	 specialise,	 but	 also	 the	 speed	 at	which	 such	 transformation	
takes	place.	This	is	crucial	because	it	allows	observing	the	dynamic,	rather	than	static,	
effects	of	trade	specialisation	trajectories.		
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Our	results	show	the	importance	of	a	value-added	approach,	rather	than	simply	gross	
exports,	in	observing	both	countries’	specialisation	and	their	domestic	contribution	to	
exports.	The	emergence	of	GVCs	has	widened	the	gap	between	what	a	country	exports	
and	 what	 it	 actually	 produces;	 policies	 trying	 to	 infer	 countries’	 domestic	 structure	
based	on	gross	export	risk	being	based	on	misleading	premises.		
Despite	the	optimism	that	GVCs	have	sparked	in	terms	of	providing	easier	and	faster	
access	 to	 the	global	market,	we	 find	 that	 specialisation	 trajectories	countries	 take	 in	
participating	 in	 GVCs	 do	 have	 an	 impact	 on	 their	 economic	 performance;	 this	 is	
relevant	for	policy	makers	implementing	export	oriented	policies.		
Concerning	 the	 direction	 of	 countries’	 trade	 patterns,	 while	 in	 the	 past	 countries	
specialising	 in	 low-tech,	 labour	 intensive,	manufacturing	 have	 been	 able	 to	 upgrade	
towards	 high-tech	 and	more	 capital	 intensive	manufacturing	 (Lin	 and	Monga	 2010),	
our	results	suggest	that	specialising	in	low-tech	activities	now	exerts	a	negative	effect	
on	countries’	growth	in	domestic	value	added	(DVA)	exported.		
In	 addition,	 high-tech	 manufacturing	 also	 seems	 a	 difficult	 specialisation	 trajectory	
from	a	development	standpoint:	while	we	find	a	positive	effect	during	the	crisis	period,	
we	find	no	evidence	over	the	whole	time	span	of	our	sample.		
This	 evidence	 suggests	 that	 policies	 aimed	 at	 fostering	 specialisation	 in	 low-tech	
manufacturing	 in	order	 to	 then	move	onto	high-tech	manufacturing	may	not	 lead	 to	
the	same	positive	outcome	of	the	past.	
Concerning	 services,	 despite	 the	 recent	 optimism	 about	 the	 new	 specialisation	
possibilities	 stemming	 from	 the	 increasing	 offshoring	 of	 these	 activities	 (Gereffi	 and	
Fernandez-Stark	 2010;	Hernandez	 et	 al.	 2014),	we	 find	 little	 evidence	 in	 support	 for	
policies	favouring	a	GVC	specialisation	in	services.		
Acceleration	in	the	specialisation	in	KIBS	seems,	in	fact,	to	have	a	positive	effect	on	the	
growth	of	DVA,	although	only	during	the	crisis	period,	i.e.	between	2008	and	2014.	We	
find	 no	 evidence	 that	 such	 a	 specialisation	 trajectory	 may	 have	 long-term	 positive	
effects	on	countries’	exports	in	DVA.		
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To	 some	 extent,	 this	 supports	 Rodrik's	 (2015b)	 concerns	 regarding	 developing	
countries’	 tendency	 to	specialise	 in	KIBS	at	 increasingly	early	stages	of	development,	
and	 casts	 some	 doubt	 on	 policies	 favouring	 developing	 countries’	 participation	 in	
service	GVCs.		
5.2	Inter-sectoral	linkages:	a	platform	for	export?		
Another	crucial	conclusion	from	this	thesis	is	that	countries’	domestic	structure	is	not	
only	 relevant	 in	 shaping	 their	 export	 performance,	 but	 also	 in	 promoting	 the	
emergence	of	new	sectors.		
Revisiting	 Hirschman's	 (1958)	 contribution	 on	 inter-sectoral	 linkages,	 this	 thesis	 has	
explored	 in	 particular	 whether	 natural	 resource	 industries	 (NRI)	 can	 provide	 large	
enough	domestic	intermediate	demand	to	foster	the	emergence	of	other	sectors.	This	
is	particularly	 interesting	because	natural	 resources	have	often	been	associated	with	
stagnant	 economic	 growth,	 and	 are	 considered	 as	 enclave	 sectors	with	 few	 linkages	
with	the	rest	of	the	economy.	
Policies	based	on	natural	resources	have	traditionally	focused	on	forward	linkages	that	
should	help	countries	to	move	towards	downstream	manufacturing	industries,	yielding	
mixed	(Morris	et	al.	2012),	although	often	unsatisfactory,	results	(Hausmann,	B	Klinger,	
et	al.	2008;	Auty	1986).		
In	 this	 thesis	 we	 have	 focused	 on	 a	 specular	 avenue,	 looking	 at	 backward	 linkages	
stemming	from	NRI	to	KIBS,	as	well	as	high-tech	manufacturing.	Chapter	2	shows	that	
both	 have	 proved	 to	 be	 hard	 specialisation	 avenues	 for	 developing	 countries	 (see	
Figure	2.3).		
Taking	 again	 a	 value	 added	 approach,	 we	 find	 the	 strength	 of	 domestic	 backward	
linkages	to	have	a	positive	effect	on	the	export	of	DVA	in	KIBS;	 interestingly,	we	find	
these	effects	to	be	even	stronger	for	countries	with	a	revealed	comparative	advantage	
in	 NRI.	 We	 find	 similar	 results	 for	 high-tech	 manufacturing,	 although	 the	 effect	
vanishes	once	we	account	for	the	productivity	in	NRI.	
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The	 thesis	 revisits	 the	debate	 around	 the	existence	of	 a	natural	 resource	 curse	 and,	
more	 specifically,	 contributes	 to	 the	 growing	 body	 of	 evidence	 emphasising	 the	
importance	 of	 services	 backward-linked	 to	 NRI	 in	 countries	 with	 natural	 resource-
based	 economies	 (Marin	 et	 al.	 2009;	 Marin	 and	 Smith	 2010;	 Marin	 and	 Benavente	
2011;	Urzua	2012).	
Within	this	stream	of	work,	we	propose	a	novel	path	for	countries	to	take	advantage	of	
their	 NRI	 to	 spur	 exports	 in	 other	 sectors.	 Instead	 of	 looking	 at	 forward	 linked	
manufacturing	 activities,	 we	 show	 that	 countries	 with	 large	 NRI	 can	 use	 backward	
linkages	 to	KIBS	 to	 foster	 this	 sector’s	exports.	We	complement	 the	qualitative	work	
testing	this	hypothesis	(Kaplan	2012;	Bloch	and	Owusu	2012)	by	offering	quantitative	
evidence	with	input-output	data.		
In	terms	of	policy	implications,	it	is	crucial	to	be	clear	that	this	evidence	should	not	be	
interpreted	as	new	support	for	specialisation	in	NRI.	Rather,	it	suggests	that	countries	
that	already	have	a	specialisation	in	such	industries	should	foster	domestic	backward	
linkages	to	increase	their	possibilities	of	diversifying	their	exports	towards	KIBS.		
5.3	Global	value	chains:	power	and	export	sophistication	at	the	micro-level	
In	 order	 to	 study	 GVCs	 at	 the	 micro	 level,	 we	 use	 transaction	 level	 data	 from	 the	
Colombian	 Customs	 and	 match	 these	 with	 complexity	 measures	 from	 the	 Atlas	 of	
Complexity	 for	 Colombia.	 This	 measure	 of	 complexity	 has	 been	 used	 to	 compute	
export	 sophistication	 and	 upgrading	 (Zhu	 and	 Fu	 2013;	 Poncet	 and	 Starosta	 de	
Waldemar	2013;	Jarreau	and	Poncet	2012).		
The	transaction	data	provide	information	on	what	each	Colombian	exporter	is	trading,	
in	 what	 amount,	 and	 with	 which	 buyer.	 We	 use	 this	 information	 to	 operationalise	
power	 focusing	 on	 two	 different	 aspects,	 which	 we	 refer	 to	 relational	 and	 market	
power	respectively.		
First,	 the	 dyadic	 and	 relational	 features	 of	 each	 buyer-supplier	 pair	 computing	 how	
much	the	buyer	depends	on	its	supplier	and	vice	versa.		
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Second,	we	also	acknowledge	that	power	may	be	related	to	the	position	each	of	the	
two	 firms	 in	a	 trade	 relationship	occupies	 in	 the	market.	 Therefore	we	compute	 the	
market	share	for	each	buyer	and	supplier.		
Our	main	finding	is	that	power	in	trade	relationships	is	correlated	to	the	sophistication	
of	 the	products	 traded	with	 each	buyer-supplier	 pair.	 Beyond	 this	 static	 association,	
we	also	find	that	our	power	measures	are	correlated	to	the	likelihood	of	both	trading	
in	new	products	and	increasing	their	sophistication.		
Interestingly,	we	find	that	depending	on	the	kind	of	power	we	consider	–	relational	or	
market	 –	 its	 association	 to	 export	 sophistication	 and	upgrading	will	 vary.	We	 find	 in	
fact	 that	when	 the	buyer’s	power	stems	 from	a	high	dependence	on	 the	part	of	 the	
supplier	 on	 the	buyer,	 it	 is	 likely	 that	 the	 supplier	will	 be	 trading	 in	 unsophisticated	
products,	with	 a	 higher	 probability	 of	 introducing	 new	products	 in	 the	pair,	 but	 low	
probability	that	these	new	products	will	 improve	the	supplier’s	export	sophistication.	
The	combination	of	these	three	findings	suggests	that	highly	dependent	suppliers	risk	
being	stuck	in	low-sophistication	activities.		
In	 contrast,	 suppliers	 trading	with	a	buyer	 that	draws	 its	power	 from	a	 large	market	
share	 tend	 to	 export	 more	 sophisticated	 products.	 However,	 they	 have	 a	 smaller	
chance	of	introducing	new	products,	arguably	because	the	buyer	is	already	trading	in	
many	 sophisticated	 products,	 and	 is	 unlikely	 to	 be	 convinced	 to	 introduce	 new	
products.	Interestingly,	the	positive	correlation	between	the	buyer’s	market	share	and	
the	 level	 of	 export	 sophistication	 is	 reversed	 when	 we	 only	 look	 at	 trading	
relationships	 with	 the	 US;	 this	 suggests	 that	 the	 association	 between	 power	 and	
sophistication	 is	 likely	 to	 change	 depending	 on	 the	 size,	 sophistication	 and	 level	 of	
integration	of	the	destination	country.	
Concerning	 the	 power	 of	 the	 supplier,	 while	 we	 find	 that	 both	 kinds	 of	 power	 are	
negatively	 associated	 to	 the	 sophistication	 level	 of	 exports,	 we	 find	 different	
associations	when	 looking	at	 the	possibility	of	 introducing	new	products	 and	 that	of	
increasing	 export	 sophistication.	 In	 fact,	 while	 we	 see	 that	 suppliers	 with	 a	 large	
market	power	are	more	likely	to	introduce	new	products,	it	is	the	buyer’s	dependence	
that	is	positively	associated	with	increases	of	export	sophistication.		
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Our	findings	are	very	relevant	to	firms	first	of	all,	who	should	choose	carefully	through	
which	segments	of	the	GVC	they	want	to	gain	access	to	global	markets.		
They	also	suggest	that	export	oriented	policies	should	also	take	into	account	the	risk	of	
domestic	firms	being	stuck	in	a	dependence	vis-à-vis	their	buyers,	with	few	possibilities	
for	upgrading.		
5.4	Conclusions	and	new	research	avenues		
The	overall	conclusion	of	this	thesis	is	that	joining	GVCs	is	not	a	guaranteed	avenue	for	
export	upgrading	and	development.	This	 is	 true	at	 the	macro	 level,	as	we	have	seen	
that	 domestic	 specialisation	 and	 inter-sectoral	 linkages	 shape	 countries’	 export	
performance	in	GVCs,	as	well	as	the	emergence	of	new	sectors;	at	the	micro	level,	we	
have	offered	evidence	that	power	 in	buyer-supplier	relationships	 is	 related	to	export	
sophistication.		
Chapter	 2	of	 this	 thesis	 shows	 that	GVCs	have	 significantly	 changed	 the	 relationship	
between	domestic	productive	structure	and	trade	specialisation,	requiring	a	different	
understanding	and	empirical	approach.	Regardless,	we	still	find	trade	specialisation	to	
be	a	relevant	determinant	of	countries’	trade	performance.		
In	 addition	 to	 Rodrik’s	 (2015a)	 concerns	 for	 developing	 countries’	 premature	
deindustrialisation	 in	 favour	 of	 services,	 we	 also	 find	 support	 for	 the	 idea	 that	
manufacturing	as	an	engine	of	growth	may	be	running	at	less	than	full	power	(Rodrik	
2016a).	 In	 fact,	 we	 find	 low-tech	 manufacturing	 to	 have	 a	 detrimental	 effect	 on	
countries’	 trade	performance,	and	only	modest	 support	 in	 favour	of	 increases	 in	 the	
specialisation	in	high-tech	manufacturing.		
So,	 the	 emergence	 of	 GVCs	 has	 made	 it	 very	 important	 to	 understand	 how	 value	
added	is	distributed	across	countries	and	sectors	in	each	GVC.		
Fragmentation	 of	 production	 is	 in	 fact	 heterogeneous	 across	 sectors	 and	 countries,	
and	so	 is	 the	distribution	of	value	added	across	value	chain	segments.	Exploring	 this	
further	will	provide	useful	insights	for	both	firms	and	policy	makers	as	to	which	GVCs	
to	target	in	order	to	promote	countries’	gainful	integration	in	the	global	economy.		
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Relatedly,	 the	 international	 fragmentation	 of	 production	 in	 segments	 also	 raises	 the	
question	of	whether	new	patterns	of	specialisation	may	open	up	to	countries	 (based	
on	specific	tasks	 in	GVCs),	rather	than	industries	as	a	whole;	this	 in	turn	is	related	to	
the	degree	of	fragmentation	of	each	value	chain	and	how	value	is	distributed	across	its	
tasks.	 Our	 data	 do	 not	 allow	 the	 investigation	 of	 this	 specific	 issue,	 because	 input-
output	 tables	 allow	 tracking	 value	 added	 across	 industries	 at	 an	 aggregate	 level,	
without	providing	information	at	the	task	level.		
How	value	added	 is	distributed	across	sectors	and	tasks	 in	GVCs	 is	also	 important	 to	
understand	how	countries	GVC	participation	 is	 impacting	technological	dynamics	and	
skill	requirements	 in	the	 labour	market	at	the	domestic	 level.	While	the	data	used	in	
this	 thesis	 did	 not	 allow	 us	 to	 address	 this	 question,	 other	 sources	 of	 data	 have	
become	available	that	could	shed	light	on	the	technological	intensity	of	countries’	GVC	
participation	and,	in	particular,	whether	importing	value	added	from	high-	or	low-tech	
sectors	will	impact	countries’	performance,	as	well	as	domestic	employment	and	skills	
requirements.		
A	further	limitation	of	the	ICIO	data	is	the	short	time	span	covered;	going	back	to	the	
mid-1990s,	 this	 considerably	 limits	 researchers’	 ability	 to	 explore	 longer-term	
phenomena,	especially	related	to	structural	change.		
Finally,	 not	 only	 do	 ICIO	 data	 not	 provide	 information	 on	 tasks	 and	 employment,	
especially	in	developing	countries,	they	also	do	not	allow	the	carrying	out	of	research	
at	the	micro	level.	Chapter	4	of	this	thesis	reverts	therefore	to	custom	data	to	observe	
a	full	picture	of	Colombian	export	transactions	with	foreign	buyers.		
To	the	best	of	our	knowledge,	while	some	scholars	have	relied	on	surveys	(Pietrobelli	
and	Saliola	2008;	Giovannetti	and	Marvasi	2016;	Del	Prete	et	al.	2017),	this	is	the	first	
attempt	to	use	data	from	administrative	sources	such	as	customs	to	compute	power	
relationships	between	buyers	and	suppliers,	and	to	study	their	relationship	with	export	
sophistication.		
There	are,	however,	some	limitations	to	the	information	available	in	our	data:	in	fact,	
we	do	not	observe	firms’	ownership,	which	means	that	we	cannot	distinguish	between	
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domestically	 owned	 firms	 and	 foreign	 companies’	 subsidiaries.	While	 both	 the	 GVC	
literature	 (Gereffi	 et	 al.	 2005)	 and	 the	 literature	on	business	 and	management	have	
long	 ago	 established	 that	 the	 ownership	 relationship	 between	 headquarters	 and	
subsidiaries	 is	 an	 important	 determinant	 of	 how	 knowledge	 and	 technology	 are	
localised	 and	 transferred	 (Blomström	 and	 Kokko	 1998;	 Gao	 et	 al.	 2007;	 Figueiredo	
2010),	 little	 quantitative	 evidence	 has	 been	 put	 forward	 to	 study	 this	 in	 a	 GVC	
framework.	 Further	 research,	 with	 a	 quantitative	 approach,	 is	 thus	 needed	 to	
investigate	how	power	and	export	sophistication	are	related	to	foreign	ownership.		
A	second	limitation	of	our	data	has	to	do	with	the	fact	that,	in	this	thesis,	we	can	only	
rely	 on	 suppliers’	 gross	 exports,	 which	 we	 have	 seen	 may	 not	 necessarily	 be	 very	
representative	of	firms’	actual	contribution	in	value	added	terms.		
While	 an	 obvious	 possibility	 would	 be	 to	 include	 import	 data	 in	 the	 analysis,	 the	
challenge	 would	 remain	 of	 how	 to	 link	 imports	 with	 exports	 across	 products	 and	
markets.	While	some	work	has	been	done	on	this	(Boehm	et	al.	2016;	Goldberg	et	al.	
2010),	the	understanding	of	input-output	linkages	at	the	firm	level	is	a	crucial	research	
avenue	to	which	more	work	should	be	devoted	in	the	future.		
Relatedly,	 more	 efforts	 are	 needed	 to	 trace	 value	 added	 within	 firms’	 production	
processes	 to	 be	 able	 to	 examine	 whether	 GVC	 participation	 differs	 from	 trade	 tout	
court.	It	would	be	particularly	interesting	to	study	whether	firms	that	import	to	export,	
for	 example	 in	 special	 economic	 zones,	 behave	 in	 a	 different	 way	 from	 domestic	
producers	that	also	engage	in	international	markets.	It	would	be	particularly	important	
to	assess	whether	firms’	linkages	with	the	domestic	economy	will	also	be	playing	a	role	
in	their	ability	to	benefit	from	GVC	participation,	as	hinted	by	Poncet	and	Starosta	de	
Waldemar	(2013).		
In	 conclusion,	 future	 research	 at	 the	 micro	 level	 would	 benefit	 greatly	 from	
constructing	 buyer-supplier	 transaction	 level	 datasets	 with	 information	 on	 both	
suppliers	and	buyers,	including	ownership	ties,	to	fully	account	for	firm	heterogeneity	
in	trade	along	GVCs.		
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Appendix	
	
Appendix	to	Chapter	2	
	
Appendix	2.1	–	Data	and	variables	
We	 present	 here	 some	more	 detailed	 information	 on	 the	 data	 we	 use,	 in	 particular	 which	
sectors	are	included	in	our	four	macro-sectors	and	how	we	compute	our	measures.		
In	Table	A1	below	we	present	which	sectors	have	been	aggregated	into	the	four	sector	groups.	
NR,	LTMF	and	HTMF	have	been	compiled	following	OECD	sector	classification.	
Table	A.1:	Macro	sector	groups	and	ISIC	codes	
Sector	
groups	
Included	sectors	 ISIC	codes	
KIBS	 Computer	and	related	activities;		
R&D	and	other	business	services.	
C72,	
C73T74.	
NR	 Agriculture,	hunting,	forestry	and	fishing;		
Mining	and	quarrying.	
C01T05,	
C10T14.	
LTMF	 Food	products,	beverages	and	tobacco;		
Textiles,	textile	products,	leather	and	footwear;	
Wood,	products	of	wood,	and	cork;		
Pulp,	paper,	and	paper	products;		
Coke,	refined	petrol	products,	and	nuclear	fuel;		
Rubber	and	plastic	products;		
Other	non-metallic	mineral	products;		
Basic	metals;		
Fabricated	metal	products;	
Manufacturing	nec	and	recycling.	
C15T16,	
C17T19,	
C20,	
C21T22,	
C23,	
C25,	
C26,	
C27,	
C28,	
C36T37.	
HTMF	 Chemicals	and	chemical	products;	
Machinery	and	equipment;	
Computer,	electric,	and	optical	equipment;	
Electrical	machinery	and	apparatus;	
Motor	vehicles,	trailers,	and	semi-trailers;	
Other	transport	equipment.	
C24,	
C29,	
C30T33X,	
C31	
C34	
C35	
Source:	Author’s	taxonomy,	based	on	OECD	technological	intensity	definitions.		
Table	A2	below	gives	the	list	of	countries	included	in	the	high-income	group	in	our	analysis.	As	
many	of	our	countries	become	high-income	over	time,	we	report	in	the	second	column	of	the	
table	the	number	of	years	they	are	among	the	high-income	countries.		 	
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Table	A.2:	High-income	countries	
Country	 Number	of	years	
ARG	 1	
AUS	 17	
AUT	 17	
BEL	 17	
BRA	 1	
BRN	 17	
CAN	 17	
CHE	 17	
CHL	 2	
CYP	 17	
CZE	 7	
DEU	 17	
DNK	 17	
ESP	 17	
EST	 6	
FIN	 17	
FRA	 17	
GBR	 17	
GRC	 16	
HKG	 17	
HRV	 5	
HUN	 5	
IRL	 17	
ISL	 17	
ISR	 17	
ITA	 17	
JPN	 17	
KOR	 12	
LTU	 3	
LUX	 17	
LVA	 3	
MLT	 9	
NLD	 17	
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NOR	 17	
NZL	 17	
POL	 3	
PRT	 11	
RUS	 1	
SAU	 7	
SGP	 17	
SVK	 6	
SVN	 9	
SWE	 17	
USA	 17	
Note:	The	second	column	of	the	table	reports	the	number	of	years	each	country	has	a	GDP	per	capita	above	US$	
12,236	and	is	therefore	considered	as	high-income	for	the	purpose	of	our	empirical	analysis.		
Source:	Author’s	own	calculation	using	ICIO	tables.	
The	three	figures	below	compare	RCAs	computed	with	gross	exports	and	DVA	for	NR,	LTM	and	
HTM	respectively.	We	observe	that	 for	all	 these	three	sectors,	 in	addition	to	KIBS	 (cfr	Figure	
2.1),	DVA	RCAs	compared	to	their	gross	export	homologue	do	not	simply	“deflate”	the	RCA.	In	
contrast,	we	observe	that	some	countries	have	higher	RCAs	when	we	compute	these	with	DVA	
compared	 to	 gross	 exports.	 This	 offers	 further	 support	 to	 the	 view	 that	 measuring	 trade	
specialisation	 in	 DVA	 changes	 the	 distribution	 of	 RCAs,	 and	 that	 choosing	 a	 value	 added	
approach	will	change	the	analysis’s	results.			 	
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Figure	 A.1:	 Country	 Average	 RCA	 in	 NR	 across	 years	 in	 gross	 exports	 and	 domestic	 value	
added	
Note:	Figure	A.1	compares	countries’	average	RCA	in	NR	across	years	in	our	sample,	using	gross	exports	and	
domestic	value	added	in	exports.	
Source:	Author’s	own	calculation	using	ICIO	tables.	
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Figure	A.2:	 Country	Average	RCA	 in	 LTM	across	 years	 in	 gross	 exports	 and	domestic	 value	
added	
Note:	 Figure	A.2	 compares	 countries’	 average	RCA	 in	 LTM	across	 years	 in	 our	 sample,	 using	 gross	 exports	 and	domestic	 value	
added	in	exports.	
Source:	Author’s	own	calculation	using	ICIO	tables.	
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Figure	A.3:	Country	Average	RCA	 in	HTM	across	years	 in	gross	exports	and	domestic	value	
added	
Note:	 Figure	A.3	 compares	 countries’	 average	RCA	 in	HTM	across	 years	 in	our	 sample,	using	gross	exports	 and	domestic	 value	
added	in	exports.	
Source:	Author’s	own	calculation	using	ICIO	tables.	
	
Figure	 2.2	 shows	 specialisation	 trends	 across	 high-income	 and	 developing	 countries,	
for	 completeness’s	 sake	 we	 reproduce	 here	 the	 same	 figure	 without	 distinguishing	
countries	 based	 on	 income	 per	 capita.	 Figure	 A.4	 shows	 the	 average	 RCA	 across	
countries	over	years	in	our	four	sector	groups.	There	is	a	clear	trend	of	moving	away	
from	 natural	 resources	 and	 low-tech	 manufacturing,	 while	 the	 trend	 seems	 to	 be	
positive,	 although	 less	 strong	 for	 high-tech	 manufacturing.	 Specialisation	 in	 KIBS	
initially	decreases,	but	then	picks	back	up	again	from	2005	onwards.			 	
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Figure	A.4:	Average	RCA	Across	countries	and	over	years	
Note:	Figure	A.4	shows	trend	in	the	average	RCA,	computed	with	domestic	value	added	in	exports,	across	countries	
in	our	sample,	for	four	sector	groups:	knowledge	business	services	(KIBS),	natural	resources	(NR),	low-tech	
manufacturing	(LTM),	and	high-tech	manufacturing	(HTM).		
Source:	Author’s	own	calculation	using	ICIO	tables.	
It	is	also	worth	stressing	that	the	RCA	of	countries	in	a	given	sector	need	not	to	sum	to	a	given	
value	 (as	 it	 would	 be	 the	 case)	 for	 market	 shares	 for	 example;	 therefore	 cross-country	
averages	of	RCAs	provide	a	meaningful	idea	of	how	countries’	specialisation	evolves	over	time,	
on	average.			 	
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Appendix	2.2	–	Computation	of	domestic	value	added	in	exports	
We	now	turn	to	how	we	compute	our	variables	based	on	value	added.	The	usual	 formula	to	
look	at	value	added	in	production	is	the	following:		𝑉′𝐵𝐹 
Where	V’	is	a	diagonalised	vector	of	value	added	shares,	B	is	the	usual	Leontief	inverse	
that	 reallocates	 value	added	based	on	 the	 sector	of	production,	 and	F	 is	 a	 vector	of	
final	demand.		
If	we	take	an	example	with	three	countries,	a,	b,	and	c,	this	can	be	depicted	as	follows:		
𝑣! 0 0 0 𝑣! 0 0 0 𝑣!  ∗  𝑏!! 𝑏!" 𝑏!"  𝑏!" 𝑏!! 𝑏!"  𝑏!" 𝑏!" 𝑏!!   ∗  𝑓!! 𝑓!" 𝑓!"  𝑓!" 𝑓!! 𝑓!"  𝑓!" 𝑓!" 𝑓 !  	
The	letters	in	subscript	refer	to	countries:	when	there	are	two	of	them	it	means	that	
value	added	is	flowing	from	the	former	to	the	latter;	so	bab	is	the	intermediate	demand	
going	from	a	to	b’s	production,	while	fab	is	the	final	demand	in	b	triggering	production	
in	a.	The	matrix	multiplication	above	yields:		
𝑣!𝑏!! 𝑣!𝑏!" 𝑣!𝑏!"  𝑣!𝑏!" 𝑣!𝑏!! 𝑣!𝑏!"  𝑣!𝑏!" 𝑣!𝑏!" 𝑣!𝑏!!   ∗  𝑓!! 𝑓!" 𝑓!"  𝑓!" 𝑓!! 𝑓!"  𝑓!" 𝑓!" 𝑓!!  	
Which	in	turn	is	equal	to:		
𝑣𝑎𝑏𝑎𝑎𝑓𝑎𝑎 + 𝑣𝑎𝑏𝑎𝑏𝑓𝑏𝑎 + 𝑣𝑎𝑏𝑎𝑐𝑓𝑐𝑎 𝑣𝑎𝑏𝑎𝑎𝑓𝑎𝑏 + 𝑣𝑎𝑏𝑎𝑏𝑓𝑏𝑏 + 𝑣𝑎𝑏𝑎𝑐𝑓𝑐𝑏 𝑣𝑎𝑏 𝑎𝑓𝑎𝑐 + 𝑣𝑎𝑏𝑎𝑏𝑓𝑏𝑐+ 𝑣𝑎𝑏𝑎𝑐𝑓𝑐𝑐 𝑣𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑎𝑓𝑎𝑎 + 𝑣𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑓𝑏𝑎 + 𝑣𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑐𝑓𝑐𝑎 𝑣𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑎𝑓𝑎𝑏 + 𝑣𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑓𝑏𝑏+ 𝑣𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑐𝑓𝑐𝑏 𝑣𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑎𝑓𝑎𝑐 + 𝑣𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑓𝑏𝑐 + 𝑣𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑐𝑓𝑐𝑐 𝑣𝑐𝑏𝑐𝑎𝑓𝑎𝑎 + 𝑣𝑐𝑏𝑐𝑏𝑓𝑏𝑎+ 𝑣𝑐𝑏𝑐𝑐𝑓𝑐𝑎 𝑣𝑐𝑏𝑐𝑎𝑓𝑎𝑏 + 𝑣𝑐𝑏𝑐𝑏𝑓𝑏𝑏 + 𝑣𝑐𝑏𝑐𝑐𝑓𝑐𝑏 𝑣𝑐𝑏𝑐𝑎𝑓𝑎𝑐 + 𝑣𝑐𝑏𝑐𝑏𝑓𝑏𝑐 + 𝑣𝑐𝑏𝑐𝑐𝑓𝑐𝑐 	
In	the	matrix	above,	each	column	represents	the	final	demand	of	each	country	across	
origins.	On	 the	 other	 hand,	 rows	 indicate	 the	 origin	 of	 value	 added	 across	 uses,	 i.e.	
different	final	demand	and	the	intermediate	demand	it	goes	through.		
For	example,	the	first	element	in	the	top-left:	𝑣!𝑏!!𝑓!! + 𝑣!𝑏!"𝑓!" + 𝑣!𝑏!"𝑓!"	is	final	
demand	consumed	by	a	and	originated	entirely	by	country	a	divided	as	follows:	
1. 𝑣!𝑏!!𝑓!!	Value	added	produced	and	consumed	within	a,	i.e.	never	exported.		
2. 𝑣!𝑏!"𝑓!"	 Value	 added	 produced	 by	 a,	 for	 the	 production	 of	 country	 b	 that	
satisfies	final	demand	in	a,	i.e.	value	added	exported	and	re-imported	in	a.		
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3. 𝑣!𝑏!"𝑓!"	It	is	the	same	as	2	but	with	country	c.	
From	 the	matrix	 above,	 the	 components	 that	 are	 included	 in	 our	 DVA	measure	 are	
those	in	bold	in	the	matrix	below:		
𝑣𝑎𝑏𝑎𝑎𝑓𝑎𝑎 + 𝑣𝑎𝑏𝑎𝑏𝑓𝑏𝑎 + 𝑣𝑎𝑏𝑎𝑐𝑓𝑐𝑎 𝑣𝑎𝑏𝑎𝑎𝑓𝑎𝑏 + 𝑣𝑎𝑏𝑎𝑏𝑓𝑏𝑏 + 𝑣𝑎𝑏𝑎𝑐𝑓𝑐𝑏 𝑣𝑎𝑏𝑎𝑎𝑓𝑎𝑐 + 𝑣𝑎𝑏𝑎𝑏𝑓𝑏𝑐 + 𝑣𝑎𝑏𝑎𝑐𝑓𝑐𝑐 𝑣𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑎𝑓𝑎𝑎+ 𝑣𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑓𝑏𝑎 + 𝑣𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑐𝑓𝑐𝑎 𝑣𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑎𝑓𝑎𝑏 + 𝑣𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑓𝑏  + 𝑣𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑐𝑓𝑐𝑏 𝑣𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑎𝑓𝑎𝑐 + 𝑣𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑓𝑏𝑐+ 𝑣𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑐𝑓𝑐𝑐 𝑣𝑐𝑏𝑐𝑎𝑓𝑎𝑎 + 𝑣𝑐𝑏𝑐𝑏𝑓𝑏𝑎 + 𝑣𝑐𝑏𝑐𝑐𝑓𝑐𝑎 𝑣𝑐𝑏𝑐𝑎𝑓𝑎𝑏 + 𝑣𝑐𝑏𝑐𝑏𝑓𝑏𝑏 + 𝑣𝑐𝑏𝑐𝑐𝑓𝑐𝑏 𝑣𝑐𝑏𝑐𝑎𝑓𝑎𝑐+ 𝑣𝑐𝑏𝑐𝑏𝑓𝑏𝑐 + 𝑣𝑐𝑏𝑐𝑐𝑓𝑐𝑐 	
This	is	achieved	by	computing	a	vector	of	export	for	each	country	i	that	includes	only	
final	demand	from	other	countries,	and	is	multiplied	by	the	V’B	matrix,	selecting	then	
only	the	relevant	rows	belonging	to	country	i.	
	
	
Appendix	to	Chapter	3	
In	 this	Appendix	we	present	 some	more	detailed	 information	on	 the	data	we	use	 in	
Chapter	 4,	 as	 well	 as	 the	 most	 relevant	 robustness	 checks	 we	 have	 performed	 to	
establish	the	reliability	of	our	results.		
Appendix	3.1	–	Variables	and	data	
In	 Table	 A3	 below	 we	 present	 what	 sectors	 have	 been	 aggregated	 into	 the	 sector	
groups:	KIBS,	natural	resources	(NR),	low-tech	and	high-tech	manufacturing	(LTMF	and	
HTMF	respectively).	
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Table	A.3:	Sector	groups	and	ISIC	codes	
Sectors	groups	 Sector	names	 Sector	codes	
KIBS	 Computer	and	
related	activities;		
R&D	and	other	
business	services.	
C72,	
C73T74.	
NR	 Agriculture,	hunting,	
forestry	and	fishing;		
Mining	and	
quarrying.	
C01T05,	
C10T14.	
HTMF	 Chemicals	and	
chemical	products;	
Machinery	and	
equipment;	
Computer,	electric	
and	optical	
equipment;	
Electrical	machinery	
and	apparatus;	
Motor	vehicles,	
trailers	and	semi-
trailers;	
Other	transport	
equipment.	
C24,	
C29,	
C30T33X,	
C31	
C34	
C35	
Source:	Authors’	own	classification	based	on	the	OECD	Technology	intensity	definition	
Note:	the	ICIO	data	are	an	aggregated	version	of	the	2-digits	ISIC	Rev.3,	so	we	have	identified	high-tech	
manufacturing	based	on	the	high	and	medium-high	technology	intensity	as	defined	by	the	OECD	
https://www.oecd.org/sti/ind/48350231.pdf		
We	 also	 present	 a	 table	 recapitulating	 the	 variables	 used	 in	 the	 paper	 and	 the	
respective	abbreviations,	as	well	as	a	correlation	table	for	our	main	model.	
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Table	A.	4:	List	of	variables	and	acronyms		
Variable	name	 Explanation	 Source	
dva_kbs_cap	
Domestic	value	added	(DVA)	exported	by	
KIBS,	excluding	the	portion	of	DVA	exported	
through	exports	of	NR	or	AGR	or	MIN	
Authors’	own	
calculations	with	
the	OECD	ICIO	
tables	
dd_kbs_agr_cap	 Domestic	intermediate	demand	from	the	AGR	sector	for	KIBS	
Authors’	own	
calculations	with	
the	OECD	ICIO	
tables	
dd_kbs_min_cap	 Domestic	intermediate	demand	from	the	MIN	sector	for	KIBS	
Authors’	own	
calculations	with	
the	OECD	ICIO	
tables	
vai_agr	 Productivity	measure	for	the	AGR	sector	
Authors’	own	
calculations	with	
the	OECD	ICIO	
tables	
vaic_min	 Productivity	measure	for	the	MIN	sector	
Authors’	own	
calculations	with	
the	OECD	ICIO	
tables	
dva_htm_cap	
DVA	exported	by	high-tech	manufacturing	
(HTM)	excluding	the	portion	of	DVA	
exported	through	export	of	NR	or	AGR	or	
MIN.	
Authors’	own	
calculations	with	
the	OECD	ICIO	
tables	
dd_htm_agr_cap	 Domestic	intermediate	demand	from	the	AGR	sector	for	HTM	
Authors’	own	
calculations	with	
the	OECD	ICIO	
tables	
dd_htm_min_ca
p	
Domestic	intermediate	demand	from	the	
MIN	sector	for	HTM	
Authors’	own	
calculations	with	
the	OECD	ICIO	
tables	
agr_rca	 Dummy	taking	value	1	if	the	country	has	an	RCA	in	AGR	
Authors’	own	
calculations	with	
the	OECD	ICIO	
tables	
min_rca	 Dummy	taking	value	1	if	the	country	has	an	RCA	in	MIN	
Authors’	own	
calculations	with	
the	OECD	ICIO	
tables	
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schooling	 Gross	enrolment	in	secondary	education	
World	Bank	
World	
Development	
Indicators	
internetaccess	 Internet	users	per	thousand	inhabitants	
World	Bank	
World	
Development	
Indicators	
Source:	authors	own	classification	
Below	we	report	a	correlation	matrix	of	all	the	variables	included	in	our	econometric	
analysis.	
Table	A.	5:	Correlation	matrix	of	main	variables	
	
dva_kbs
_cap	
dd_kbs	
_agr	
dd_kbs	
_min	
school
ing	
internetac
cess	
dva_kbs	
_cap	
1	 	 	 	 	
dd_kbs	
_agr	
0.7412*	 1	 	 	 	
dd_kbs	
_min	
0.6035*	 0.7363*	 1	 	 	
schooling	 0.6159*	 0.5574*	 0.4882*	 1	 	
internetac
cess	 06293*	 0.4270*	 0.3737*	
0.476
5*	 1	
*	=	p-value	<0.05	
All	dva	and	dd	variables	are	in	natural	logs.	
	
Source:	authors’	own	calculation	with	the	ICIO	tables.			 	
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Appendix	3.2	–	Detailed	tables	of	countries	with	RCAs	
We	include	below	three	tables,	detailing	which	countries	had	an	RCA	in	NRI,	AGR	and	
MIN	in	our	sample,	to	give	a	more	complete	picture	of	what	observations	in	our	data	
have	the	RCA	dummy	variables	taking	value	1.		
Table	A.6:	Countries	with	RCA	in	AGR	
Country	
Number	of	
Years	with	
RCA	
	 	
ARG	 17	
AUS	 17	
BGR	 17	
BRA	 17	
CAN	 10	
CHL	 17	
CHN	 17	
COL	 17	
CRI	 17	
CYP	 1	
CZE	 1	
DNK	 7	
ESP	 16	
EST	 14	
FIN	 8	
FRA	 1	
GRC	 17	
HRV	 15	
HUN	 17	
IDN	 17	
IND	 17	
IRL	 4	
ISL	 17	
KHM	 17	
LTU	 15	
LVA	 17	
MAR	 17	
ME1	 3	
MYS	 17	
NLD	 15	
NZL	 17	
PER	 17	
PHL	 17	
POL	 5	
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PRT	 12	
ROU	 16	
ROW	 17	
SVK	 5	
THA	 17	
TUN	 17	
TUR	 17	
VNM	 17	
ZAF	 7	
Source:	authors’	own	calculation	with	the	ICIO	tables.	
Note:	the	second	column	of	the	table	reports	the	number	of	years	in	which	each	country	has	an	RCA	in	
AGR.	
Table	A.	7:	Countries	with	RCA	in	MIN	
Country	
Number	of	
Years	with	
RCA	
	 	
ARG	 9	
AUS	 17	
BRA	 2	
BRN	 17	
CAN	 17	
CHL	 11	
CHN	 1	
COL	 17	
IDN	 17	
MAR	 6	
ME1	 17	
MYS	 17	
NOR	 17	
PER	 17	
POL	 2	
ROW	 17	
RUS	 17	
SAU	 17	
TUN	 13	
VNM	 17	
ZAF	 17	
Source:	authors’	own	calculation	with	the	ICIO	tables.	
Note:	the	second	column	of	this	table	reports	the	number	of	years	in	which	each	country	has	an	RCA	in	
MIN.		
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Appendix	3.3	–	Robustness	checks	
Our	 main	 specification	 relies	 on	 per	 capita	 measures.	 This	 is	 to	 take	 into	 account	
different	size	of	countries	to	make	flows	of	value	added	across	countries	comparable.	
The	 underlying	 assumption	 is	 that	 countries	 with	 larger	 populations	 will	 also	 have	
larger	 production	 of	 KIBS	 and	 high-tech	manufacturing;	 they	 will	 also	 have	 a	 larger	
intermediate	demand	emanating	 from	the	NR	sector.	However,	 this	assumption	may	
not	 necessarily	 be	 true	 for	 the	NR	 sector	 in	 particular,	whose	 size	 can	 be	 driven	 by	
endowment	of	natural	resources	that	need	not	be	tightly	related	to	the	population	of	a	
country.	 The	 input-output	 tables	 allow	 for	 another	way	 of	 accounting	 for	 countries’	
size	 when	 looking	 at	 intermediate	 domestic	 demand.	 That	 is,	 using	 the	 coefficients	
from	 the	 Leontieff	 inverse	matrix	 for	 the	 two	NR	 sectors,	 AGR	 and	MIN.	 These	will	
capture	the	sector’s	intensity	in	KIBS	and	high-tech	manufacturing.		
We	now	present	 our	main	models	 using	 these	 coefficients	 instead	of	 the	 per	 capita	
measures	to	check	for	the	robustness	of	our	results.	Because	the	 intensity	of	the	NR	
sector	is	unlikely	to	be	related	to	the	country’s	size,	we	use	as	outcome	variables	the	
DVA	in	exports	in	absolute	terms.		
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Table	A.8:	The	effect	of	NRI	intermediate	demand	on	the	DVA	of	KIBS	in	exports,	
using	Leontieff	Inverse	coefficients	–	System	GMM	estimation	
VARIABLES	 AGR	 MIN	
		 		 		
dva_kbst-1	 0.838***	 0.989***	
	 (0.0753)	 (0.0583)	
dd_kbs_agr	 0.155**	 	
	 (0.0787)	 	
dd_kbs_agr*agr_rca	 0.185**	 	
	 (0.0831)	 	
schooling	 0.00314	 -0.000914	
	 (0.00219)	 (0.00259)	
internetaccess	 -0.00280*	 -0.00338	
	 (0.00147)	 (0.00232)	
dd_kbs_min	 	 0.0700	
	 	 (0.0607)	
dd_kbs_min*min_rca	 	 0.0996**	
	 	 (0.0468)	
Constant	 2.185***	 0.478	
	 (0.816)	 (0.424)	
	 	 	
Observations	 1,756	 1,756	
Number	of	geo-sectors	 122	 122	
AR(2)	 0.180	 0.346	
Hansen	test	
overidentification	 0.954	 0.470	
Difference-in-Hansen	 0.792	 0.607	
System	GMM	estimation	for	the	effect	of	Inverse	Leontieff	coefficient	of	uses	of	AGR	(col.	1)	and	
MIN	(col.	2)	of	KIBS	on	the	DVA	in	export	of	KIBS.	The	analysis	is	carried	out	at	the	geo-sector	level,	
i.e.	for	each	country-sector	combination,	where	the	sectors	are	two	KIBS	sectors:		Computer	and	
related	activities	(ITS);	R&D	and	other	business	services	(BZS).	The	variables	agr_rca	and	min_rca	
are	binary	variables	taking	value	1	if	the	country	has	an	RCA	(in	value	added	terms,	rather	than	
gross	export)	in	AGR	or	MIN,	respectively.	Schooling	is	gross	enrolment	in	secondary	education	and	
internet	access	is	internet	users	per	thousand	inhabitants.		
Standard	errors	in	parentheses	
***	p<0.01,	**	p<0.05,	*	p<0.1	
dva	and	dd	variables	in	logs	
For	the	AR	and	Hansen	tests	the	p	values	are	reported.	
Source:	authors’	own	calculation	with	the	ICIO	tables.	
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We	 find	 very	 robust	 results,	with	 agriculture	 intermediate	demand	having	 a	positive	
and	significant	impact	on	the	export	of	KIBS	value	added;	such	effects	are	even	larger	
for	countries	with	an	RCA.		
In	contrast,	mining	does	not	show	the	same	positive	relationship	we	detected	in	Table	
3.1,	except	for	countries	with	an	RCA,	in	which	case	the	domestic	KIBS	intensity	of	the	
mining	sector	does	have	a	positive	effect	on	the	export	of	KIBS	value	added.		
Overall	 these	 additional	 results	 support	 our	 conjecture	 that	 intermediate	 domestic	
demand	emanating	from	the	NR	sectors	can	indeed	spur	the	export	of	KIBS,	and	that	
this	is	particularly	true	for	countries	with	a	specialisation	in	NRI.		
As	 for	 KIBS,	 we	 now	 look	 at	 our	 main	 model	 for	 high-tech	 manufacturing	 using	
Leontieff	Inverse	coefficients	in	Table	A9.	We	find,	globally	speaking,	consistent	results	
with	 our	 main	 model	 for	 high-tech	 manufacturing:	 intermediate	 demand,	 captured	
here	as	NRI	production’s	intensity	in	high-tech	manufacturing,	has	a	positive	effect	on	
the	export	of	high-tech	manufacturing	value	added.		
This	effect	is	even	stronger	for	countries	with	an	RCA	in	NRI,	both	for	agriculture	and	
mining	sectors.		
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Table	A.9:	The	effect	of	NRI	intermediate	demand	on	the	DVA	of	high-tech	
manufacturing	in	exports,	using	Leontieff	Inverse	coefficients	–	System	GMM	
estimation	
	VARIABLES	 AGR	 MIN	
		 		 		
dva_htmt-1	 0.867***	 0.697***	
	 (0.0702)	 (0.169)	
dd_htm_agr	 0.0609**	 	
	 (0.0275)	 	
dd_htm_agr*agr_rca	 0.0685**	 	
	 (0.0312)	 	
Schooling	 0.00204	 0.00851	
	 (0.00567)	 (0.00899)	
Internetaccess	 -0.000810	 0.000361	
	 (0.00349)	 (0.00395)	
dd_htm_min	 	 0.0782*	
	 	 (0.0463)	
dd_htm_min*min_rca	 	 0.0854*	
	 	 (0.0472)	
Constant	 1.170	 1.398	
	 (0.721)	 (1.229)	
	 	 	
Observations	 5,268	 5,268	
Number	of	geo-sectors	 366	 366	
AR(2)	 0.350	 0.634	
Hansen	test	
overidentification	 0.616	 0.499	
Difference-in-Hansen	 0.482	 	
System	GMM	estimation	for	the	effect	of	Inverse	Leontieff	coefficient	of	uses	of	AGR	(col.	1)	
and	MIN	(col.	2)	of	high-tech	manufacturing	on	the	DVA	in	export	of	high-tech	manufacturing.	
The	analysis	is	carried	out	at	the	geo-sector	level,	i.e.	for	each	country-sector	combination,	
where	the	sectors	are	six	high-tech	manufacturing	sectors,	the	full	list	can	be	found	in	the	
appendix	table	A1.		The	variables	agr_rca	and	min_rca	are	binary	variables	taking	value	1	if	the	
country	has	an	RCA	(in	value	added	terms,	rather	than	gross	export)	in	AGR	or	MIN,	
respectively.	Schooling	is	gross	enrolment	in	secondary	education	and	internet	access	is	
internet	users	per	thousand	inhabitants.		
Standard	errors	in	parentheses	
***	p<0.01,	**	p<0.05,	*	p<0.1	
dva	and	dd	variables	in	logs	
For	the	AR	and	Hansen	tests	the	p	values	are	reported,	column	two	does	not	report	the	
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Hansen-in-Difference	test	because	the	estimation	relies	on	the	first	to	fourth	lag	of	the	
endogenised	variables,	which	is	too	few	instruments	of	calculate	the	Hansen-in-Difference	
test.	A	set	of	other	lag	combinations	has	been	tried	but	this	one	was	the	one	passing	the	other	
two	tests,	i.e.	second	order	autocorrelation	(AR2)	and	the	Hansen	test	for	overidentification.		
Source:	authors’	own	calculation	with	the	ICIO	tables.	
	
Appendix	to	Chapter	4	
	
Appendix	4.1	–	Variables	and	descriptive	evidence	
	
Table	A.10:	correlation	table	of	the	main	variables	
	
	 pci	 mpci	 mdpci	 avpci	 sdp	 mdp	 ssh	 msh	 nhs4	
pci	
1	 0.842	**	
0.917	
**	
0.94	
**	
0.218	
**	
-
0.156	
**	
0.095	
**	
0.217	
**	
0.229	
**	
mpci	
0.842	
**	 1	
0.962	
**	
0.948	
**	
0.217	
**	
-
0.125	
**	
0.074	
**	
0.15	
**	
-
0.153	
**	
mdpci	
0.917	
**	
0.962	
**	 1	
0.993	
**	
0.224	
**	
-
0.145	
**	
0.074	
**	
0.178	
**	
0.009	
*	
avpci	
0.94	
**	
0.948	
**	
0.993	
**	 1	
0.224	
**	
-
0.151	
**	
0.077	
**	
0.186	
**	
0.027	
**	
sdp	
0.218	
**	
0.217	
**	
0.224	
**	
0.224	
**	 1	
-
0.052	
**	
-
0.097	
**	
0.328	
**	
-
0.003	
mdp	
-
0.156	
**	
-
0.125	
**	
-
0.145	
**	
-
0.151	
**	
-
0.052	
**	
1	 0.321	**	
-
0.135	
**	
-
0.061	
**	
ssh	
0.095	
**	
0.074	
**	
0.074	
**	
0.077	
**	
-
0.097	
**	
0.321	
**	 1	
0.158	
**	
0.023	
**	
msh	
0.217	
**	
0.15	
**	
0.178	
**	
0.186	
**	
0.328	
**	
-
0.135	
**	
0.158	
**	 1	
0.098	
**	
nhs4	
0.229	
**	
-
0.153	
**	
0.009	
*	
0.027	
**	
-
0.003	
-
0.061	
**	
0.023	
**	
0.098	
**	 1	
Signif.	Code:	0.01	*;	0.001	**	
Source:	Author’s	own	calculation.		
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While	the	variable	names	are	unchanged	from	the	tables	in	the	main	body	of	the	text,	
we	report	hereunder	the	abbreviations	for	the	four	measures	of	complexity:		
● pci:	upper	bound	complexity	
● mpci:	lower	bound	complexity	
● mdpci:	median	complexity	
● avpci:	average	complexity	
	
We	have	explored	 in	Chapter	 4	 the	 relationship	between	diversification	 (in	 terms	of	
number	 of	 traded	 products	 and	 trade	 partners)	 and	 the	 sophistication	 of	 export,	 in	
figure	4.3	and	4.4.		
Related	to	this,	we	wish	to	push	our	analysis	further	and	explicitly	 look	at	the	power	
relationships	 between	 buyers	 and	 suppliers	 and	 the	 association	 with	 sophistication,	
captured	by	our	complexity	measures.	In	Figures	4.5-4.8	we	show	how	each	of	the	four	
components	 of	 power	 is	 related	 to	 upper	 bound	 complexity	 (plotted	 against)	 and	
lower	bound	 complexity	 (coloured).	 Because	of	 the	high	number	of	 observations,	 to	
ensure	 the	 readability	 of	 the	 graph,	we	plot	 the	 graph	with	 a	 transparency	 element	
alpha.		
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Figure	A.5:	Suppliers’	dependence	and	complexity.	
Source:	Author’s	own	calculation	
Note:	The	figure	plots	for	each	buyer-supplier	pair	the	supplier’s	dependence	and	the	upper	bound	
complexity	of	the	pair,	coloured	with	the	pair’s	lower	bound	complexity.	Alpha	is	a	transparency	
parameter	that	makes	each	dot	transparent	and	ensures	that	overlapping	dots	are	readable.		
We	detect	a	positive	effect	between	 the	 supplier’s	dependence	and	both	upper	and	
lower	bound	sophistication	(Figure	4.5).	This	is	somewhat	at	odds	with	what	the	GVC	
literature	predicts,	according	to	which	suppliers	that	depend	on	buyers	would	be	likely	
to	find	themselves	stuck	in	low	value	added	and	low	sophistication	activities.	This	is,	of	
course,	a	simple	association	that	does	not	control	for	other	confounding	factors.	These	
factors	 include	 the	 supplier’s	 own	 characteristics	 or	 other	 measures	 of	 power,	
especially	 the	market	share	of	 the	buyer,	which	we	have	seen	 is	 the	other	source	of	
the	buyer’s	power.		
Figure	4.6	shows	that	the	buyer’s	market	share	has	indeed	a	similar	relationship	with	
both	upper	and	lower	bound	complexity.	We	find	a	positive	association	between	the	
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market	share	of	the	buyer	and	both	the	upper	and	lower	bound	complexity.	This	is	in	
line	with	the	literature	on	transaction	level	data	in	trade,	which	has	emphasised	that	
large	buyers	tend	to	account	for	a	large	share	of	trade,	purchasing	many	sophisticated	
products	 from	 a	 variety	 of	 suppliers	 (Sugita	 et	 al.	 2015;	 Benguria	 2014;	 Eaton	 et	 al.	
2007).	
	
Figure	A.6:	Buyers’	market	share	and	complexity	
Source:	Author’s	own	calculation	
Note:	The	figure	plots	for	each	buyer-supplier	pair	the	buyer’s	market	share	and	the	upper	bound	
complexity	of	the	pair,	coloured	with	the	pair’s	lower	bound	complexity.	Alpha	is	a	transparency	
parameter,	commonly	used	to	make	dense	scatterplots	easier	to	interpret.		 	
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We	now	turn	to	the	two	components	of	a	supplier’s	power:	the	buyer’s	dependence	
and	the	supplier’s	market	share.	In	Figure	4.7	we	find	a	negative	relationship	between	
the	 former	 and	 complexity	 measures	 (both	 upper	 and	 lower	 bound);	 this	 may	 be	
because	 suppliers	 that	 trade	with	 very	 dependent	 buyers	may	 lack	 the	 incentive	 to	
upgrade	and	introduce	new,	more	sophisticated	products.	
	
Figure	A.7:	Buyers’	dependence	and	complexity	
Source:	Author’s	own	calculation	
Note:	The	figure	plots	for	each	buyer-supplier	pair	the	buyer’s	dependence	and	the	upper	bound	
complexity	of	the	pair,	coloured	with	the	pair’s	lower	bound	complexity.	Alpha	is	a	transparency	
parameter,	commonly	used	to	make	dense	scatterplots	easier	to	interpret.	
In	 contrast,	 in	 Figure	 4.8	 we	 see	 a	 positive	 relationship	 between	 the	 second	
component	of	the	supplier’s	power	(its	market	share)	and	sophistication.	This	suggests	
that	 suppliers	 with	 significant	 market	 power	 also	 tend	 to	 trade	 in	 sophisticated	
products	 and,	 according	 to	 GVC	 literature,	 would	 be	 able	 to	 introduce	 new	 more	
sophisticated	products.		
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Figure	A.8:	Suppliers’	market	share	and	complexity	
Source:	Author’s	own	calculation	
Note:	The	figure	plots	for	each	buyer-supplier	pair	the	supplier’s	market	share	and	the	upper	bound	
complexity	of	the	pair,	coloured	with	the	pair’s	lower	bound	complexity.	Alpha	is	a	transparency	
parameter,	commonly	used	to	make	dense	scatterplots	easier	to	interpret.	
	
Appendix	4.2	–	Productivity	estimates	
We	 now	 provide	 some	 more	 detail	 on	 the	 how	 we	 estimate	 the	 productivity	 of	
suppliers.	One	of	 the	main	challenges	 in	estimating	productivity	at	 the	micro	 level	 is	
that	productivity	 is	unobserved	by	 the	 research	but	observed	by	 the	 firm,	and	 it	will	
affect	 the	 use	 that	 the	 firm	makes	 of	 its	 inputs,	 creating	 a	 “transmission	 bias”	 (del	
Gatto	et	al.	2011).	We	therefore	 take	a	proxy	variable	method,	 looking	at	 the	 traces	
that	productivity	leaves	in	a	variable	that	we	can	observe,	in	our	case	the	intermediate	
inputs	of	the	suppliers	(Levinsohn	and	Petrin	2003).	
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We	 follow	 Wooldridge	 (2009)	 and	 implement	 this	 in	 R	 with	 the	 prodest	 package,	
developed	 by	 Rovigatti.	 We	 estimate	 a	 Cobb-Douglas	 production	 function	 for	 each	
supplier	i	at	time	t:	
𝑦!" = 𝛼 + 𝑤!"𝛽 + 𝑘!"𝛾 + 𝜔!" + 𝜀!"  
Where	yit	 is	the	(log	of)	output,	wit	is	a	vector	of	free	variables,	kit	 is	a	vector	of	state	
variables	and	εit	is	the	error	term.	ωit	is	the	unobserved	technical	efficiency	parameter,	
evolving	according	to	a	first-order	Markov	process.	
The	method	relies	on	the	following	assumptions:	
- ωit	 =	 g(xit,pit)	 is	 an	unknown	 function	g()	 of	 the	 state	 and	 a	 variable	proxying	
productivity.	 In	particular	we	assume	that	our	proxy	variable	 (inputs)	 react	 to	
TFP	 and	 that,	 conditional	 on	 the	 state	 variable	 (total	 asset	 in	 this	 case),	 the	
proxy	variable	is	increasing	in	ωit		
- E(ωit	|	ωit-1	)=f[ωit-1	]	Productivity	is	an	unknown	function	f()	of	its	own	lag.		
We	 choose	 in	 particular	 to	 follow	 Levinsohn	 and	 Petrin	 (2003)	 and	 use	 inputs	 as	 a	
proxy	 variable	 because	 this	 is	 closer	 to	 economic	 theory.	 This	 is	 because	 inputs	 are	
typically	not	state	variables,	and	our	data	(as	balance	sheet	data	often	do)	report	zero	
investment	for	many	firms	(del	Gatto	et	al.	2011).	
Appendix	4.3	-	Robustness	checks	
We	now	present	the	following	robustness	checks:	
1. we	control	for	size	of	the	supplier,	measured	as	firm’s	turnover;		
2. we	also	control	for	the	supplier	sophistication	in	the	linear	probability	models;	
3. we	 also	 run	 another	 linear	 probability	 model	 to	 study	 the	 probability	 of	
improving	the	supplier’s	(rather	than	the	pair)	sophistication;		
4. we	present	our	main	results	excluding	the	pairs	with	US-based	buyers.		
Adding	 income	as	a	 control	 variable	 leaves	our	 results	essentially	unchanged.	This	 is	
probably	because	of	 two	reasons:	on	 the	one	hand	the	market	share	of	 the	supplier	
already	 accounts	 for	 a	 large	 part	 of	 the	 size	 effects	 and,	 on	 the	 other	 hand,	 size	
measured	 in	 total	 size	 may	 not	 necessarily	 be	 strongly	 correlated	 with	 export	
performance	to	the	extent	that	there	are	firms	with	 large	domestic	sales	that	export	
very	little.		
Table	A.11:	Table	4.6	controlling	for	size	
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	 Upper	bound	 Lower	bound	 Median	 Average	
nsh4	 0.0096	***	(0.0017)	
-0.0132	***	
(0.0016)	
-0.0006	
(0.0011)	
-0.0009			
(0.0009)	
sdp	 -0.0838	***	(0.0243)	
-0.0478*	
(0.0235)	
-0.0443	**	
(0.0161)	
-0.043	**	
(0.0133)	
msh	 0.1119	**		(0.0364)	
0.0948	**	
(0.0352)	
0.0707	**	
(0.0242)	
0.0429	*	
(0.02)	
mdp	 -0.0044		(0.0518)	
-0.0701				
(0.05)	
-0.0575			
(0.0343)	
-0.0531		
(0.0284)	
ssh	 -0.0121	(0.0857)	
-0.0909			
(0.0828)	
-0.2255	***	
(0.0568)	
-0.2192	***	
(0.047)	
tfp	 0.0724	***	(0.0161)	
0				
(0.0155)	
-0.0033				
(0.0107)	
-0.0148		
(0.0088)	
ntrans	 0.0038	**		(0.0012)	
-0.0025	*	
(0.0011)	
-0.0011				
(0.0008)	
-0.0009			
(0.0006)	
age	 -0.0009				(0.0062)	
0.0018			
(0.006)	
-0.0041				
(0.0041)	
-0.0004			
(0.0034)	
income	 0			(0)	 0			(0)	 0			(0)	 0			(0)	
N.	obs.	 42741	 42741	 42758	 42758	
R2	 0.94	 0.94	 0.97	 0.98	
OLS	 regression	 results	 with	 time	 and	 buyer-supplier	 pair	 dummies,	 with	 suppliers’	 size	 as	
additional	control,	measured	as	suppliers’	total	income	(i.e.	sales).		
Dependent	 variables	 are	 upper-,	 lower	 bound,	 median	 and	 average	 complexity	 of	 the	 pair,	
based	on	data	from	http://www.datlascolombia.com	
All	explanatory	variables	are	lagged,	except	TFP	and	age.	
Signif.	Codes:	0	***;	0.001	**;	0.01	*;	0.05	°	
Standard	errors	in	parentheses	
Source:	Author’s	own	calculation.		 	
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Table	A.	12:	Table	4.7	controlling	for	size	
	 New	to	the	
pair	
New	to	the	
supplier	
New	to	the	
supplier	
nhs4	 -0.0109	***	(0.0011)	
-0.0069	***	
(0.001)	
0.0004				
(0.0006)	
pci	 -0.0819	***	(0.0041)	
-0.0414	***	
(0.0036)	
0.0136	***	
(0.0024)	
sdp	 0.0149			(0.015)	
0.1082	***	
(0.0133)	
0.0982	***	
(0.0086)	
msh	 -0.0375	°	(0.0225)	
-0.048	*		
(0.0198)	
-0.0228	°		
(0.0129)	
mdp	 0.0219			(0.0319)	
-0.0197				
(0.0282)	
-0.0344	°		
(0.0183)	
ssh	 -0.03			(0.0528)	
0.0693				
(0.0467)	
0.0895	**	
(0.0303)	
tfp	 0.0403	***	(0.0099)	
0.0383	***	
(0.0088)	
0.0112	*		
(0.0057)	
ntrans	 -0.0001			(0.0007)	
-0.0002				
(0.0006)	
-0.0001				
(0.0004)	
age	 -0.0122	**	(0.0038)	
-0.0084	*	
(0.0034)	
-0.0002				
(0.0022)	
income	 0				(0)	
0				
(0)	
0				
(0)	
nhs4_d	 						
0.6718	***	
(0.0037)	
N.	obs.	 42739	 42739	 42739	
R2	 0.37	 0.37	 0.73	
Linear	probability	model	with	year	and	buyer-supplier	pair	dummies	
with	 suppliers’	 size	 as	 additional	 control,	 measured	 as	 suppliers’	
total	income	(i.e.	sales).		
Dependent	 variable	 in	 col.	 1	 is	 a	dummy	 taking	 value	1	 if	 the	pair	
introduces	a	new	product,	col.	2	and	3	use	a	dummy	taking	value	1	
if	 the	 pair	 introduces	 a	 new	 product	 that	 the	 supplier	 wasn’t	
exporting	in	the	year	before.			
All	explanatory	variables	are	lagged,	except	TFP	and	age.	
pci	is	the	lagged	level	of	upper	bound	complexity;	nhs_d	is	a	dummy	
taking	value	one	 if	 the	pair	has	 introduced	a	new	product,	 i.e.	 the	
outcome	variable	in	column	1.	
Signif.	Codes:	0	***;	0.001	**;	0.01	*;	0.05	°	
Standard	errors	in	parentheses	
Source:	Author’s	own	calculation.		 	
201		
Table	A.13:	Table	4.8	controlling	for	size	
	 Increase	in	the	
upper	bound	
sophistication	
Increase	in	the	
lower	bound	
sophistication	
Increase	in	the	
median	
sophistication	
Increase	in	the	
average	
sophistication	
nhs4	 -0.0055	***	
(0.0009)	
0.0072	***	
(0.0008)	
0.0103	***	
(0.001)	
0.0046	***	
(0.0012)	
lagged_level	 -0.2224	***	
(0.0032)	
-0.2425	***	
(0.0032)	
-0.3769	***	
(0.0056)	
-0.4016	***	
(0.0085)	
sdp	 -0.0194	°	
(0.0117)	
-0.0203	°	
(0.0113)	
-0.0557	***	
(0.0141)	
-0.0329	°	
(0.0177)	
msh	 -0.0103			
(0.0175)	
0.0213				
(0.0169)	
-0.0126			
(0.0211)	
0.023			
	(0.0265)	
mdp	 0.0569	*	
(0.0249)	
-0.1066	***	
(0.0239)	
-0.1281	***	
(0.03)	
0.002			
	(0.0379)	
ssh	 -0.0176			
(0.0412)	
-0.0119			
(0.0396)	
-0.0581			
(0.0496)	
-0.0296			
(0.0624)	
tfp	 0.0237	**	
(0.0077)	
-0.0075			
(0.0074)	
0.0054				
(0.0093)	
0.0047				
(0.0117)	
ntrans	 0.0006				
(0.0006)	
-0.0006			
(0.0005)	
-0.0005			
(0.0007)	
-0.0002			
(0.0009)	
age	 -0.0024				
(0.003)	
0.0049	°		
(0.0029)	
0.0036			
	(0.0036)	
0.0006				
(0.0045)	
income	 0				
(0)	
0			
(0)	
0				
(0)	
0				
(0)	
N.	obs.	 42724	 42724	 42758	 42758	
R2	 0.24	 0.28	 0.32	 0.2	
Linear	probability	model	with	year	and	buyer-supplier	pair	dummies	with	suppliers’	size	as	additional	
control,	measured	as	suppliers’	total	income	(i.e.	sales).		
Dependent	variables	in	columns	1-4	are	dummy	variables	taking	value	one	if	the	pair	experiences	an	
increase	 in	 upper-,	 lower	 bound,	 median	 and	 average	 complexity	 from	 the	 previous	 year,	
respectively.			
All	explanatory	variables	are	lagged,	except	TFP	and	age.	
Lagged_level	 is	 the	 lagged	 level	 of	 the	 sophistication	 measure	 on	 which	 the	 outcome	 variable	 is	
based:	col.	1:	lagged	level	of	upper	bound	complexity;	col.	2:	lagged	level	of	lower	bound	complexity;	
col.	3:	lagged	level	of	median	complexity;	col.	4:	lagged	level	of	average	complexity.	
Signif.	Codes:	0	***;	0.001	**;	0.01	*;	0.05	°	
Standard	errors	in	parentheses.	
Source:	Author’s	own	calculation.	
We	 now	 present	 the	 results	 for	 our	 linear	 probability	 models	 exploring	 the	
introduction	of	new	products	and	 the	 increase	of	 the	pair’s	 sophistication.	Our	main	
model	controls	for	past	levels	of	sophistication	of	the	pair;	in	these	tables	we	control	
instead	for	the	past	sophistication	levels	of	the	supplier.		
Table	 A4	 replicates	 Table	 4.7,	 looking	 at	 how	 the	 power	 indexes	 are	 related	 to	 the	
probability	 of	 introducing	 a	 new	 product	 into	 the	 pair	 and	 whether	 this	 product	 is	
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simply	new	to	the	pair	or	to	the	supplier	too.	We	find	overall	consistent	results,	except	
for	 the	 sign	 of	 the	 correlation	 between	 the	 supplier’s	 upper	 bound	 sophistication,	
exp_pci,	with	the	probability	of	 introducing	a	product	new	to	the	supplier.	While	the	
pair’s	 upper	 bound	 sophistication,	 pci,	 in	 Table	 4.7	 is	 positively	 associated	 to	 the	
probability	of	 trading	products	 that	are	new	to	the	supplier;	here	we	find	a	negative	
relationship.	
This	suggests	that	the	most	sophisticated	pairs	are	more	 likely	to	 introduce	products	
that	 have	 not	 been	 traded	 by	 the	 supplier	 in	 the	 previous	 year.	 However,	 this	
relationship	works	for	suppliers	that	have	not	yet	reached	high	levels	of	sophistication:	
thus,	 being	 in	 very	 sophisticated	 relationships	 is	 particularly	 beneficial	 for	 suppliers	
that	are	not	very	sophisticated	themselves.		
Interestingly,	we	also	find	that	there	is	a	positive	association	between	the	dependence	
of	 the	buyer	 and	 the	 likelihood	of	 introducing	a	new	product	 to	 the	pair.	 This	 again	
suggests	that	of	the	two	components	of	the	supplier’s	power,	buyer’s	dependence	 is	
the	crucial	element	for	upgrading.	
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Table	A.14:	Table	4.7	controlling	for	supplier’s	sophistication	
	 New	to	the	pair	 New	to	the	
supplier	
New	to	the	
supplier	
nsh4	 -0.0181	***	(0.0011)	
-0.0098	***	
(0.0009)	
0.0023	***	
(0.0006)	
exp_pci	 -0.0084	*	(0.0032)	
-0.0181	***	
(0.0029)	
-0.0126	***	
(0.0018)	
sdp	 0.0185			(0.0152)	
0.1025	***	
(0.0134)	
0.0901	***	
(0.0087)	
msh	 -0.0452	*	(0.0226)	
-0.0489	*	
(0.0199)	
-0.0187			
(0.0129)	
mdp	 0.0545		(0.0322)	
-0.0043				
(0.0282)	
-0.0408	*	
(0.0183)	
ssh	 -0.0399			(0.0532)	
0.0669				
(0.0467)	
0.0936	**	
(0.0303)	
tfp	 0.037	***	(0.0097)	
0.0354	***	
(0.0085)	
0.0106		
(0.0055)	
ntrans	 -0.0004			(0.0007)	
-0.0003				
(0.0006)	
0				
(0.0004)	
age	 -0.0125	**	(0.0038)	
-0.0084	*	
(0.0034)	
0			
	(0.0022)	
nhs_d	 			 			 0.669	***	(0.0036)	
N.	obs.	 42758	 42758	 42758	
R2	 0.36	 0.36	 0.73	
Linear	probability	model	with	year	and	buyer-supplier	pair	dummies.		
Dependent	 variable	 in	 col.	 1	 is	 a	 dummy	 taking	 value	 1	 if	 the	 pair	
introduces	a	new	product,	col.	2	and	3	use	a	dummy	taking	value	1	if	the	
pair	 introduces	a	new	product	 that	 the	supplier	wasn’t	exporting	 in	 the	
year	before.			
All	explanatory	variables	are	lagged,	except	TFP	and	age.	
exp_pci	 is	 the	 lagged	 level	 of	 upper	 bound	 complexity	 of	 the	 supplier,	
rather	 than	 the	pair;	nhs_d	 is	a	dummy	taking	value	one	 if	 the	pair	has	
introduced	a	new	product,	i.e.	the	outcome	variable	in	column	1.	
Signif.	Codes:	0	***;	0.001	**;	0.01	*;	0.05	°	
Standard	errors	in	parentheses	
Source:	Author’s	own	calculation.	
In	 Table	 A.15	 we	 replicate	 Table	 4.8,	 looking	 at	 the	 likelihood	 of	 increasing	 pair’s	
sophistication,	although	controlling	now	for	the	supplier’s	sophistication	 levels	as	we	
did	in	Table	A.14.		
Overall	 we	 again	 find	 consistent	 results,	 although	 there	 are	 some	 changes	 in	 the	
significance	levels	of	the	relationships	between	the	supplier’s	dependence.	This	is	now	
only	 significantly	 and	 negatively	 associated	 to	 increases	 in	 the	 upper	 bound	 and	
median	sophistication	of	the	pair.		
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We	 also	 detect	 some	 changes	 in	 the	 significance	 of	 the	 coefficients	 of	 the	 buyer’s	
dependence,	 which	 is	 insignificant	 for	 the	 probability	 of	 increases	 in	 the	 median	
sophistication	 but	 positively	 and	 significantly	 associated	 to	 increases	 in	 the	 average	
sophistication.		
Table	A.15:	Table	4.8	controlling	for	supplier’s	sophistication	
	 Increase	in	the	
upper	bound	
sophistication	
Increase	in	the	
lower	bound	
sophistication	
Increase	in	the	
median	
sophistication		
Increase	in	the	
average	
sophistication	
nhs4	 -0.023	***	
(0.0009)	
0.0237	***	
(0.0009)	
0.0119	***	
(0.0011)	
0.0052	***	
(0.0013)	
lagged_level	 -0.0644	***	
(0.0027)	
-0.0918	***	
(0.0027)	
-0.157	***	
(0.0062)	
-0.2547	***	
(0.0099)	
sdp	 -0.0343	**	
(0.0127)	
-0.0031			
(0.0123)	
-0.0644	***	
(0.0152)	
-0.0264			
(0.0183)	
msh	 -0.0199			
	(0.0189)	
0.0381	*	
(0.0183)	
-0.0091				
(0.0227)	
0.0307			
(0.0274)	
mdp	 0.1443	***	
(0.0269)	
-0.106	***	
(0.0261)	
-0.0474				
(0.0323)	
0.1087	**	
(0.0389)	
ssh	 -0.0413				
(0.0445)	
-0.0616			
(0.0431)	
-0.0571				
(0.0533)	
-0.0762			
(0.0644)	
tfp	 0.0185	*		
(0.0081)	
-0.0163	*	
(0.0078)	
-0.0014				
(0.0097)	
-0.0005			
(0.0117)	
ntrans	 0.0002				
(0.0006)	
-0.0007			
(0.0006)	
-0.0005				
(0.0007)	
-0.0002			
(0.0009)	
age	 -0.0024				
(0.0032)	
0.0094	**	
(0.0031)	
0.0089	*	
	(0.0039)	
0.0054			
(0.0047)	
N.	obs.	 42724	 42724	 42758	 42758	
R2	 0.11	 0.15	 0.21	 0.15	
Linear	probability	model	with	year	and	buyer-supplier	pair	dummies.		
Dependent	variables	in	columns	1-4	are	dummy	variables	taking	value	one	if	the	pair	experiences	an	
increase	 in	 upper-,	 lower	 bound,	 median	 and	 average	 complexity	 from	 the	 previous	 year,	
respectively.			
All	explanatory	variables	are	lagged,	except	TFP	and	age.	
Lagged_level	 is	 the	 lagged	 level	 of	 the	 sophistication	measure	 of	 the	 supplier,	 rather	 than	pair,	 on	
which	the	outcome	variable	is	based:	col.	1:	lagged	level	of	upper	bound	complexity	of	the	supplier;	
col.	 2:	 lagged	 level	 of	 lower	 bound	 complexity	 of	 the	 supplier;	 col.	 3:	 lagged	 level	 of	 median	
complexity	of	the	supplier;	col.	4:	lagged	level	of	average	complexity	of	the	supplier.	
Signif.	Codes:	0	***;	0.001	**;	0.01	*;	0.05	°	
Standard	errors	in	parentheses.	
Source:	Author’s	own	calculation.	
We	now	 run	 a	 similar	 linear	 probability	model	 to	 the	ones	 above,	 but	we	 study	 the	
probability	 of	 increasing	 the	 four	 measures	 of	 sophistication	 at	 the	 supplier	 level,	
rather	 than	 the	pair.	 The	main	difference	with	 the	models	present	 so	 far	 is	 that	 the	
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outcome	 variables	 have	 always	 been	 at	 the	 pair	 level,	while	 in	 this	 case	we	 look	 at	
suppliers.		
In	table	A.16	we	find	the	number	of	products	exported	by	the	pair	to	have	unchanged	
coefficients	with	respect	 to	previous	specifications.	The	 lagged	 level	of	 the	supplier’s	
sophistication	 is	 also	 consistently	 negatively	 associated,	 as	 has	been	detected	 in	 the	
previous	tables.		
We	find	that	the	dependence	of	the	supplier	is	negatively	correlated,	as	was	often	the	
case	 in	 similar	 specifications,	 with	 the	 likelihood	 of	 increases	 of	 the	 lower	 bound,	
median	and	average	sophistication	of	the	supplier,	although	not	with	the	upper	bound	
sophistication.	This	suggests	that	the	dependence	of	the	supplier	vis-à-vis	its	buyer	has	
an	impact	on	the	upper	bound	sophistication	of	the	pair,	but	not	the	supplier.		
The	 buyer’s	market	 share	 is	 positively	 associated	with	 increases	 in	 the	 lower	 bound	
and	median	sophistication,	which	suggests	that	pairs	with	a	large	buyer	are	more	likely	
to	see	the	supplier	drop	low-productivity	products,	although	the	same	cannot	be	said	
of	 the	 probability	 of	 introducing	 products	 that	 are	 more	 sophisticated	 than	 those	
already	exported	by	the	supplier.		
Interestingly,	 the	buyer’s	dependence	 is	no	 longer	significant,	which	hints	at	 the	fact	
that	dependence	of	the	buyer	does	not	affect	the	sophistication	at	the	supplier	level,	
but	only	the	sophistication	within	the	pair.		
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Table	A.16:	Linear	probit	on	power	components	and	increases	in	supplier’s	
sophistication	
	 Increase	in	the	
upper	bound	
sophistication	
Increase	in	the	
lower	bound	
sophistication	
Increase	in	the	
median	
sophistication		
Increase	in	the	
average	
sophistication	
nhs4	 -0.0039	***	(0.001)	
0.0033	**	
(0.0011)	
0.0029	**	
(0.001)	
0.0045	**	
(0.0014)	
lagged_level	 -0.2159	***	(0.0031)	
-0.1481	***	
(0.0041)	
-0.1695	***	
(0.0057)	
-0.4997	***	
(0.0107)	
sdp	 0.0112			(0.0146)	
-0.1533	***	
(0.0145)	
-0.0289	*	
(0.0145)	
-0.1075	***	
(0.0197)	
msh	 -0.0069			(0.0217)	
0.0544	*	(0.0217)	 0.0431	*	
(0.0217)	
0.0317			
(0.0295)	
mdp	 -0.0171			(0.0308)	
0.0418			(0.0308)	 -0.0375			
(0.0309)	
0.0009			
(0.042)	
ssh	 0.0645			(0.0509)	
0.0789			(0.0509)	 -0.1527	**	
(0.0511)	
0.1111			
(0.0694)	
tfp	 0.0137			(0.0092)	
0.0087			(0.0092)	 0.0073			
(0.0093)	
0.0188			
(0.0126)	
ntrans	 0.001			(0.0007)	 0.0009			(0.0007)	 -0.0004			(0.0007)	
0.0003			
(0.0009)	
age	 -0.0041			(0.0037)	
-0.0051			(0.0037)	 -0.0006			
(0.0037)	
-0.0009			
(0.005)	
	
N.	obs.	 42758	 42739	 42758	 42758	
R2	 0.21	 0.14	 0.21	 0.18	
Linear	probability	model	with	year	and	buyer-supplier	pair	dummies.	
Dependent	variables	 in	 columns	1-4	are	dummy	variables	 taking	value	one	 if	 the	 supplier,	 rather	
than	 the	 pair,	 experiences	 an	 increase	 in	 upper-,	 lower	 bound,	 median	 and	 average	 complexity	
from	the	previous	year,	respectively.			
All	explanatory	variables	are	lagged,	except	TFP	and	age.	
Lagged_level	 is	 the	 lagged	 level	 of	 the	 sophistication	measure	 on	which	 the	 outcome	 variable	 is	
based:	 col.	 1:	 lagged	 level	 of	 upper	 bound	 complexity;	 col.	 2:	 lagged	 level	 of	 lower	 bound	
complexity;	col.	3:	lagged	level	of	median	complexity;	col.	4:	lagged	level	of	average	complexity.	
Signif.	Codes:	0	***;	0.001	**;	0.01	*;	0.05	°	
Standard	errors	in	parentheses.	
Source:	Author’s	own	calculation.	
For	completeness	we	also	report	hereunder	the	results	for	the	Ecuador	and	Venezuela	
subsample,	which	are	globally	consistent	with	the	results	from	our	main	model.	
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Table	A.17:	Power	components	and	sophistication,	Ecuador	and	Venezuela	
subsample	
	 Upper	bound	 Lower	bound	 Median	 Average	
nhs4	 0.011	***	(0.0021)	
-0.0125	***	
(0.0021)	
0.0003			
(0.0015)	
-0.0005			
(0.0012)	
sdp	 -0.0592	°	(0.0308)	
-0.0503			
(0.0317)	
-0.0509	*	
(0.0219)	
-0.0444	*	
(0.0179)	
msh	 0.1269	**	(0.0462)	
0.1771	***	
(0.0476)	
0.1316	***	
(0.0329)	
0.093	***	
(0.0269)	
mdp	 -0.0091			(0.0666)	
-0.0951			
(0.0686)	
-0.0648			
(0.0474)	
-0.0538			
(0.0388)	
ssh	 -0.0069			(0.0935)	
-0.1014			
(0.0962)	
-0.2239	***	
(0.0665)	
-0.2125	***	
(0.0544)	
tfp	 0.0887	***	(0.0247)	
-0.0156			
(0.0254)	
-0.0391	*	
(0.0176)	
-0.0394	**	
(0.0144)	
ntrans	 0.0024			(0.0017)	
-0.003	°	
(0.0018)	
-0.0012			
(0.0012)	
-0.001			
(0.001)	
age	 0.0042			(0.0076)	
0.0036			
(0.0079)	
-0.0022			
(0.0054)	
0.0007			
(0.0044)	
N.	obs.	 26099	 26099	 26108	 26108	
R2	 0.89	 0.89	 0.94	 0.96	
OLS	regression	results	with	time	and	buyer-supplier	pair	dummies.	Estimates	based	
on	pairs	with	non-US	based	buyers	only.		
Dependent	 variables	 are	 upper-,	 lower	 bound,	median	 and	 average	 complexity	 of	
the	pair,	based	on	data	from	http://www.datlascolombia.com	
All	explanatory	variables	are	lagged,	except	TFP	and	age.	
Signif.	Codes:	0	***;	0.001	**;	0.01	*;	0.05	°	
Standard	errors	in	parentheses	
Source:	Author’s	own	calculation.		 	
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Table	A.18:	Linear	probit	on	the	power	components	and	the	introduction	of	new	
products	in	the	pair,	Ecuador	and	Venezuela	subsample	
	
New	to	the	
pair	
New	to	the	
supplier	
New	to	the	
supplier	
nhs4	
-0.0101	***	
(0.0014)	
-0.0061	***	
(0.0012)	
0.0008			
(0.0008)	
pci	
-0.0884	***	
(0.0054)	
-0.0487	***	
(0.0048)	
0.0115	***	
(0.0031)	
sdp	
0.0144			
(0.0195)	
0.1203	***	
(0.0174)	
0.1105	***	
(0.0112)	
msh	
-0.0348			
(0.0292)	
-0.0421				
(0.0261)	
-0.0183			
(0.0169)	
mdp	
0.0265			
(0.0422)	
-0.0241				
(0.0377)	
-0.0422		
(0.0244)	
ssh	
-0.0341			
(0.0591)	
0.0696				
(0.0527)	
0.0928	**	
(0.0341)	
tfp	
0.0582	***	
(0.0157)	
0.0485	***	
(0.014)	
0.0088			
(0.009)	
ntrans	
-0.0007			
(0.0011)	
-0.0008				
(0.001)	
-0.0003			
(0.0006)	
age	
-0.0119	*	
(0.0048)	
-0.0091	*	
(0.0043)	
-0.001			
(0.0028)	
nhs4_d	
			
			
0.6808	***	
(0.0046)	
N.	obs.	 26099	 26099	 26099	
R2	 0.35	 0.35	 0.73	
Linear	 probability	 model	 with	 year	 and	 buyer-supplier	 pair	
dummies.	Estimates	based	on	pairs	with	non-US	based	buyers	only.			
Dependent	variable	 in	 col.	 1	 is	 a	dummy	 taking	value	1	 if	 the	pair	
introduces	a	new	product,	col.	2	and	3	use	a	dummy	taking	value	1	
if	 the	 pair	 introduces	 a	 new	 product	 that	 the	 supplier	 wasn’t	
exporting	in	the	year	before.			
All	explanatory	variables	are	lagged,	except	TFP	and	age.	
pci	is	the	lagged	level	of	upper	bound	complexity;	nhs_d	is	a	dummy	
taking	value	one	 if	 the	pair	has	 introduced	a	new	product,	 i.e.	 the	
outcome	variable	in	column	1.	
Signif.	Codes:	0	***;	0.001	**;	0.01	*;	0.05	°	
Standard	errors	in	parentheses	
Source:	Author’s	own	calculation.		 	
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Table	A.	19:	Linear	probit	on	the	power	components	and	the	likelihood	of	increases	
in	the	sophistication	of	the	pair,	Ecuador	and	Venezuela	subsample	
	 Increase	in	the	
upper	bound	
sophistication	
Increase	in	the	
lower	bound	
sophistication	
Increase	in	the	
median	
sophistication		
Increase	in	the	
average	
sophistication	
nhs4	 -0.0048	***	
(0.0011)	
0.0071	***	
(0.0011)	
0.0091	***	
(0.0012)	
0.0027		(0.0015)	
lagged_level	 -0.2311	***	
(0.0041)	
-0.2396	***	
(0.004)	
-0.3833	***	
(0.0071)	
-0.4273	***	
(0.0106)	
sdp	 -0.0237			(0.015)	 -0.016			(0.0149)	 -0.0589	**	
(0.0188)	
-0.0322			
(0.0227)	
msh	 -0.0235			
(0.0225)	
0.0469	*	
(0.0224)	
-0.0016			
(0.0282)	
0.0593		(0.0341)	
mdp	 0.0609		(0.0325)	 -0.1335	***	
(0.0323)	
-0.1642	***	
(0.0407)	
-0.0142			
(0.0494)	
ssh	 -0.014			(0.0454)	 0.0128			
(0.0453)	
-0.027			(0.057)	 -0.0161			(0.069)	
tfp	 0.0364	**	
(0.012)	
-0.0358	**	
(0.012)	
-0.018			(0.0151)	 -0.0311		
(0.0182)	
ntrans	 0.0005			
(0.0008)	
-0.0012			
(0.0008)	
-0.0001			
(0.0011)	
0.0004			
(0.0013)	
age	 -0.0025			
(0.0037)	
0.0062		(0.0037)	 0.0047			
(0.0047)	
-0.003			(0.0056)	
N.	obs.	 26091	 26091	 26108	 26108	
R2	 0.24	 0.28	 0.3	 0.18	
Linear	probability	model	with	year	and	buyer-supplier	pair	dummies.	Estimates	based	on	pairs	with	
non-US	based	buyers	only.			
Dependent	variables	 in	columns	1-4	are	dummy	variables	taking	value	one	if	the	pair	experiences	
an	 increase	 in	 upper-,	 lower	 bound,	 median	 and	 average	 complexity	 from	 the	 previous	 year,	
respectively.			
All	explanatory	variables	are	lagged,	except	TFP	and	age.	
Lagged_level	 is	 the	 lagged	 level	 of	 the	 sophistication	measure	 on	which	 the	 outcome	 variable	 is	
based:	 col.	 1:	 lagged	 level	 of	 upper	 bound	 complexity;	 col.	 2:	 lagged	 level	 of	 lower	 bound	
complexity;	col.	3:	lagged	level	of	median	complexity;	col.	4:	lagged	level	of	average	complexity.	
Signif.	Codes:	0	***;	0.001	**;	0.01	*;	0.05	°	
Standard	errors	in	parentheses.	
Source:	Author’s	own	calculation.	
	
